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**U.S. RESPONSE TO RELIEF EFFORTS IN SUDAN,
ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA, AND MOZAMBIQUE**

**JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION**

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 10, 1988

Serial No. 100-22

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U.S. RESPONSE TO RELIEF EFFORTS IN SUDAN, ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA, AND MOZAMBIQUE

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1988

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER, AND
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee and subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:43 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe [chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa] presiding.

Members present from the Subcommittee on Africa: Representatives Clarke, Burton, and Dornan of California.

Members present from the Select Committee on Hunger: Representatives Hall, Dorgan of North Dakota, Penny, Ackerman, and Gilman.

Also present: Representative Roth.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD WOLPE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. WOLPE. The Subcommittee on Africa and the Select Committee on Hunger have called this joint hearing today to assess the current emergency situation in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan, and to examine the American response to the urgent relief needs. Unfortunately, Mickey Leland, chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger, is unable to join us today, but we are pleased to have the participation of other select committee members.

We are holding this urgent hearing today because of our continuing concern over the severe food emergencies in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan. All of the latest information from the field reinforces that the overall situation is acute indeed. Reports indicate that more than 17 million people are currently classified as at risk in these four countries alone. The situation does not look good. The incidence of starvation is already high in many areas.

In Sudan, we have reports that food is simply not reaching people in the south, as a result of both government and rebel activity. In Ethiopia, we have food distribution problems complicated by attacks on relief transportation and, recently, on the feeding centers themselves. In Mozambique, destabilization activity by antigovernment forces has destroyed much of the social and economic infrastructure and created serious problems for the relief efforts. In Angola, civil strife has resulted in massive uprooting of the na-

tion's rural population and hampered effective relief efforts in the southeast.

The issue for discussion today is not whether the United States has made a generous effort in the relief response. Clearly, it has, and we commend the administration for its work. Generally, the issues we do want to focus on today are, first, given the constraints and obstacles to effective delivery of food in these four countries, is there anything else that the United States can do to improve upon the response to the situation in a timely manner?

Second, in decisions regarding food and nonfood pledges, are we using the same criteria for providing humanitarian assistance in all countries? That is, are we continuing the principle that "a hungry child knows no politics?" And, third, are we using our political and diplomatic leverage on behalf of humanitarian priorities, given the imminent threat of mass starvation in many areas?

The first of our witnesses today will be Congressman Toby Roth, who has long had an interest in monitoring the situation in Ethiopia.

Charles la Muniere is director for emergencies in Africa at the United Nations. Mr. la Muniere has just returned from an extensive tour of Mozambique, and was also in Angola looking at the emergency situation. Mr. Brunek Szynalski is acting chief for disaster relief for the United Nations World Food Program, one of the major actors in the response to the food emergencies across Africa. Mr. Szynalski has just arrived from WFP headquarters in Rome.

We appreciate very much the efforts that these gentlemen have made to be here today. Let me say that neither of the officials who will participate following Congressman Roth's presentation are presenting official United Nations testimony to the Congress, but have agreed to share information they have regarding the emergencies.

Because of the difficulties of international organizations' officials appearing before Congress or other parliamentary bodies, we have assured these gentlemen that our interest is simply in obtaining information on the current information that is faced in the threatened countries. We will not be requesting them to make any policy assessments.

Mr. la Muniere, I should indicate, will be providing us with a brief overview of the situation we face in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, and perhaps indicate some obstacles to providing effective relief assistance. Mr. Szynalski will provide information on the Sudan crisis.

We will also be hearing from Willis Logan, who serves as the director of the Africa Program of Church World Services, which is the relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches. Mr. Logan is based in New York.

Then our last panel of witnesses today will include Mr. Charles Gladson, who is the new Africa Bureau Administrator for A.I.D. Mr. Gladson will provide information on the American Government's humanitarian assistance that is being provided to the countries in question, and give an overall assessment of the situation that is currently faced. Mr. Roy Stacy, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, will address some of the policy questions regarding the nature and level of our assistance to the Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.

That concludes my opening statement. I believe my distinguished ranking members will be arriving shortly, and I believe they will have opening statements, but let me turn first to my distinguished colleague, Congressman Tony Hall, who has been very actively involved for a number of years in attempting to meet the emergency needs in Ethiopia.

Mr. Hall.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO**

Mr. HALL. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to express my appreciation to the Africa Subcommittee and especially to you, Mr. Chairman, who have been very diligent in your efforts to do something about this terrible and continuing crisis in Africa.

In my years with the Select Committee on Hunger, I have become increasingly concerned with the situation in Africa. A few months ago I visited Ethiopia and Mozambique and saw firsthand the critical conditions that the people of these countries are facing. I was encouraged by the U.S. Government's effort in both Ethiopia and Mozambique to supply and deliver assistance under almost impossible conditions, and I want to commend the administration for its work in these countries and in the Sudan.

Unfortunately, in the few short months since I visited Africa, the conditions in these countries have deteriorated, especially in Ethiopia. This was my second trip to Ethiopia in 3½ years. On the first trip, I saw what many of you have seen, tremendous famine, tremendous death. I can remember one morning seeing, in one of the camps, 25 children die of not only starvation but of tremendous infection among them.

I did not see that kind of situation on my most recent visit. What I saw and what I was struck with this time was the tremendous number of orphans and large number of older people that were not dying at any alarming rates but nevertheless were hungry, without medical attention. At the same time, in certain areas of Ethiopia I saw tremendous development assistance going on. When I say "tremendous," I mean that in the area that I was in, I saw Food-for-Work Programs which were resulting in the construction of bridges and the digging of small wells. I saw irrigation. I saw very unique programs for fisheries education. I was not only surprised but elated at some of the development assistance that was occurring in Ethiopia.

I look forward today to hearing how the administration and the United Nations perceive the situation in these countries and what efforts will be undertaken to overcome these new obstacles.

Mr. Chairman, I have some other things to say in my remarks, and I would ask that they be made part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 64.]

Mr. WOLFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall.

If he has had an opportunity to catch his breath, I would like to call upon my distinguished ranking member, Mr. Burton of Indiana, to make his opening statement.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN BURTON, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA**

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I make my opening statement, Congressman Emerson of the Select Committee on Hunger is not yet with us, and I have a statement he would like to have entered into the record.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 65.]

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been pointed out that 17 million people have been affected by famine and unrest in these four countries. Three of them—Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique—provide a horrible and vivid lesson on the destructive force of one ideology—communism. What other system has caused such untold suffering across cultures, continents, and time zones? What a colossal indictment of that system.

I think that many people in the West have some vague idea that what Communist countries lack in political freedom, they somehow make up for in the economic area. What these countries prove is that communism fails to provide any human need: not freedom, not peace, not prosperity, not even a crumb to eat or a roof over one's head—nothing.

And what an heroic effort A.I.D. has made to help the victims in these countries, often despite their governments. What an incredible thing that when we reach out to help these people of Ethiopia, that government charges us for the privilege of helping their people—and they charge us dearly for that help.

Before we hear from our witnesses, I would like to just point out a ray of hope. It is an African solution to the war in one of these countries, Angola. An editorial in the Los Angeles Times, titled "Good Signs in Angola," January 3, 1988, notes that Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia have put together a peace proposal for Angola. It calls for direct negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA, and would require the removal of all foreign troops, including the 40,000 Cubans who are so far away from their home.

The editorial supports the plan, noting that, "The war has been devastating, particularly in the terrible toll that it has exacted from the impoverished civilian population, but the war also has been used to postpone independence for neighboring Namibia. Peace would clear the way to implement Namibian independence. Dr. Jonas Savimbe, the leader of UNITA, has already agreed to participate in the talks and is waiting for a response from the MPLA."

I hope the United States and the United Nations will encourage this African initiative, and that maybe at least one of these countries will know peace and freedom, justice and prosperity. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.

Are there any other Members that would care to make an opening remark? Mr. Ackerman and then Mr. Gilman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me first thank you and express my appreciation for your long-term and abiding interest in Africa and humanitarian causes, and people who are hungry and children who need to be fed. You have the admiration of all of us in the Congress.

I have been to Ethiopia, as have some of my colleagues. I have been there twice. It was quite an eye-opening situation. I saw, as everybody else did, the film clips across the news from time to time at night, and found them very horrifying. Yet they are really nothing like the situation that you are confronted with when you see it in person, when you see young children actually dying in front of your eyes and feel so helpless in not being able to do anything about it. It is no longer just film and celluloid but you can reach out and touch them, if you could do something; you can smell the stench of death on wholesale levels. We were in one particular camp and walked around through that camp, and I was absolutely puzzled about what to do and what kind of approaches could really be taken when you have the possibility of 1 million people actually dying.

I stood outside of this tent which they told me was a hospital tent, and I looked down and on the floor, right in front of me was a makeshift stretcher. On this stretcher was the body of a little girl, just about the same age as my daughter, and she was partially covered with a very torn and tattered piece of sheet. I was absolutely mesmerized. I couldn't move, I couldn't turn away, I couldn't cry, I couldn't turn around. I just stood there for several minutes, Mr. Chairman, just frozen, and suddenly she moved. Her hand moved, and I recognized the fact that she was still alive.

I turned quickly to the door of this tent, and there was a guard, or whatever you want, or an orderly, standing in front of it. When I say "tent," there must have been 700 people inside of it. I said to him, "Quickly, this child is still alive. Take her inside, inside the hospital tent." He just looked at me, hardly moving, shook his head back and forth and said, "She has already been in the hospital tent. There is nothing more we can do for her. We are just waiting for her to stop moving so that we can bury her."

I will never forget that kind of experience, Mr. Chairman. It has made an indelible impression upon me for the rest of my life. That child wasn't clinging to a volume of Karl Marx or anything else. She was just a child who was just about to die of starvation and neglect and policies certainly coming from a communist regime, in good measure, over which she had no control and no participation.

That experience, Mr. Chairman, left me with very mixed emotions. I was very proud as an American that our country has done so much for Ethiopia and other places in Africa, more so than all of the Communist regimes put together—and those people don't subscribe to our philosophy, at least their governments don't—so proud of everything we were doing, and yet so embarrassed in thinking about the tremendous resources that we do have, not really utilizing them to the full extent that we can. I was embar-

rassed and proud both at the same time. It was a very, very strange feeling.

I am going back to Ethiopia, Mr. Chairman. I am leaving the first week in April. Several of our colleagues have expressed an interest. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, to get an update on the situation there, and hopefully a whole lot of good will come of it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Ackerman, let me just say that first of all I want to thank you for that statement. I have never had the opportunity to comment on this publicly before, but one of the more memorable experiences for me was viewing this extraordinary 20/20 show that was done, when a special hour was devoted—about 2 years ago, I think it was, now—to what you did in New York in bringing to the attention of New York school children what was happening in Ethiopia.

The television coverage of that entire experience, in which you had some of the poorest children of New York, who themselves were living on welfare, in enormously difficult economic circumstances, were so moved by what you helped to convey to them about what was happening in Ethiopia that they organized an extraordinary kind of effort that led to the creation of an entire planeload of grain that was brought directly into an Ethiopian village. Then the cameras went to the village and you saw the actual relief delivery and the impact it was having upon children there, and some of the sights also—a family which was suffocating their own child because it was perishing and they didn't want the child to suffer any longer.

Some of those images were just extraordinary, but I think the thing that I shall always remember and be enormously grateful to you for is helping us begin to understand the childhood impulse in this country to reach out and to respond in a way that was able to cut across borders and ideologies and every other kind of division within American society. I thought it was an extraordinary achievement. My hope, of course, is that it can be sustained and galvanized in the new emergency that is revisiting the African Continent now.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me just say thank you for those overly generous comments, and let me say that we here have a fantastic job, those of us who are elected to this great body, and a great responsibility that goes along with it because of the tremendous opportunity that we have to do a lot of good in this world.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gilman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you and the gentleman from Texas for holding this important hearing at this appropriate time. I think we all recognize that the specter of famine and drought continues to loom in Ethiopia, in the Sudan, and an intense and growing manmade

crisis is also taking place in Mozambique and Angola. Deaths from hunger-related diseases, from starvation and dismemberment, are commonplace, affecting hundreds of thousands of children. The gentleman from New York's remarks were certainly poignant, and remind us all of the importance of trying to find some solution to these problems.

The displacement of massive numbers of civilians throughout the southern portion of the African Continent is proportionately greater than that of the past Ethiopian famine, and billions of dollars in damages to the infrastructure of Angola and Mozambique have occurred. A major cause of the crisis in Mozambique is not drought, although some areas continue to lack adequate rainfall.

According to the U.S. Embassy in Maputo and the United States and private agencies working in Mozambique, the primary cause of the food crisis has been the terrorist activities. Attacks on farmers in rural communities have forced many to abandon food production and leave their land altogether. By cutting the main transportation arteries inside Mozambique, particularly the rail lines, the terrorists have made the distribution of food within the country difficult or virtually impossible in many regions. An estimated 1.2 million people are inaccessible due to guerilla activity, and many of the others can only be reached by armed convoy, by sea or by air. The terrorists bear overwhelming responsibility for the human crisis within Mozambique.

The problem in Angola is even more complicated. I believe that development and humanitarian assistance could be a very effective way of developing a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship with Angola and in influencing the Angolan Government to be more sensitive to the needs of the small farmers in the rural areas in that part of the world. As was pointed out during a previous select committee hearing, the private voluntary organizations and U.N. personnel report that UNITA forces purposely have planted some mines in places where only civilians would tread. Of course, that kind of information, those kind of reports, are shocking.

Accordingly, I look forward to hearing from our expertise witnesses and our good colleague, Mr. Roth, in order that our committee can learn more about these issues so that we can know how to properly respond to this crisis.

Mr. Chairman, if you would forgive me, I have another hearing going on at the same time but I will return as quickly as I can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.

We turn now to our first witness, Congressman Roth. Let me say, Toby, that before you offer your remarks this afternoon, that there is probably no one that has been more involved in trying to keep American attention focused upon the situation in Ethiopia, both with respect to the food crisis but also with respect to the continuing human rights violations that have created so many problems and so much human agony within that country. Though we have sometimes had differences upon the most effective or appropriate response to try to address some of those concerns, I certainly do thank you for your efforts in helping to try to keep that issue before all of us.

Mr. Roth.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TOBY ROTH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN**

Mr. ROTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I feel that what has been said here today about your work is certainly right on target and while, as you had mentioned, we don't always agree, I do have the greatest respect for you, and also for the Subcommittee on Africa and the Select Committee on Hunger.

When you see all the different things that our colleagues could be doing today, I must say that I am most impressed that Congressman Clarke, Congressman Ackerman, Congressman Penny, Congressman Hall, Congressman Burton, Congressman Gilman, and Congressman Dornan of California and you, Chairman Wolpe, are here today. I think that is very commendable.

A stone's throw from here a young President by the name of John Kennedy said, "Here on Earth, God's work must truly be our own," and I think that these two committees are doing God's work. I was really moved quite by Congressman Ackerman relating his personal experiences to us. I think we all feel that way, and I think that is why we are here this afternoon.

I know of your time constraints and I am going to try to abide by them, Mr. Chairman. This committee is meeting to examine the U.S. response to the famine situation in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan. I would like to, in the time allotted me, stress just three points. The first is, we all have a map in front of us. It is a map published by the director for Emergencies in Africa, who is also testifying today. It is a status report on the emergency situation in Africa as of just a few months ago.

We see these countries of Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and various parts of sub-Sahara, and I think the question must be asked my friends and colleagues as we look at this map of Africa, is it a coincidence that famine has struck in these countries, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola? Is there some reason that Mother Nature has singled out these three countries by chance? I don't think so.

All of these countries share one common trait: Their disastrous agricultural yields can be directly attributed to the failures of collectivized farming and a patent disregard for human life. Therefore, I think that Congressman Gilman in his opening remarks hit the nail right on the head, if I may say so, in what is one of the real basic problems we have in this part of the world. So indeed it is particularly appropriate that this committee has highlighted the fact that famine continues to return to these three African countries. That is my first point.

Second, I would like to address the resolution introduced by Mr. Hall and Mr. Leland which this committee is considering, which focuses specifically on Ethiopia. In this resolution, the authors commend the President, the Secretary of State, and the A.I.D. for their efforts in the famine relief. That is commendable. We have all repeatedly recognized this administration, this Government, especially Peter McPherson and his colleagues at A.I.D., for the tremendous job they have done and are continuing to do under Alan Woods, despite very difficult circumstances.

Yes, we have all been sensitized to what is going, the hunger and the tremendous hardship of famine in Africa in the last few years. That leads me to my third point, something that Mr. Ackerman touched on, I think, in his opening remarks, in saying: What more can we do? What can we do? How can we get to the root causes? How can we treat more than just the symptoms? How can we treat the causes? That brings me to my third point.

There is nothing in this resolution which condemns the Mengistu regime for its part in the famine. The first priority of a government is to feed its people, not to use food as a weapon against the opposition, and yet we know by many accounts, including that of our own Charge in Ethiopia, Ambassador David Corn, that food was used as a weapon in the last famine. Ethiopia's foreign minister, Tibibu, told Ambassador Corn point blank that back in 1984 that food, and I quote, "is a major element in our strategy against secessionists." The foreign minister admitted that the Ethiopian army tries to cut the rebels off from food supplies, and he threatened that the Ethiopian Government would destroy any food found being brought into Ethiopia from the Sudan.

It is really quite an interesting work, and those of you who haven't had a chance to read it, I commend this book to you. There is also another one that will not allow you to sleep at night and I think, Mr. Ackerman, you would be interested in this book. It is "Breakfast in Hell," by a British doctor who was all over Ethiopia. It is really quite moving. No matter how hard your nature, you are going to be moved to tears by reading the examples in this book.

We also know from many high-placed, high-ranking defectors that famine relief is not a priority. Dauwit, for example, who ran Ethiopia's relief operation and has since come to freedom, says that Mengistu's policies, and I quote, "have caused hundreds of thousands to die and brought unprecedented suffering to the entire population. The government," he says, "spends its time, energy, and money on two things: ideology and fighting nine separate rebel movements."

We know from our own people in our Government and from the famine relief organizations of the atrocities and obstructionist practices of the Ethiopian Government. Every respected human rights organization in the world attests to this fact. For example, the Economist's world human rights guide ranks the Ethiopian regime as the worst human rights violator in the world.

Let me quote from a report in Saturday's Washington Post. It said this:

'If people die in Ethiopia in 1988, it won't be because of drought,' said one relief official who declined to be named for fear of government reprisal. 'If people die, it is going to be because of political and military situations.'

In a report issued just this week on the situation in Ethiopia, A.I.D. officials report that several thousand people were assembled at Korem on February 7. The next day, 2,000 people were loaded into a truck at gunpoint. There were 20 people killed and many more were wounded when they passively resisted. Two thousand people—and this is happening while trucks are desperately needed at the ports.

The man we praise in your resolution, our Secretary of State, George Schultz, is also very clear in his condemnation of the Ethiopian regime. Just last month right here in this room, Mr. Schultz spoke before our Foreign Affairs Committee on Ethiopia, and he said—I asked him about the situation—he said, and I quote:

The situation is worse than deplorable, in that you have these great problems of hunger and you try a humanitarian basis to deal with them. The government interjects itself in a very unhelpful way.

—When I asked him whether or not we could ever resolve the problems of Ethiopia relating to hunger if the government does not change its ways, he was very clear. The answer was an emphatic “No.”

Many of you also heard the testimony of our former colleague, Ambassador Millicent Fenwick, who served as our Ambassador to the U.N. Agencies for Food and Population. She said before the Foreign Affairs Committee last fall:

When we know of an injustice and we say nothing, it is as though we condoned it. When we contribute to a system of injustice, we become accomplices.

We know that Ethiopia's brutal regime has used Western famine relief to extract financial gains. It has charged exorbitant port fees for our food donations. It has accepted trucks from the West only on the condition that they be Mercedes trucks; that title be handed over to the government after 2 years; and that we pay \$50,000 in taxes for every truck donated.

The Ethiopian Government today continues to practice such abuses. They are keeping the roads open only a few hours. Food is again rotting at the docks because the government has other priorities. Forced resettlement has resumed, a practice that is not only immoral at any time but one which is now taking away desperately needed trucks from the relief effort.

Even those farmers who are allowed to stay in their homelands are being subjected to a campaign of forced collectivization. All control over their lives and properties is taken away from them. As you would expect, their productivity is lower and has been going down every year. And, because the state confiscates most of the surplus anyway, there is nothing to fall back on, and the list goes on and on.

Yet not one word of this is mentioned in the resolution. I like the resolution, but I think that we have to look at all the facts. That is the tragedy, in my opinion, in the resolution. It is—and forgive me for having to say this—it is rather an embarrassment. It is almost like a letter to Santa Claus. A more gifted debater than I could make a case that this resolution amounts to what could almost be called disinformation.

In addition to this very serious and obvious omission in the resolution, I would like also to point out that the resolution has a curious provision in item 4. If you will check the resolution, item 4 says that the U.S. Government should, and I quote, “prevent the dislocation of large numbers of persons across national borders or into relief camps.”

Translated, what does that mean? It seems to me altogether inappropriate for it to be a policy of the U.S. Government, our Government, to prevent people from voting with their feet and escap-

ing from a brutal dictatorship. We have met with some of these people who have traveled for weeks across deserts, many of them close to death. Are we saying here that it should be the policy of our Government to stand on these borders, for example in Ethiopia, and not allow these people to come into the relief camps in the Sudan? This is a very curious provision indeed.

In closing, I would like to urge my colleagues to consider the legislation which Congressman Bill Gray and I have introduced earlier this year, which is much more than a thank you note to the U.S. Government. It is supported by the chairman of the Human Rights Caucus, members of the Hunger Committee, the Black Caucus, all sides of the political spectrum. We now have 86 cosponsors to that legislation. It is a bill which directly responds to the continued abuses of the Ethiopian Government. It is a bill that says we care about the 40 million people who are victims in Ethiopia.

You see, as I see it, we should be on the side of the victims in Ethiopia, not on the side of the oppressors. The London Times put it very well in an editorial just a few weeks ago. The London Times said this:

It is not God's will that the Ethiopian people must suffer so, a classic story of crop failure on a massive scale. It is the fault of men who rule Ethiopia, a gang of blood-stained, ideologically obsessed zealots who should be accused before the court of world opinion of a charge of criminal negligence bordering on genocide.

My personal opinion is that this resolution is not nearly strong enough; that this resolution is really an affront to a great people, a proud people, a gifted race, a great culture, a culture older than any European culture. Those who have died and are dying by the thousand deserve better from the greatest democracy in the world. That is as I see it, speaking from the heart, and I want the members of this committee to know I appreciate your allowing me to appear here today.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Roth, for your testimony. It provides a very useful backdrop, I think, for what will be following, and our subsequent witnesses as well.

Are there questions from members of the committee? Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I would just like to make one brief comment, and the witness is welcome to elaborate on my comments if he sees fit.

A number of us are believed to be myopic in our views when we talk about how Communist governments have caused a majority of these problems. It is no mystery to me that the three countries that we are talking about, plus the Sudan, have been affected by Communist governments that believe in collectivized farming. There is no incentive for people to produce, and what they do produce on these collectivized farms is taken away from them and used by the government.

Because of that, we see countries that, although they have had economic problems in the past, are suffering dramatically now. We attribute that suffering primarily to famine, to natural causes, when in fact, as the gentleman who just testified has stated so eloquently, it is the fault of the government leaders, the tyrants who are ruling those countries, and not just in Ethiopia but in Angola and Mozambique as well.

Now I have heard remarks here today directed at the UNITA forces and the Renamo forces in Mozambique and Angola, and we have heard them blamed for many of the atrocities and much of the problems in those countries. There is no question in my mind that there probably have been some atrocities perpetrated by those organizations in the field of battle. I think that unfortunately that happens in any war, but the majority of the problems in Angola, in Mozambique and in Ethiopia, and in large part in the Sudan caused by Ethiopia, these problems are caused by tyrants who control those countries at the behest of the Communist parties in those countries. They are Communist governments, supported largely the Soviet Union, and we need to make that point very, very clear.

If we could put pressure on those governments ultimately to change their policies, to become more democratic, to start creating a climate where people could produce their own farm products on the little parcels of land they used to own, then those countries would start to do better. In the short run, it is almost like the Gordian knot. It appears as though, unfortunately, millions of people are probably going to die, and I don't think that even though we try valiantly to get food to those people, we are going to change that too dramatically, although we should continue to try through A.I.D. and other means.

But we should never take our eye off the ball, and the ball is that the root cause of the problem is not drought, is not just the famine; it is the Communist tyrants who rule those countries.

If you have any comment, I would like to hear from you, Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. Well, Mr. Burton, you are a person who understands the philosophy, and so on, of these issues very well. You approach it from an intellectual viewpoint. I would have no disagreement or debate with what you say.

Personally I come more from a position, maybe as Mr. Ackerman said about the young girl dying. To me it is more of a feeling of the heart rather than struggle of the mind, and I don't want to see any person starving. That is my whole interest in this. There are people starving that do not need to starve, and I see the government as being a big part of the problem. If this Communist government would be feeding its people, I am not opposed to this government because it is a Marxist or a Communist government. I am opposed to this government because it is committing genocide on its own people. That is where I am coming from.

Someone had mentioned, in one of the opening remarks, that people are not dying at alarming rates. Any time a person, a single person, dies of starvation, it is alarming, and that is my whole point. Thank you for allowing me to say that.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.

Do any other members have any questions? Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN of California. The term "genocide" is a post-World War II term. I don't even know if it was coined before that, but it came to mean one people murdering another people, scapegoating a whole people and systematically slaughtering them. We still have resolutions come up to this floor of Armenian people, asking us to please put through resolutions telling one of our NATO allies, the

Government of Turkey, to admit that genocide took place by government policy under the dying Ottoman Empire to kill 1½ million Armenians.

Hitler obviously had a well-documented policy of trying to slaughter the Jews of Europe, so enormous a horror that even the victims couldn't believe it until they stepped off the trains at the death camps, because the thought was so inherently, impossibly offensive. And in killing 6 million of Europe's Jews, he also managed to kill 6 million other people in his death camps.

But you said a nation committing genocide on its own people. I first learned this expression, "autogenocide," in regard to Cambodia. Here was a government called "uncle"—ANCAR. It killed about 2 million of its own people, more than a quarter of the population, to purify their own Khmer people into an agrarian people.

When a government—without guilt-tripping any Americans who ascribe to atheism or an agnostic philosophy of not knowing—when a state government does not believe in a life hereafter, a supreme being and an immortal soul, people become pawns to them. They are just figures on economic charts.

I am sure that the Vietnamese, as they put economic policies into effect in a nation of over 16 million people, that they looked back on the war—since those were just worker ants they sent south—and said, "So we lost a million and a half people, two million people? If they were still around, we would have to feed them, so we just press on from here."

Now could you elaborate on that before you close your testimony, because I have never heard more eloquent testimony in the House, frankly, than from my colleague, Mr. Roth. Could you elaborate on why a people would genocide its own people to accomplish another end? Do you think I am overly philosophizing that if people are just here for a short, brief span in a country that is getting poorer and poorer, to perfect your own political system or to entrench your own power, is it too cynical to think that they look at people as ciphers on a chart, rather than as human beings created in the image and likeness of a supreme being, of God? Just give me a little bit more, since you said this is an issue of the heart, of how you assess the hard-heartedness of the government in Addis Ababa, and does it remind you of the government in Phnom Penh? It sure does me.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Dornan, I think you make a very good point. As far as history, you are a great historian. You know that the one thing we never learn from history is to learn from history. When I read what has taken place and talk to people who have actually experienced these terrible dislocations where they transport people, relocate people from the northern part of Ethiopia to the southern part, where you have a different climate, different diseases and so on, and how many people die in the trucks, when I listen to the people and I visit with them in London and in Paris, the doctors without borders, where people are forced into these trucks, where a man comes from the hinterland someplace, tries to get food for his family, for his children, his wife, his parents, and he is rounded up there and taken 600 miles to the south, never to see his wife, never to see his children, never to see his parents again, I mean, your

heart must go out to these people. That is why I am involved in these issues.

As far as genocide, I think as long as we have recorded history, I think we are going to have problems like that, but you and I have an obligation to try to lessen these problems as much as possible. One of the people that I know you read a lot about is John Kennedy. As I had mentioned before, John Kennedy just a stone's throw from here gave us our marching orders, when he said that here on Earth, God's work must truly be our own. We can't correct all of the mistakes of the world, but certainly we can correct some of them.

I think the people on these two subcommittees can go a long way in doing that, but we have to speak out against cruelty and inhumanity to man anywhere in the world, and this is certainly in Ethiopia. These are not my words. It is considered by all the people that watch human rights violations, as the country in the world with the worst human rights violations in the world, and we come along with—you know, really the resolution is almost, I feel it is almost an embarrassment, it is so weak. It is not enough. I mean, Teddy Roosevelt said, as far as I am concerning in resolutions, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." We say something here but there is nothing behind it, and I think that is the tragedy of it.

Mr. DORNAN of California. If I could make just a final comment, I would like at least—

Mr. ROTH. I just want to say this.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Sure.

Mr. ROTH. The people that bringing the resolution, I appreciate what they are trying to do and I admire them. It is just that we have a different viewpoint.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Well, if I may just make a closing comment, I just debated on the floor a resolution against this thug murderer, Noriega, in Panama. If we can't put in language as strong as the way we condemned Noriega, since people are dying—it was Mr. Ackerman on the evening news who inspired me to go to Ethiopia a few years ago, and I walked through the Anzokia and Ibnet camps. One of them was emptied forcibly by the Communist government in Addis Ababa 3 weeks after I departed that camp with my young AA.

That means that having walked through that camp—and you know how it is over hillsides—you could actually get up on some high ground and see 100,000 displaced people, and when I read that 10 percent of them died 3 weeks after I left, that meant my eyeballs and possibly my handshake made contact with 10,000 people who were to go to God within 3 weeks. That is such an enormous figure that my mind can't comprehend it.

When we are talking about that level of death by government policy, the words should certainly be as tough as the words we passed on the House floor against Manuel Noriega, who kills people by the hundreds through drug dealing, not by the tens of thousands through Communist government policy that is morally and economically bankrupt. We had better have equally tough language in this well-meaning resolution.

I thank my colleague.

Mr. ROTH. I thank the people of the committee for allowing me to appear here today.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Roth.

Now I would like to invite Mr. la Muniere and Mr. Szynalski to come forward.

I would like to just make a request of all of our witnesses. We are going to ask, if at all possible, if you could try to summarize your written testimony, and we will of course include the totality of this written submission in the records, in about as close to a 5-minute time frame as possible, so we can have maximum time to ask questions and talk through some of the questions that we do have.

I want to express again to both of you our appreciation for your being here. We understand you are here in your individual capacities to supply information, and we will not engage you in a policy dialog kind of session, but we are interested in receiving from you as much information as you can provide as to the situations that obtain in the countries under consideration.

With that, let me turn first to Mr. la Muniere.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES LA MUNIERE, DIRECTOR,
EMERGENCIES IN AFRICA, UNITED NATIONS**

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as brief as possible.

Mr. WOLPE. You are going to have to have the microphone right in front of you. This microphone is a very focused mike, so it has to be right in front of you.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Is that all right?

Mr. WOLPE. Closer, then.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. There?

Mr. WOLPE. That's good.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. What I propose to do is cover the main points I wish to comment on to this committee concerning the countries' willingness to deal with and accept emergency assistance, but I will let my colleague Mr. Szynalski comment on the question of food aid and logistics because this is his bailiwick. He is chief of the section which in WFP handles these matters on a daily basis and I think his comments would be more precise than mine could be in this situation.

Mr. Chairman, starting with Angola and the situation which obtains in that country right now, I came back from Angola—3 days ago—and, after meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the government accepted the report which the U.N. interagency mission had prepared concerning the emergency situation in that country.

I think it is important to draw attention to the fact that before we went to Angola, we had requested assurances from the government that we would be able to go where we wanted to, to say what we wanted about our findings, and that the report should be as objective as possible. The government had agreed to this, and indeed clearing it, which took some time, has hardly modified any content of that report, which will be out to the donor community in a

matter of days or weeks at most, so that I shall not go into the details of its contents.

Primarily, the conclusions of the mission which we led to the country were that the current emergency situation in Angola is due to war. There is no question about that. There are other factors that brought the country to the point that it is now, which are long and historical, but the current situation and the plight of roughly 1½ million Angolans has been exacerbated by the fact that war—either open in the southern part of the country, or through destabilization activities—is prevalent throughout the country.

We consider that 500,000 people at least have been displaced. I say 500,000 people because even though we attempted to establish precisely what their numbers were, and we went to three provinces, discussed at the country level, at the province level, how the data were gathered, it was very clear to us that the information base in the country is very shaky. But the estimate of 500,000 displaced people for the totality of the country in my opinion is lean.

This weakness, the capacity of the government to gather data and to effectively work at the provincial and district level, is present in all the aspects of the emergency response. We discussed that a great deal, because for donors to be satisfied that their contributions to a situation such as this do reach the beneficiaries, it is necessary to have a management structure at the country level that operates. The current capacity of these institutions in Angola are limited.

There is a State Secretariat that is responsible for moving emergency commodities to displaced and affected people. It needs strong backing. There is an interministerial that coordinates emergency policy. It needs to be strengthened, as well.

And we finally thought that for any kind of emergency response capability to be effective in the country, there had to be some kind of executive organ at the highest level that could manage it and call for decisions, going from allocating berths to vessels that bring food aid to providing military escorts for trucks that are going to deliver this food aid to the country. We also found, by and large, that a large percentage of the urban population has neither the means to grow or to buy its food, due to the situation in the country, and that in some way or fashion this group of people had to be assisted.

The government agreed to carry out these reforms, and we expect to get within a few days a new definition of the responsibility for handling the emergency at all levels—that is, assessment of the situation, validation of data, definition of needs, and then establishment of an implementation or distribution system that will work.

The big problem in Angola right now, as far as the emergency is concerned, is logistics. When we looked at the country literally province by province with my colleague on the mission, we found that the existing capability was vastly underused—trucks working as little as 20 percent of capacity because there were not enough military escorts to escort them through the country to the areas where they had to go and deliver food.

We found also that some additional training was necessary. A strengthen capacity had to be established in the government, be-

cause otherwise we felt that part of the assistance given to the Angolan people, the victims of the current situation, would not reach them. Quite bluntly, we felt we could not really recommend a significant increase in emergency assistance if, on the part of the government, the necessary steps would not be taken to ensure that it does get to the people. There again, I think we have received satisfaction from the ministries concerned, including the Ministry of Defense, and we hope that in future this will happen.

Concerning needs right now, because of a good response of the donor community and the purchase of some food by the government, the food aid requirements of the 1 million affected and 500,000 displaced Angolans are covered until the end of the current crop year, which is the end of March. This means—and I will let my colleague comment on that—that very soon we will have to make another estimate of food requirements for Angola for the next crop year—1988-89. However, in terms of availability of food aid, both basic and supplementary, affected the people in Angola have their needs covered for another 2 months.

The big problem will be to meet additional logistics requirements, in terms of trucks and manpower, so that the volume of assistance to these 500,000 people when next year comes along is met with a commensurate capacity to move the commodities and right now we are convinced it is not sufficient, so this is where the additional assistance has to be provided.

We have also worked with the government on a rather pragmatic and lean program of assistance in the nonfood sectors, basically covering essential agricultural inputs, emergency health requirements, relief and survival items, and essential drinking water supplies, because a good deal of the problems which the government and the people are facing is not only unavailability of food, it is basically an unavailability of essential items such as seeds and hoes so they can start growing their own stuff and basic health care.

Drinking water is an enormous problem, and the incidence of water-borne diseases is increasing, both in the cities and the country, and of course health. Virtually the whole health infrastructure in the country has been destroyed and, as a result, the condition of displaced people in camps, in the provincial cities and in districts, is worsening. So working with the government, again we have prepared a program which is not very extensive but which covers the immediate needs and which can be implemented realistically.

The final issue to be addressed, and it has to be addressed anew before the new food needs are devised and defined, is accessibility. The country is in a war, and a very fluid, situation. In the report that we prepared 2 months ago, we had made provisions for an airlift to a town in Mochico province, which was at that time pretty much surrounded and besieged and where people were really starving. There was malnutrition throughout the whole town; children were particularly affected.

Well, there is a considerable amount of money required for that, but we have learned since then that this town is no longer accessible to government aircraft. It has been taken over by UNITA. Now this is the reality of Angola. The situation is not stable. The amount of suffering that the farming population is subjected to is

increasing, there is no doubt. There are widespread acts of destabilization in the countryside. The logistics infrastructure is breaking down, and we feel that a special effort should be mounted to try to help alleviate these conditions, but it does depend on the government's capacity to increase its logistics capabilities.

Details of this program and of the situation will be available, as I said, before Mr. Chairman, in a matter of weeks.

Now turning to Mozambique, the situation there, if anything is, I think, worse than in Angola. There is no open warfare, as there is in the southern part of Angola, but the amount of acts of destabilization, sabotage and banditry which are perpetrated at random throughout the country have increased recently. Except for major cities, no part of the country is free from this situation. Who the perpetrators are is not always easy to tell, but the country is completely torn up. Socially the woof and web is really being stretched.

Faced with this situation, the government has nonetheless decided on some major decisions and taken major options affecting both its requests for emergency assistance and for rehabilitation. If you will remember, Mr. Chairman, there was a donor's meeting that was held in Geneva last year on Mozambique's requirements, and the response by the donor community has been excellent—in fact, in several sectors, it exceeded what had been requested by the government. I think the U.S. Government, for that matter, is the chief contributor to that effort and that response.

But there was a clear realization in the donor community and in the government that tighter assessments of requirements had to be made. The figures that were being provided were not clear, in terms of numbers of affected people, their location and so forth, so as a result it was decided about 3 months ago to prepare a new assessment of the emergency situation in the country.

This was carried out at the country level by assessment missions which went to five of the most affected provinces, and included representatives of donor countries, NGO's, the government, the U.N. agencies. As a result of these missions, a general consensus has emerged about the scope and gravity of the situation. There again—and the government admits it—it is difficult to get very precise figures and the effort that has to be made next year, which is underway, will be to tighten the information base.

But we can say right now that currently, it is fair to say that there are 1.1 million displaced Mozambicans inside Mozambique, probably 700,000 to 800,000 Mozambicans displaced outside Mozambique—that is, they have fled to Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. There are 2.3 million Mozambicans seriously affected by the emergency—that is, they need assistance in terms of food but also other commodities, and in addition 2.6 million mostly urban Mozambicans who, while they have the means to purchase the food, will have to be helped by having this food provided and marketed through commercial channels. The country simply hasn't got the capacity to grow its own food right now, as a result of the breakdown of the agricultural setup throughout the country.

Now when we worked with the governments in defining the new appeal, a number of new factors came to the fore. One of them was that it is quite clear that the emergency situation in Mozambique is one which is structural, which is in fact caused by external fac-

tors over which the government has no control, and hence is likely to last. Therefore, as we cannot assume that the situation will get better soon, in terms of the pressure brought on the country, the government and its partners felt that the emergency had to be addressed not only in terms of providing just emergency food aid, medicine and so forth, but by also providing the kind of assistance that would help to rehabilitate the country.

We are therefore no longer talking of emergency assistance only. We are talking of emergency and rehabilitation. In the logistics which my colleague will comment upon, there is the question of rebuilding an infrastructure, as well as providing boats and trucks. In agriculture, while assisting displaced people, it is not only a question of just giving them food. It is a question of giving them additional seeds and tools, or placing them in small irrigation schemes that can be rehabilitated. In the health field, as well, it is not only a question of providing medicines, but of reconstructing health centers in the provinces, training nurses, and re-equipping some of the provincial hospitals to receive sick people and war victims, and these victims are there in vast numbers.

As a result of this approach, the government has taken a number of steps. In seeking the assistance of the donor community, it has made a number of changes from its previous stand. I will just briefly go over this.

For instance, it has been decided right now that to transport the enormous quantities of food and commercial product that have to be moved in the country, the private sector must be assisted, and a good deal of the request which the government has put forth is for trucking material which will then be provided to private truckers who have the capacity to pass sometimes where armed convoys do not pass. That is a new dimension of the logistics.

The distribution chain, which is weak and which we have not been able to really define or follow through to the district level, will be strengthened by having systematic recourse, at the local level, to the help of religious institutions—churches or the mosques.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. la Muniere, I wonder if I could interrupt just for a moment? I am anxious that we try to get an overview of the Ethiopia situation as well as the Angola situation, and our time is very limited.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. OK. Right.

Mr. WOLPE. We might be able to get back for additional details at the staff level, but if we could just get kind of the broader contours right now, that would be most helpful.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Right. OK. Well, let me get to Ethiopia. I think on Ethiopia, that if we had met in this room 3 weeks ago my statement would be much more upbeat than it is today, because basically we felt that the response to the Ethiopian emergency was going along pretty well. The early warning system worked well. The assessment of requirements was carried out in time. The response of the donor community was good, and in terms of feeding the drought-affected people in the country, things were pretty much on track, even though there were some delay in the provision of additional trucks and so forth.

Now recently the recrudescence of fighting in Tigray has just about brought down this very carefully built up plan for providing and distributing food to the drought victims in Tigray. I think we should say that in other parts of the country things are moving pretty well. In the south, in the center, and even in Eritrea, in the north, where food trucks are able to travel with less problems, the World Food Program fleet is operating and the situation is largely under control.

What is extremely worrying to us right now, and to all of donor community is the recent increased fighting which is affecting Tigray, and which has in fact, hopefully temporarily stopped most movement of food by road to roughly 1½ million of the Tigrayan people who are in dire need of this assistance. My colleague will comment further on this point.

A solution, we don't have one right now. The situation changes very rapidly. The TPLF allegedly have taken four major cities. The main road of access to the area is blocked, little if anything passes, but the situation will evolve. We don't know yet how.

We must be ready for one thing, however. Because of this recent development it is clear that people will try to flee from these areas, and camps are in the offing. We had hoped to escape again this year the springing forth of these vast and enormous camps where disease was spread and where people congregated, and in fact I think we were pretty much on track, but because of this recent development in Tigray there is no way, I think, we can escape that. People will emerge from these areas, will regroup, and I think it is necessary that we should be ready to take up this eventuality.

Otherwise, on the other aspect of the situation I don't think I need to comment, because basically the effort is proceeding well. On the logistical side of things there are quite a few problems but they are under control, and I think perhaps my colleague can comment on those.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. la Muniere. We are always frustrated by our own time and ambitions, but we will have enough to get into a few more areas in the questioning.

I think I probably mispronounced your name very badly previously. I think it is Mr. Szynalski. Is that it? OK, fine. We look forward to receiving your testimony.

STATEMENT OF BRUNEK SZYNALSKI, ACTING CHIEF, DISASTER RELIEF, U.N. WORLD FOOD PROGRAM

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be very brief, essentially to clarify somewhat the role that the international community is playing in this whole assistance effort.

The World Food Program is providing essentially food assistance, and emergency food assistance is only a small part of our total.

Mr. WOLPE. Could you pull the microphone a bit closer to you, please?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Shall I repeat what I had said before?

Mr. WOLPE. No, that's OK.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Now food assistance, of course, is essential in emergency situations, and our program, just like all other aid agencies, of course cannot judge the situations on the political side, so

we provide assistance where it is needed. However, there are a number of common denominators when it comes to these four countries. It is not only politics but it is also poverty.

These four countries are probably the poorest in the whole of Africa. When we had the crisis some 3 years ago, these were the countries which had been very badly affected, perhaps with the exception of Angola, mainly because no one knew much about Angola at that time. The situation in Ethiopia is indeed more serious than last time, and we can confirm that it is essentially because of drought conditions. We have assessed the situation. It has been reassessed by FAO. It has been also assessed by U.S. A.I.D. It has been also assessed by a number of NGO's.

The situation was serious and remains very serious. The response of the international community has been extremely good this time, mainly because we have learned the lessons from the past and because the donors, perhaps for political reasons, have been a bit quicker. However, that we can forget. The fact is that the response has been extremely generous and as of this moment we have reached almost 1 million tons of food aid for the Ethiopian emergency. There are only 30,000 tons outstanding in cereals and about 38,000 tons in supplementary foods.

On the logistic side the response has also been very good. Now all the trucks which have been pledged are arriving. The Ethiopian Government has been quite responsive to all the requests that we have been making continuously with regard to port charges, with regard to costs. The port charges in Ethiopia are in fact one of the lowest in the whole of East Africa. We certainly, who have mobilized the trucking arrangements for the whole international community, have never had to pay any additional charges to the Government of Ethiopia for importing trucks for the food assistance effort.

Now I will pass quickly over the three other countries, in order not to prolong my introduction, but I will be ready to answer any questions. As far as Sudan is concerned, the situation is not very simple. Overall the country has enough food to feed itself. There has, however, been a very serious drought in the north of the country, in the provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, and there is a need to transfer resources from surplus areas to deficit areas. The government itself is unable to pay for these costs, and the donor community is making an effort, including the United States, to fund the transfer of these surplus cereals from surplus areas into deficit areas.

There are emergency situations on both the eastern front and on the western front, both regarding refugees—refugees from Chad on the west, refugees from Ethiopia in the east—and the area of Red Sea fields where Bedouin nomads had been so badly hit in the 1984-85 drought that they continue needing emergency food assistance.

As far as the south is concerned, which is the subject of strife, the total quantity of emergency assistance required is relatively small and the problems are indeed security. Now security is something that we in the international community cannot of course control. We try to have parties meet, essentially through the Interna-

tional Committee of the Red Cross, and we try to propagate the policy of open roads. However, we cannot control that.

I think it is important to remember, however, that after the first big loss that we have suffered in October 1987, in Ethiopia, where we lost 16 trucks, we have not lost one truck since then in Ethiopia. We have never had any written agreement with the other party but we have been able to move food without much difficulty throughout the country, particularly in those two areas where the drought and the problems are the biggest.

We believe that in spite of this recent flare-up of activity in Tigray, I think we should not overstate the case. The whole thing happened last Friday, it continues this week, but it may also end within days. We should not take this as an excuse not to continue providing food assistance. We will have problems in Ethiopia. We have always had them but we have always managed to resolve them.

In Mozambique the basic situation is related essentially to the civil strife, and the food assistance which has been provided by the international community has been generously given but not so generously delivered. In fact, only two-thirds of the assistance which has been promised has reached the country.

Therefore, although there are problems inside the country with distribution, caused by internal strife, there have also been problems caused by donors who have not actually delivered the food as fast as they should have done. It is not their fault. Everyone has his excuse, and I do not think anyone should be particularly blamed for the situation. However, the people in need in Mozambique are being reached, are being reached—are being reached by international assistance and a very generous U.S. assistance program.

In Angola the overall needs are less. Mr. la Muniere has made a summary of his report. We consider that the total number of displaced people which need assistance and which can be reached is no more than about 300,000. They can be reached perhaps at a very high cost.

What we are talking about in terms of logistics are those infrastructures which have been totally destroyed, not necessarily by the war. The country itself, when it got independence, it never managed to recover from the loss of capital and technical personnel which left, and we have to still think that we have to develop the country first because we can ensure that they can become self-sufficient.

I think I do not wish to say anything more about the emergency assistance program in these four countries but, as I said earlier, I am sure there will be questions, detailed questions which I am able to answer on logistics, on assessment, and on the scope of the total international assistance program.

Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

I would like to just pursue a couple of quick things. I am going to turn on our little buzzer system here and try to restrict each of us to our 5 minutes or less, just because of our time constraints in terms of questions.

In terms of the Angolan situation, just what kind of cooperation is being received from the government generally? If I understand you correctly, the government has been fully cooperative with the effort of trying to get food to those who are starving and malnourished. Is that correct?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, you know, it was first a question of assessing and going into data banks, finding out what it was all about, and we were really granted access to all the data sources that exist even though they are very minimal and unsatisfactory. So that when we were looking at, for instance, the number of displaced people, the mission went to the provinces and checked the books that existed, and we realized that even though there were well-meaning people gathering this data, it was just not good enough.

Mr. WOLPE. I just was trying to get a sense of the government's willingness to try to assist to the extent——

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Yes. They opened up everything and took us where we wanted to go.

Mr. WOLPE. What is just a summary estimate of the numbers of people in Angola that are in the two categories: one, facing starvation; the second category, malnourished and in need of food assistance?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Facing starvation? I don't think many people except perhaps those people who have just been routed out and are traveling aimlessly around until they get to a reception center are actually facing starvation.

There is a very high malnutrition rate in many parts of the country. It is visible in several parts of the cities. It was visible in the provincial headquarters that we visited, which are surrounded, which we reached only by plane, and the rate of malnutrition according to UNICEF in recent years is climbing. Overall availability of food is declining.

Mr. WOLPE. We have heard the number of displaced. I have heard two different numbers from the two of you, from 300,000 to 500,000.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. No. We have 533,000 displaced in our report, which is the figure that we agreed on and looked at. Now the 300,000 that Mr. Szynalski refers to are those that can be reached with the current situation and can get the support.

Mr. WOLPE. Oh, I see, so there is another 200,000?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. As you see, this is the question of accessibility which I mentioned before. The situation is very fluid. An updated figure will be needed before donors meet.

Mr. WOLPE. I see.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. We have to be very careful, when asking for emergency assistance, to make sure that it is for people that we can reach.

Mr. WOLPE. So there are a quarter of a million people who are displaced, who cannot be reached right now?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Absolutely, and more than we know. This is quite clear. But there are above the numbers presented in the report.

Mr. WOLPE. Do we have at least a ball park estimate of the numbers of malnourished, beyond——

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Malnourished?

Mr. WOLPE. Yes.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Well, the rate of malnutrition is about 24 percent among children. There is no survey for the total population, but I think it is significant to note that on an annual number of births of 416,000, 100,000 children die before the age of 5. Now that is a very, very high death rate among children.

Mr. WOLPE. Roughly, 1 in 4, just a little bit less.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Yes.

Mr. WOLPE. What is the unmet nonfood requirement? Can you give us a summary of that within Angola?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. I can circulate, if you want to, Mr. Chairman, a sheet of paper which summarizes all of that. Otherwise, I can briefly read it to you, time being of the essence.

Mr. WOLPE. If you could, just maybe read a few of the highlights of that and then provide more of the detail.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, in terms of logistics requirement we are talking roughly \$8.5 million. Breaking down into \$600,000 for personnel; about \$5 million for equipment; and \$3 million for airlifts, mobilization cost, maintenance and so forth. In terms of essential agricultural inputs, the figure I am giving you is not final because it is \$3 million for two projects which we think have to be carried out, which would benefit 20,000 people, so if you expand that to the large number of displaced people who need this kind of assistance to regain a measure of capacity to grow their own food, it is much higher. We felt only two could be implemented in areas where you have access, where you can carry this kind of work. But the needs are greater.

Mr. WOLPE. I see.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Emergency health requirements amount to \$5 million, which break down briefly into \$2 million for the supply of basic drugs, \$1.4 million for the rehabilitation of health facilities, \$1 million in logistics support, and roughly \$500,000 for building up the Ministry of Health's capacity to manage and plan its program.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me shift, if I may, just for a second, and get one Ethiopian question out. I would be interested in getting your sense of the general attitude of the government as it relates to this emergency, in terms of whether it has been forthcoming or resistant to doing the things that are needed.

I would also invite particular comment on the tragedy that may have apparently occurred at Korem not long ago. My understanding is that the government is seeking, as you were saying earlier, to try to prevent the re-creation of these large, densely populated settlements, and that there was an incident in which several people had gathered together. Some were killed. I think 20 was the number that was given in press accounts.

I would be interested in what are you doing or what is the international community recommending to the Ethiopian Government as it relates to a means of trying to prevent the accumulation of these populations in the first place that will lead to the creation of the camps. And, second, what if any response has been given by the Ethiopian Government to this apparent coercion that was involved in this episode and in the killings themselves?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, let me make a few remarks and then I am sure my colleague will have something to add.

The only way in which we could have prevented the resurgence of large camps was to get the food out and push it out far enough in the countryside so that people wouldn't have to go and travel a long distance to get their own food. It was part of the distribution chain.

The policy of the government was also germane to that, in that they realized the impact, the negative impact of these large congregations of people in 1985-86, and the organization and transport of food was targeted to having it moved up-country fast enough so you would not have these camps. We had good cooperation from the Relief Commission on that, from the Minister of Transport, and I don't think personally that we can complain of the government on this score. They were very helpful.

Now with the current situation in Tigray, where food is not going to any more, all the efforts that we have carried out before are probably going to come to naught because people will have to come out and seek food in large numbers.

With respect to your other question on resettlement, we know that 8,000 people, roughly, have been resettled so far this year. Regarding the Korem incident—I think it was on the 20th of February, if I am not mistaken—we have not been able to get any direct eyewitness confirmation of what happened. The statement was made, I think through the BBC, that 20-odd people had been shot trying to run away from trucks which were going to take them to resettlement camps, but I have not been able, nor has our representative in the country, to get reliable eyewitness verification of the incident, and we tried very hard.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Szynalski.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. If you don't mind, I will just complement this somewhat.

It is not just a government policy that there should be no camps for people who seek food and shelter. It has been the international community's policy from the beginning. We had agreed with the government that we should avoid by all means to have the camp situation, which causes health problems and massive deaths.

The incidents that occurred, in fact there were two incidents. None of them have been confirmed. A group of ambassadors have gone to Korem and they have not been able to confirm that any deaths have occurred. However, it is quite plausible to think that some disorders may have occurred because it is a fact that the government is trying to resettle some people from these areas which do have problems of economic self-sufficiency.

We have, however, been reassured, after repeated presentations, that the government will never force people to be resettled. Now we cannot, of course, control that this policy which is being officially stated to us is actually met, but we believe that they have been making efforts not to force people, like some 3 years ago when they did that. I think that we have to take it for granted that they are trying to do their best, although if they have a policy of resettlement and they try not to force people, there are always one or two local officials who are perhaps overzealous, and these are facts of life. I don't think that this can be considered as a general policy.

Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is an awful lot of territory to cover in one hearing, when you are talking about four countries and three major problems, so I will start with Angola. Angola receives approximately \$2 billion in export earnings, primarily from the sale of oil.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Right.

Mr. BURTON. According to the testimony which will be heard later from Deputy Assistant Secretary for the African Bureau, Mr. Stacy, as little as 3 percent of that figure, if it were used for food, could feed most of the people in Angola—\$2 billion a year, \$60 million would probably take care of a great many of the food needs, and yet the country continues not to take care of those needs.

In 1987 the government spent more than \$1 billion on armaments, and at least \$4 billion over the last 4 years. They now own a number of Mig-23's, a large number, SU22 bombers, tanks, missiles, and artillery, and they are paying Fidel Castro about \$700 million annually for 40,000 Cuban troops.

My question is, when we are talking about giving emergency food aid through the U.N. and other agencies, has anybody thought to ask the Government of Angola why they are not utilizing 3 or 4 percent of the total \$2 billion they are getting from annual export sales, to feed their people? Why aren't they using that money, instead of asking or relying on the U.N. and other sources for food, when they are bringing in those kinds of revenues?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, it is a logical question. Unfortunately I cannot answer it. We are dealing with a humanitarian situation. We went out and verified what was happening. The government would undoubtedly respond to such a question as this, "Well, we are defending our national territory." Beyond that, I can't say much more about it.

It was true that they were importing food in large quantities until 2 years ago, when the price of both the U.S. dollar and oil fell, and since then they have not imported large quantities, but I am at a loss to answer your question. It is a fact.

Mr. BURTON. Well, it is my understanding that the country of Angola, up until the last—what—6 or 7 years, was an exporter of food. They could very well be a breadbasket of that part of southern Africa if this civil war was stopped and if the problems with the government were changed, a lot of the governmental policies.

We are humanitarian. We don't like to see hungry children starve to death. I don't think anybody here would be that callous. We want to make sure that people are fed, but the question should be raised, why should those of us who are struggling in the West, who are trying to feed the people of Ethiopia and other parts of the world, exporting tremendous amounts of humanitarian aid, why should we be asked to give humanitarian aid to a country when they are spending virtually none of their money, the \$2 billion they are getting in export sales, on feeding their own people, when we know in fact that 3 or 4 percent of that figure would feed probably the whole country?

That question should be asked, and we should put their feet to the fire and say, "Hey, before you start asking other countries for humanitarian aid, you turn inward and look at yourself," because 3 or 4 percent wouldn't make a dent in the amount of money they are spending in buying military assistance from the Soviet Union—wouldn't make a dent.

I would like to also ask a question or two about Ethiopia. I know my time is short.

Has the government resumed the forced resettlement of its people, and what efforts now are being made to stop it? I know you have touched on that before, but are there any efforts being made to stop the resettlement that Representative Roth referred to earlier?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, I think on that latter question my colleague already responded to it, but the program of resettlement of the government this year was 40,000 people. They had planned to resettle 40,000 people in the course of the year, making sure that the proper infrastructure was established in the resettlement area to avoid the mistakes of 1985. So far we know—we know, we are informed and we have figures that show that slightly less than 8,000 people have been resettled.

What we are told by the government is that resettlement is voluntary, people go to these new areas if they want to but they are not coerced into doing so.

Mr. BURTON. That simply doesn't jibe with other testimony we have heard today and previously about this being a voluntary resettlement program. When they herd people into planes and trucks like cattle and cart them off, it doesn't sound voluntary.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. But I have no knowledge of this taking place. I knew it took place during the height of the last drought, in 1985 and 1986. This is well-documented, and we then intervened strongly and repeated with the government, as much as we could, but I have not any information, nor has my colleague, that this has started again on a scale of that nature.

Mr. BURTON. I read a report by Doctors Without Borders which was, I believe, subsequent to 1985.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. No.

Mr. BURTON. Was it about 1985? It was not subsequent to that?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. It was 1986.

Mr. BURTON. 1985-86? Well, I will check that. I may be incorrect there.

There are reports that the Ethiopian Government is using food distribution camps as military draft and relocation centers. Is that true, to your knowledge? Are they drafting people out of the camps?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. We have no information to confirm or deny that. There is one thing, however, which I think we should not forget, is that the resettlement idea as such is not a Government of Ethiopia invention. It is based on the report produced by the World Bank and FAO jointly, a 12-volume report which had studied the central areas, the highlands of Ethiopia, and which had recommended that the only solution for that area is some kind of resettlement of people to those areas in Ethiopia which are much more productive.

Mr. BURTON. The World Bank made this recommendation?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. The World Bank made this recommendation jointly with FAO. This is an official report, and this is the basis for this policy.

Mr. BURTON. If I might pursue that for just a moment, have they made that recommendation in other areas such as Nicaragua, where there has been some forced relocation?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. I am not aware of that possibility. I only know about Ethiopia because I know Ethiopia quite well, and I have been to these areas and I know how bad it is. We have a 100,000 ton food for work program annually in the highland areas of Ethiopia to prevent soil erosion, and we know how difficult it is to ensure that people make a living from that soil.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.

Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question I believe will be for Mr. la Muniere. It has to do with the migration of people from southern Sudan into Ethiopia. There was a film that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had shown me about the 3rd or 4th of December, concerning 10,000 Sudanese young men who had come over the border. The situation appeared to me to be very similar to the situation of about 3½ years ago. There were about 10,000 of them—a number of horrendous stories of death, this death march that they had come through.

There were other reports but only rumors at the time, later in that week, that 40,000 other Sudanese young people had come over the border looking for food. What is the latest on that particular situation?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. I am sorry. I didn't want to provide information on Sudan because I am not up-to-date on it, so I will pass on that question to my colleague.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Yes, I can answer that question because we are in fact providing food assistance to the Sudanese refugees in the camps of Gambela, Dima, and Asosa. At the moment the figures are, 198,000 refugees are in these three camps and one other location. I don't remember the name. It is a very small one.

Mr. HALL. So, in other words, for the large number of people that are coming over the border, you feel that their needs are being looked after properly?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. It is indeed, but I can confirm what you have stated. The 10,000 people who have come across the border in December, they were in a very bad state indeed, and those who are coming lately, they seem to be in very bad shape.

Mr. HALL. How do they appear to be now? The people that are coming across the border, are they in the same shape as they were a couple of months ago?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. The new ones who are coming in are in just as bad shape as those who came in December.

Mr. HALL. But you feel you have enough international donors, food, et cetera, to take care of that problem?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Well, we will be running short toward the end of April, beginning of May, but we are trying to mobilize additional food assistance already.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Szynalski, is there any evidence of the Ethiopian Government misappropriating any relief supplies?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. I can answer that easily because we have been trying to delve into that question. So far we have found no evidence that there has been any misappropriation of relief supplies, although rumors have been going on ever since I remember, not just this year but in 1984-85 and even before. Rumors are not something that we have ever been able to confirm.

Mr. HALL. Is there any evidence or indication that the food being provided is being denied on a political basis?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. I didn't catch that. Excuse me.

Mr. HALL. Is there any evidence or any indications that the food being provided now in Ethiopia is being denied to Ethiopian people on a political basis?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Absolutely none. I have no evidence to confirm that.

Mr. HALL. How would you characterize the overall Ethiopian Government response to this latest emergency?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. I would say it has been extremely cooperative, certainly much more so than in 1984-85. I have been associated with the 1984-85 emergency. I have evaluated the whole African crisis during that period, and we find that the attitude of the Ethiopian Government now has been very forthcoming in almost all areas, except perhaps in the area which it doesn't control itself, that is, security.

Mr. HALL. Mr. la Muniere, we in the Hunger Committee have had hearings concerning the transport of emergency food. We would like to know what the U.N.'s position is on the relief convoys as they go through congested areas. Are they still relying very much on the "open road-own risk" concept, and concerning the latest developments in the civil wars in that region, what is the outlook for getting food into the affected region?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, I think that the unaccompanied open road policy which we have insisted on, the World Food Program in the U.N., has been maintained throughout out. Currently in all of Ethiopia where conditions permit, the trucks of the World Food Program Transport Operation, go unescorted everywhere, including Eritrea.

What is now happening in Tigray is that the on-going war has escalated and no vehicles are traveling. I think perhaps my colleague can comment on that, but we will in any case always insist on maintaining this nonescorted policy in Ethiopia because so far it has worked. Except for one incident, the U.N. trucks have been able to travel without being harmed from either side.

Mr. HALL. Well, prior to December there was a reliance in the northern provinces on airlifts. Is that still going on or, if it is not going on, will that be resumed as a result of the problem that we are now facing?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Airlifts have never been considered as a means of transport on their own. Airlifts have been complementary to the trucking operation, and we have always stated that the airlift is something which we will need simply because we do not have enough trucking capacity. Airlifting will need to be continued for quite some time to come, perhaps not at the same level as in the

past, but if an area falls into insurgent hands you cannot airlift in any case. At the moment you cannot airlift into Adigrat, and last Friday you couldn't airlift into Mekele. Airlifting will be necessary, not only in Ethiopia but also in Mozambique and in Angola, as well as in southern Sudan.

Mr. HALL. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief comment to my colleague?

This book, written by our former Ambassador to Ethiopia——

Mr. HALL. He wasn't an Ambassador.

Mr. BURTON. I beg your pardon?

Mr. HALL. He was the Chargé. He was not the Ambassador.

Mr. BURTON. The Chargé—I beg your pardon, I stand corrected—David Corn in 1984-85 indicates that food was used as a weapon during his tenure over there, and that there is a real possibility that food has been exchanged for other purposes with the Soviet Union.

Mr. WOLPE. Would the gentlemen like to comment on that?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Well, I don't think that we can really make a valid comment on that. I know that during that period, 1984-85, a number of accusations had been made, including the one that food aid has been re-exported to the United States. I do not believe that much of this has ever been documented.

Mr. WOLPE. Just a comment, briefly, in response. In fact, the Congress at one point last term mandated the administration to conduct an investigation into two claims: one that there were serious human rights violations, abuses, occurring inside Ethiopia; and the second, that food was being used as a political weapon. If both of those charges were to be found valid, there were certain sanctions that were supposed to flow automatically as a consequence of that Presidential finding.

The administration did do an investigation and reported that there were, in fact, serious human rights violations surrounding the forced resettlement effort that had been suspended subsequently, but that the claims with respect to the use of food were in fact invalid. That was the administration's own report to the Congress at that point.

Mr. BURTON. Do we have a copy of that report? I would like to look at that.

Mr. WOLPE. We can surely get it.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. In fact, why don't we just attach it in the committee record also, as well?

[The report referred to above retained in committee files.]

Mr. WOLPE. Let me also just take a moment to express my appreciation to Mr. Hall, who just concluded his round of questions, for what he has done over the last several years as it relates to the food relief effort, not only in terms of the public policy piece of what has happened but also in terms of his efforts at mobilizing the private sector and the nongovernmental community. He has played a very, very helpful role by his own personal visitations and by his own networking with the groups here within the United States, and I thank him for that.

I would like to turn now to Mr. Penny.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Wolpe.

I have a couple of questions about three different countries in the region, and this would be for either one of you, one or the other, not both. I understand that over 400,000 Mozambicans have taken refuge in the southern tip of Malawi. What conditions are these refugees facing, and what is being done to meet their needs?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Yes, I can answer that because again, together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, we have been taking care of the Mozambican refugees since November 1986. At present there are a total of 480,000 Mozambican refugees in Malawi. We expect that this figure is going to reach 600,000 by the end of the year. Food assistance is being provided essentially by the World Food Program, by bilateral donations channeled through the High Commissioner for Refugees, and from the United States. Some bilateral assistance is being provided also by the Federal Republic of Germany.

At the moment the needs have been met, at least on paper, until around July of this year. We are mobilizing the balance of food until the end of the year at the present moment.

Mr. PENNY. You said the needs have been met on paper. That means that you have quantities that should be sufficient for that population?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. We are living, what you might say, on the knife's edge. We have about 2 weeks' supply only at any one moment, because we have to rely essentially on foods from Zimbabwe.

Mr. PENNY. Are there certain population groups within this refugee population that you are not now at all able to reach?

Mr. SZYNALSKI. No, I don't believe that. In Malawi we have a fairly good logistics network and we are able to reach everybody. The problem is of supplies. We had relied on Zimbabwe being able to sell us large quantities of food, and we have not been able to get what we wanted. Therefore, that is the reason why the situation is very, very touchy, we might say.

Mr. PENNY. Let me move to Angola. Could you describe some of the obstacles faced in transporting food to those most in need, and do you feel that the steps that the Angolan Government has agreed to take will do much to improve the transportation situation?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, the government has agreed to set up an interministerial commission which will involve the Minister of Defense, because Defense is the ministry which will determine whether or not military escorts will be available for truck convoys, and this is really the crunch. We have found that the capacity that exists in the country is vastly underutilized because trucks do not work more than 20 to 30 percent of the time.

Now this is really essentially from primary to secondary distribution points—that is, from the three main ports of the country, mostly the north and the central one, to the provincial cities. Beyond that, the distribution has to be organized at the district level, and this is really where assistance will have to come from the outside, the provision of shorter trucks, not long-haulers, 20-tonners and so forth, but short, smaller trucks, four-wheel-based, that can go from provincial headquarters to district centers.

Mr. PENNY. And can you tell me what the prospects are for that kind of assistance being delivered, and what role we are playing and what role other donor countries might be playing?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. The requirements identified are for 40 large trucks and 27 small trucks. The Italian Government has already agreed to provide a certain percentage of these trucks. It is negotiating right now. Sweden also will provide some assistance, and there are negotiations going on right now between the government and the European Economic Community to try to meet and fill the gap in terms of haulage capacity.

Mr. PENNY. I want to move to Ethiopia for my last two questions. Could you comment on the nature of the cooperation between the Ethiopian Government, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in particular, and the U.N. and the donor organizations in mounting relief operations presently? Is there more cooperative atmosphere there now than there was the last time that we—

Mr. LA MUNIERE. I believe there is excellent collaboration in Ethiopia at this time, at this stage. The donor community is well structured and meets regularly. The Special Representative of the Secretary General meets with the donor community regularly, and act as their spokesman vis-a-vis the government. Similarly, the NGO's or PVO's have organized themselves under the CRDA, and there is a constant flow of information between the donor community, the U.N., and the NGO's.

The RRC chief commissioner or its representative participates in all these meetings, and this is where the input from the government in terms of enhancing cooperation and collaboration, exchanging information, takes place. I think that at this stage the model which exists in Addis Ababa is amongst the best ones that I have come across in terms of effective cooperation between the members of the donor community and the government.

Mr. PENNY. My last question is on resettlement and the amount of oversight or involvement of the U.N. in monitoring resettlement. We had some problems there earlier. I think there were some instances of abuse. How involved are we, and how is the resettlement situation currently?

Mr. LA MUNIERE. Well, I don't know.

Mr. SZYNALSKI. Well, the U.N. has not been that much involved with resettlement. It has always protested at any attempt at forced settlement. We cannot comment much on what has happened in the past.

We do know that ourselves, we had a project many years ago, some 8 years ago or so, for resettlement, but we had to discontinue it because we had problems of getting access to the resettlement areas, and we simply stopped it. As of late there has been some attempt by the government to bring the U.N. back into the fold with regard to the resettlement because some NGO's support it, but I do not believe that much U.N. support has been given to the resettlement program as such.

Mr. LA MUNIERE. The heavy support has been provided by the Italian Government. It was in their own bilateral program. UNDP had a number of resettlement schemes financed through the IPF which were closed some years ago for technical reasons. The government now has set up an eight-man commission which is charged

with devising a kind of model approach for the resettlement of people, defining the minimum requirements—housing, health, water, land availability—and this commission meets regularly with members of the donor community to discuss plans, approaches, and to try to interest some of the donors to finance specific resettlement schemes.

But in terms of overall monitoring we have neither the capacity nor the role to go step-by-step with the government to see what is taking place. We know their policy. Their target is 40,000 for this year and so far, as I said, 8,000 people have been resettled. We know where they have been resettled and we have the monitors that work inside the U.N. structure visit such areas, but beyond that we do not really have a capacity to control. It is beyond our ken.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFE. Thank you very much.

I want to express my appreciation to both of you for some enormously helpful information and testimony. I think it will help us substantially in our assessment of what needs to be done at this point. I thank you both.

I would like to now invite Mr. Willis Logan to come forward. Mr. Logan serves as the director of the African program of Church World Services, which is the relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches.

I am delighted to welcome you. You have been before our committee on other occasions. We are glad to welcome you back at this point. As I said earlier, we are going to ask you—we are obviously both running late and enormously strapped for time—if you could summarize your remarks, and that would be greatly appreciated. Your full written testimony will be included in the record.

STATEMENT OF WILLIS LOGAN, DIRECTOR, AFRICA OFFICE, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST

Mr. LOGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to be a part of this discussion this afternoon, and for the sake of brevity I will limit my remarks to the Sudan. I believe that the people who are suffering from hunger in the Sudan are part of one of the world's most unpublicized tragedies.

As most of you know, the Sudan is the largest country in Africa, covering an area that is roughly one-third the size of the United States. From the air it looks mostly like a vast desert, etched by the waters of the Blue and White Nile Rivers which meet at the capital, Khartoum, and flow northward to the Red Sea. An Islamic state, divided between a controlling Arab/African/Muslim population in the north and a majority Black African southern population that is mostly Christian and animist. This immense country is currently torn by internal conflict and drought.

One of the basic reasons for the conflict is the tension created by the domination of the Sudan by the Arab/African/Muslim north. The dilemma of Christians living under Islamic law is difficult to comprehend. The history of northern Arab/African prejudice against southern Black Africans goes back hundreds of years. The

south is hoping for a federation so that the regions can establish autonomous rule, but the north is seeking unification under an Islamic state.

Battles between the Sudanese People's Liberation Front in the south and government forces have devastated southern Sudan and compounded the difficulty of getting food aid into the drought-stricken areas. Nowhere is the crisis more evident than in the southern city of Malakal, which faces imminent catastrophe. I quote from a telex we recently received from Bishop Vincent Mojwok, chairman of the relief agency's coordinating council in Malakal:

It is now 1 year since the last consignment of commercial food items reached Malakal. Over the past 2 months the situation has deteriorated, with the depletion of all food supplies. The staple food, dura, has long since disappeared from the market. Supplementary foods such as rice, flour, and sugar, are equally unavailable to the vast majority of people.

The town has been enduring siege-like conditions for the past few months. It is extremely dangerous for citizens to venture out into the countryside for food. Besides, food in the villages is also very scarce due to drought and insecurity. The harvest of 1987 has yielded only a small fraction of what would be normal in a reasonably good year before the war.

The present situation is, therefore, that Malakal is facing imminent catastrophe. The majority of the population is reduced to extremity. Hundreds of people are roaming the streets in search of food. Many are already close to death through starvation.

Several million hungry people in the south may be completely cut off from outside aid. The Sudan Council of Churches, our colleague agency in the Sudan, reports up to 400,000 people affected by severe drought resulting in 100 percent crop failure. An equal number are displaced by intensified military activity. In the regional capital of Juba alone, there are an estimated 200,000 displaced people.

Some 1.2 million southerners have walked up to 800 kilometers to perceived safety and survival in Khartoum. Compounding the crisis is the large refugee population that began pouring into Sudan from Ethiopia during the 1974 revolution. The Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 created another wave of refugees, and the continuing battles over Eritrean independence and conflicts in Tigray Province have resulted in a steady flow of political refugees.

It is striking to note the severe contrast in conditions between camps for refugees and camps for displaced persons—Sudanese citizens. The Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan, being officially recognized by the U.N. HCR, have a link to outside notice and assistance.

For displaced persons there is no such system. Having wandered within their own land in mass migrations, they reach a refuge in Khartoum of cardboard and burlap igloos, hoping to glean some income or food from the city. In the words of one of our regional staff people, it is no more than a human dumping ground.

I would like to say a few words about CWS's role. CWS has been involved in relief assistance to the southern Sudan for many years, in partnership with the Sudan Council of Churches. In 1987, CWS managed to deliver 500 metric tons of maize, 500 metric tons of beans, 100 metric tons of nonfat dry milk, and over 320 metric tons of wheat to the SCC, the Sudan Council of Churches, for distribution in Juba.

In September of 1987 the Italian Government made 10,000 metric tons of maize available to CWS in Kenya, of which we agreed to transport 4,000 metric tons into the southern Sudan. As of February 15th, approximately 1,000 metric tons of this has reached Juba and another 2,200 metric tons have been uplifted from Katali in northern Kenya. Delays in delivery are in part a result of border skirmishes between Kenya and Uganda.

In addition, U.S. A.I.D. recently traded wheat for 4,000 tons of Kenya maize and beans and officially allocated 25 metric tons to CWS for delivery to the southern Sudan. We are now in the process of transporting this food. There is a good possibility that an additional 1,500 metric tons will be available for use in the southern Sudan.

As a result of these modest efforts, CWS is currently ferrying the largest amount of food to the southern Sudan. The only other active U.S. agency is Catholic Relief Services. As you know, three aid agencies have been expelled. This has made distribution even more difficult, but we are certain that once the food reaches Juba, it is immediately distributed. It is all we can do to keep this modest pipeline open and active.

Our experience with the SCC has proven that such distribution, while difficult, can occur, and food is available. 2,400 tons of relief food, ready, available, and desperately needed in Malakal, has remained idle in the town of Kosti since before Christmas, awaiting military escort. Government restrictions, which allow military flights to Malakal, prohibit civilian flights to the area.

The primary problem we face in responding to the crisis is political and the major threat is insecurity. On both sides of this war, relief and food distribution have become political tools. On the one hand, government troops recently commandeered 15 relief trucks from a food convoy destined for drought-stricken Equatoria Province to use in recapturing a rebel-held town. On the other hand, rebels threatened to shoot down emergency airlift planes, claiming they can't determine whether they are being used for military or humanitarian purposes. Church officials charge that military officers have blocked shipments of relief supplies or have included weapons in food convoys, which are in turn subject to rebel attack.

In such conditions where escalating civil war is complicated by drought, the politicization of food is inevitable. As much as possible, therefore, addressing the political situation should be the priority of the U.S. response to famine in the Sudan. Only if the political situation is addressed, will the speedy distribution and safe passage of food be guaranteed.

In our view, the important response that the United States can have to the famine in the Sudan is to use its influence in the Sudan to pursue one main objective: negotiations between the rebel leaders and the Sudanese Government. The 1986 election of a civilian government was a major step in this direction. Since Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi came into power 2 years ago, there have been several formal negotiation sessions and more than 30 meetings between SPLA leaders based in Addis Ababa and emissaries from Khartoum. SPLA leader John Garang is said to agree to a cease-fire as soon as the government lifts the state of emergency and repeals Islamic law. This has not occurred.

Four key points must be addressed by the negotiating process, if it is to be successful. First is the question of nationality. Will the Sudan be Arab or African? What are the symbols and contexts for defining a national identity that is inclusive of all of the people of Sudan?

Second is the question of uneven development. In this already extremely poor country, disparities do exist between the level and

rate of development in the north and in the south. The southern Sudan is, perhaps, one of the most underdeveloped areas of the world. Something concrete has to be done to insure that development takes place in the south and that development is evenly spread throughout the country. There is a need for a two-tiered development approach that would take into account the present disparities and the ongoing needs of the entire country.

Third is the question of political participation. The Sudan is a vibrant and diverse country with many different political parties. Yet, there is no political framework for full participation in the political process. This is especially true for the parties with a base in the south which are often dependent on the northern based parties for meaningful participation in the political process.

Fourth is the question of religion and the state. What is the place and role of religion in the Sudan? Is it to be a secular government or an Islamic nation?

The U.S. promise of aid and assistance to the Sudan, while vital, must also include a commitment to promoting and achieving peace. The United States must use its influence to promote the negotiating process, and should at all costs avoid a military solution. Thus, in our view U.S. military aid to the Sudanese Government should be stopped.

Before concluding, there is one final step I would like to stress with regard to the U.S. response to the situation in the Sudan. Those of us in both Government and nongovernment agencies who are committed to the Sudan and to the future of the Sudanese people must do a great deal more work to insure that their story receives international attention.

Though the situation is so complex it almost defies interpretation, a limitation I feel acutely as I try to briefly summarize it here, a few essential issues, including those I have outlined above, do emerge. World attention can and must be focused on the plight of the southern Sudanese. We must make the world aware of the people of the southern Sudan before there are too few of them left to be called people. The extreme, complex and hazardous nature of the situation in the Sudan must not cause us, or the Sudanese parties concerned, to set aside these crucial objectives or to shirk from our considerable moral, humanitarian and strategic responsibilities to this country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Logan, for an excellent statement. I would be interested in just pursuing the policy question for a moment. You indicated your feeling that the military aid is counterproductive, because you have a political problem and the military aid is essentially providing—I take it you are suggesting—the wrong incentives for the government in terms of really grappling with what is a political problem.

Is there anything else that the United States, in your view, ought to be doing in order to encourage all parties to the conflict, the government and the rebel population in the south, to permit the facilitation of food deliveries?

Mr. LOGAN. Mr. Chairman, I think there should be a vigorous effort to try to gain some commitment to an open road policy. It is similar to the situation in Ethiopia, where food is being politically

dealt with in the sense that, as I said, there is food sitting in the dock but because the barge has no security, it cannot move. The government is not committed to moving it and the rebels have said that they would destroy any convoy food that approaches because they think that military weapons are being transported, so I think whatever leverage we have should be used to bring both of these parties to a full engagement of the negotiating process.

Mr. WOLPE. I take it that in terms of your analysis of the conflict, that this is one of these instances that has very little to do with ideology or East/West or any of those kinds of divisions that we are so focused upon here in the Congress. It has much more to do with the internal nature of southern/northern, a split within the Sudan that has both racial and ethnic components.

Mr. LOGAN. I think the factors are more internal. However, one cannot rule out external factors, but certainly the kind of internal problems that I have spoken to here go way beyond simply the need of providing relief assistance. Without peace in the Sudan and without some framework for that peace, we will not be able to address the hunger issue in the Sudan. I think by engaging the Sudanese Government and the parties who are in opposition, they have indicated a willingness to come together and, as I said, they have talked, but there is no apparent pressure from any side to make them come to some conclusion.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I think it was an excellent statement as well, Mr. Chairman, and I just have one question. I was reading a newspaper account of some of the atrocities that are taking place, and General Abu Quroon Abdallah, commander of the Wau garrison, is they say involved in atrocities against civilians, including food deprivation and crucifixions. Is that true? Are they resorting to that kind of inhumanity?

Mr. LOGAN. Congressman, there are some extremely alarming stories coming out of the Sudan, the most alarming of which is word that slavery has re-emerged in the Sudan, and this is tied to the military policy. The government has gone about, as far as I know, arming various groupings within the southern Sudan, and as a result of that raids are being carried out against various ethnic groups and there are reports—and I believe that some of these reports have even reached The Washington Post—where slavery has reemerged. That is, people are being taken captive and sold.

So, I mean, the situation is one where again it goes beyond simply relief. I mean, there is food. We could supply food, but within the political context, unless we are willing to really exert ourselves—as a country, that is—and fully engage that political process, I daresay what will happen in the southern Sudan next.

So I would just say that the atrocities and many of the things that are reported as people come out, missionaries and others, they are reporting some astounding things happening. People are being denied food for various reasons, but again it is in the political context that is within the Sudan.

Mr. WOLPE. Any other questions, Mr. Burton?

Mr. BURTON. No, that's all. Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. One last question: What has been your experience of the extent to which Sudan is expelling private and voluntary organizations engage in food relief from the south?

Mr. LOGAN. The Sudan has expelled, as I said in this brief statement, two agencies that I am personally familiar with have been expelled. There were some problems early on, basically in terms of the actions of the agencies, a conflict between the agencies and the government over proper procedure and what have you. Some of the agencies were accused of doing things that were against the sovereignty of the Sudan, and therefore they were expelled.

We as an agency work through an indigenous agency, the Sudan Council of Churches, so we have not had to confront that personally as an agency, but there is a great deal of tension between some of the voluntary agencies and the Sudanese Government.

Mr. WOLPE. There has been some discussion, in terms of the political discussions, of the government's acceptance of a new charter and some modifications to Sharia. I would like your assessment of whether or not what the government has proposed to this point, as it relates to reforms of the Sharia law, is adequate? I have seen some reports indicating that even moderate progovernment southerners don't consider those steps significant progress, since alternative Islamic laws would still govern in much of the country.

Mr. LOGAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that the people who are fighting in the south have made it very clear that one of their primary concerns or their primary concern is Islamic law, and having that rescinded or done away with. I was informed just before Christmas that there had been discussions between the Prime Minister and representatives of the opposition and that there had been some agreement on that. However, the Government has taken no action whatsoever to this date to do anything about that, so the situation remains a stalemate.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me again thank you very much for your testimony this afternoon.

Mr. LOGAN. Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Now I would like to invite members of the administration to come forward: Mr. Charles Gladson, the new Africa Bureau Administrator for A.I.D., and Mr. Roy Stacy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. We are delighted to also have Julia Taft join us, as well, from A.I.D.—just to get the title more precise, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

I would like to invite Mr. Gladson to go first. I am again going to repeat my request of all witnesses. I again would ask each of you if you might confine your oral presentations to no more than 5 minutes to permit maximum time for questions. The full text of your testimony will be entered in the record.

Mr. Gladson.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. GLADSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY JULIA TAFT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Mr. GLADSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is indeed a pleasure for me to appear before both of these committees for the first time. I am very pleased to be able to carry on this administration's and A.I.D.'s tradition of constructive and close cooperation with both committees as we seek temporary and longer-term solutions to hunger and malnutrition in Africa. I also thank you for your recent concurrent resolution commending us for our emergency relief efforts to date and urging us to continue these efforts.

The world humanitarian relief and assistance organizations, both national and international, are faced with significantly changed environments for relief in the four countries which are the subject of this hearing, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan. In the past, natural disasters were just that, driven by the impact of drought, pestilence, famine, or disease. We knew that sooner or later the disaster would recede and the conditions would improve, in part because the natural conditions would improve and in part because of emergency assistance provided through the generosity of others.

That situation, unhappily, does not exist in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and parts of Sudan. There is no guarantee that the emergency situation will get better when the rains return, when the floods recede, or when the locusts become dormant in these situations. This is because the emergency needs in these four countries are, to a very, very significant extent, caused by manmade factors, not natural causes.

By far the most important causal factor is internal strife—civil wars, fighting between government forces and rebel groups—which seriously impedes relief operations, and these facts have been eloquently testified to today. We also face circumstances in all four countries of badly misguided government policies, inefficient governmental institutions, and poorly developed infrastructure. These factors seem to be more difficult for outside parties like the United States and other donors to deal with, because the solutions are more political, more internal, less susceptible to the application of emergency relief or donor action, and resolution of the problem often takes much longer to achieve.

Even though the same general factors drive the emergency in each country we are discussing today, the emergency in each country is unique and different. Ethiopia is not identical to Sudan. Angola is different from Mozambique.

As an example of that, Mr. Chairman, indicated in the sheet that you passed out at the beginning of this hearing, the per capita income in Angola is nearly \$950. The per capita income in Ethiopia, I believe, is in the neighborhood of \$115.

The United States approaches each disaster with a fresh sheet of paper before us. While we may apply the same or similar criteria, the actual conditions extant in the particular country are what determine our program responses. This technique, forged in the crucible of our large-scale emergency relief programs in Africa over the past two decades, has served the United States well. Our goal remains to provide an appropriate share of the assistance needed to the people at risk on a timely basis, and we do not waiver from that goal.

Let me now give a brief overview of the four countries under discussion today.

Providing relief to Angola has posed great problems because there is limited information available on the needs and how well our contribution is being used. We are encouraged that the recent U.N. interagency mission to Angola was able to collect firsthand information in some of the affected areas, and we are gratified that the U.N. report concludes that the food situation is currently in hand.

We are also encouraged that the U.N. mission identified specific actions that the Government of Angola must take to improve management of its emergency program. We hope that the Government of Angola undertakes these improvements, and if there is a United Nations appeal resulting from this report, we, the United States, are willing to respond as the situation warrants.

As far as Ethiopia is concerned, we have already talked about the disturbing article reported in yesterday's Washington Post concerning the grim situation in northern Ethiopia, particularly Tigray. As you know, earlier this year, in response to the resurgence of drought, exacerbated by civil conflict and the counterproductive agricultural policies of the Government of Ethiopia, the donors mounted an ambitious relief operation. This time around, we were well ahead of the curve. Together we succeeded in finding enough food and transportation to relieve the more than 5 million Ethiopians in danger of starvation.

Unfortunately, attacks by the rebels on relief convoys to the north and the government's inability to keep the roads open have seriously affected our ability to respond to this crisis. We are working with the donor community and parties in the conflict to encourage them to give relief efforts the highest priority. I wish I could tell you that I am sanguine about the prospects for the future, but I would be misleading you to do so. We are watching closely what is happening, and will continue, to the best of our ability, to meet the needs of the innocent victims of this internal struggle.

As far as Mozambique is concerned, it is important to remember that there are two food emergencies in Mozambique—a rural-based one caused by both insurgency and drought; and an urban one caused not only by the insurgency but by long-term economic factors. We believe that the urban problem is in hand. The donors are providing enough food and it is reaching its intended beneficiaries. The rural emergency is much more problematic. The numbers of refugees still fleeing Mozambique and still coming to relief centers within the country indicates that this emergency is not yet under control. We in the donor community are examining ways that we can overcome the obstacles to getting more food aid to the affected and displaced people in rural Mozambique.

Last, Sudan. In Sudan we face the challenge of getting food to the war-affected south, to the drought-afflicted west, and to the east where we have a large collection of refugees. We take advantage of every possible opening to move food where it is needed. The logistical constraints created by Sudan's vast distances, plus the security situation in the south, continue to impede our efforts. However, there is no question that Sudan has enough food internally,

notwithstanding the drought in the west and the impact of drought in the south, to feed its people. People are suffering in the Sudan due to civil strife.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, whenever possible U.S. emergency assistance will continue to be provided to all people at risk. It is a basic tenet of our national character to reach out to people in need. I assure you we will continue to do so.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gladson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 67.]

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Gladson.

Mr. Stacy.

**STATEMENT OF ROY STACY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. STACY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have provided a more detailed statement for the record which I would like to summarize for the committees. I am pleased to meet with your committees this afternoon to do a review of some of the foreign policy aspects associated with food and emergency relief in Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola.

Let us have no doubts from the outset, Mr. Chairman, civil strife and the resultant internal insecurity are the overwhelming impediments to effective and efficient relief operations in these nations. Yesterday's headlines about renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia forcefully drive this point home and, as noted in Mr. la Muniere's statement, for the moment all overland transportation into famine-affected areas of Tigray has ceased. Without doubt, the situation is serious, the impact on relief operations is severe, and a rapid depletion of food stocks in that province alone is possible.

We deplore these developments and call on all parties to conflict to desist from the military operations so that roads may be reopened and that food might again move. We do not know how long fighting will disrupt relief operations in Tigray. The U.N.-sponsored airlift will continue, and donors and PVO's stand ready to move convoys as soon as circumstances safely permit. Meanwhile, we will work in both bilateral and multilateral channels to try to sensitize the combatants to reopen convoy movement, and we will review quickly other options essential to save lives.

However, and unfortunately as this event so aptly demonstrates, in the absence of solutions to the underlying political problems which have resulted in war, adequate delivery of emergency relief supplies will continue to be dangerous and problematic. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that we have recent information that some 38 barges have arrived at Malakal in southern Sudan, probably with considerable loss of life to some of the people, courageous people who have tried to move that food. Some 3,000 tons of food have arrived at Malakal. That gives you some indication of the hazards involved in these operations.

I must add, Mr. Chairman, that we also have vital foreign policy interests in the countries we talk about today, and hence these cannot be totally separated from our humanitarian role. But however important the foreign policy interests may be, they should not

stand in the way of doing our utmost to provide food and relief, yet our efforts must be tailored to the particular circumstances in the very different country situations.

For instance, in Ethiopia no party to this 17-year-old conflict is amenable to a negotiated solution. In Sudan, we support the freely elected government's efforts to reach negotiated solutions, a process both sides increasingly are open to. In Mozambique we actively work with a very cooperative government to stimulate policy adjustment that should reverse the country's longstanding development tragedy, while working with our allies and the South Africans to end a war that has driven nearly 1 million Mozambicans into refugee camps with substantial loss of life. In Angola, an active dialog has begun on the withdrawal of all foreign troops, an action that would allow Angolans to resolve their own internal problems and to reverse the extraordinary and food decline that has devastated that country since Portugal's withdrawal in 1975.

Comparisons between the four situations are few but those common themes are stark. The policies of governments have compounded the problems enormously. Some of these policies, mercifully, are beginning to change. We call upon all parties to pull back from the folly of seeking military solutions. This only drains resources from development and denigrates the urgency of conserving life. We seek in all countries unimpeded access for food shipments and relief personnel. We strive to maximize deliveries of food and help by every reliable and responsible channel. Where we do not have direct access, we will work through friends, mediators and others who do, to maximize leverage and influence.

We look to the United Nations family for strong leadership and organizational expertise. We note with pleasure and endorse the emergence of the International Committee of the Red Cross as a crucial intermediary in several of these nations due to its proven capabilities to deal with emergency problems, with its reputation for integrity, impartiality, and political neutrality.

Media attention to humanitarian problems in these stricken lands has played a beneficial role, not only in raising public consciousness in the West about problems but in flagging issues to recalcitrant leaders in these nations, no matter which side of the political fray they are one, that the international community holds them accountable to a high standard of compassion for their people.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to especially recognize the role that these congressional committees play in the process. Your continued interest and concern does indeed underline the imperative to feed, clothe, and sustain hungry people, regardless of politics. The resolution introduced by Representative Hall and cosponsored by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Select Committee on Hunger and members of the Africa Subcommittee on January 29th, to commend the administration for the effort it has mounted to date for famine relief in sub-Saharan Africa, is most appreciated by the Secretary and those who work hard in these endeavors, and it is reflective of the executive/legislative partnership that has emerged in this essential effort.

As you might surmise, Mr. Chairman, the Department of State also receives quite a bit of constituent mail on these subjects,

mostly from American citizens. You might find of interest that our recent tabulation for the Ethiopian drought relief to date is 724 in favor and virtually none against. I believe this statistic does symbolize the mandate we all have for pressing forward to deal with these humanitarian crises in an effective and forthright manner.

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stacy appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 93.]

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Stacy, and again, Mr. Gladson, for your testimony and for your assistance over a long period of time in these efforts. I guess my association with Mr. Stacy goes back to Zimbabwe, before you were in your Washington assignment, and I have really valued your contributions over many years.

I have a series of questions related to each of these countries, and I just have to make one observation I cannot resist, because I think it needs to be laid out on the table. I don't think any of us would quarrel with the emphasis that you placed in your testimony by way of the importance of political solutions in all of these areas, and also in the importance of deemphasizing the military, the effort of securing military solutions to the conflicts that are in process.

I must say that at times I think American policy runs counter to that valiantly stated objective, when we are providing military support to the Sudan, and I think there is some evidence that in the past, both under the previous regime and more recently, that very military support served as a disincentive to secure a political solution. Likewise in Angola, right now we are contributing militarily to the expansion of the conflict there. I find that somewhat inconsistent with the goal of achievement of a de-escalation of the violence.

My first questions relate to Ethiopia. I understand that at this moment there is an immediate need for at least another 100 trucks in northern Ethiopia. This shortfall, in the opinion of U.S. A.I.D. in Ethiopia as well as the United Nations representative, Mr. Priestley, is critical, we are told. Moreover, if more private Ketena trucks are destroyed, if emergency food needs deepen in the next 2 months and if there are any delays in deliveries of pledged trucks—all events which are highly probable, given recent accounts—then the truck shortfall will worsen substantially.

I understand that there are three options available. One is to lease trucks, presumably from Kenya; second, to purchase new trucks in the United States or in Europe and to rush them there, possibly by plane; and the third option would be to rehabilitate private trucks, the so-called Ketena fleet. I wonder if you could explain to us A.I.D.'s strategy to meet the present and projected shortfall of trucks, including what concrete steps have recently been taken?

Ms. TAFT. Sir, I am Julia Taft, and I didn't have an opening statement but I am here to respond to questions that relate to our direct investments in the relief programs.

In response to your question, we have funded several million dollars for trucks, both for the U.N. fleet and to support our PVO's. It is true that statistically there are not adequate trucks to meet the

full movement of grain that is coming into the country. However, we are now seeing a phenomenon where there are many, many trucks lying idle because they cannot get through the roads. At this point, to send more trucks in would probably not be useful because they would not arrive for several more months, and there are trucks in the region that are not moving.

We are very concerned about the security situation, and are looking at this point to perhaps investing in more airlifts if that is the only way we can get the commodities moving.

Mr. WOLFE. Well, let me say I am a little bit surprised by that testimony. There is no question about the accuracy of the account right now that there are some trucks there, but my understanding is that our own mission inside Ethiopia, the American U.S. A.I.D. mission, and other relief officials out there have stated that they see that as a temporary problem—that is, the inability to move on certain roads—and that there is a fundamental, serious shortfall of trucks, and that they have in fact no higher priority in terms of the American requirement. Are you saying that you disagree with our local mission?

Ms. TAFT. No, I am not disagreeing that there are requirements for trucks. The point that we are trying to solve is—in terms of the amount of money that we think we have or can reprogram in this effort—do we put our money into more trucks when in fact we have already purchased quite a few? We know that the European donors are coming in to repair some of the trucks, a great number of the trucks that just need spare parts and some repair. Those will all be coming on line in the next few months. There is a backlog of trucks in country that will soon be operational as well as others already purchased and yet to be delivered.

Regarding the option of the Ketena trucks, we have been working with the PVO's and helping them fund arrangements with Ketena to secure their services as part of the fleet, whether it is the Catholic Relief Service's (CRS) fleet or the World Food Program Transportation Operations-Ethiopia (WTOE) fleet. As you know, the Ketena trucks are the ones that are getting blown up right now because it is very hard to identify them with a particular relief agency. When they are identified with a relief agency, then they come under the rubric and protection of the relief agency, so that the Ketena trucks are working.

The trucker's don't like to travel these difficult areas and get blown up. In the last 5 months 90 trucks have been destroyed. Now the statement was made earlier that the WTOE had not lost any trucks since October, but 90 trucks that have been supporting relief activities have been destroyed. Most of those are Ketena trucks, which are owner-operated.

On the issue of trying to bring in trucks from Kenya, that is a problem because the Ethiopian Government does not want that to happen. We are looking at that issue in an effort to decide whether or not we should push even more. We are seeing, however, a need for those trucks or additional trucks in the south to deal with the refugee problem and some of the other needs in the south, so that may be a possibility we can work on.

Mr. WOLFE. Has there been any consideration given, with respect to the Ketena trucks—which, as you say, may be a not terribly

strategic advantage to spend a lot of effort on that rehabilitation process, given their vulnerability—but has there been any effort or any consideration being given to having the International Red Cross take full control over the Ketena trucks?

Ms. TAFT. That has been done. The ICRC has taken the lead in actually securing contracts with the Ketena trucks and painting them again to be recognized as part of the ICRC fleet.

Mr. WOLPE. If we were to increase those trucks, are we taking any action to give the United Nations greater control over those trucks?

Ms. TAFT. We would support additional Ketena trucks if they could be identified with WTOE. That is not the problem. The problem is having enough Ketena truckers who are willing to work in the difficult areas that need to be provided access to Eritrea. Now there was a recommendation that came in from the mission, which is a very good one, to try to support the private sector trucks with spare parts and with repair and maintenance facilities. This was also part of the earlier transport study.

We have been working directly with the World Bank on its long-term transportation program, which does include a component for support for the Ketena structure for spare parts, for enough foreign currency to be able to bring them on line. We have been told by the World Bank that that program is about ready to be funded, and we have talked with them on a regular basis. Now that is not going to solve the problem for the next 2 or 3 months—the security problem.

Mr. GLADSON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up for a moment, Tom Reese, the coordinator of Food for Peace, is being dispatched to Ethiopia next week to take a new look at these transportation issues, among other things.

Mr. WOLPE. Yes. Let me say I don't mean to belabor this point, but everything we have seen indicates that there is a perception by the people in the field right now, no additional studies being needed here, that there is an immediate shortfall, once the roads are available, of 100 trucks. Now I guess what I am looking for is, what is the plan to address that particular shortfall? What are we doing?

On the Ketena truck thing, let's pass beyond that for a second. You mentioned a moment ago with respect to the possibility of rental from Kenya, the leasing from Kenya, that the Ethiopian Government does not want that. They apparently are reluctant to admit Kenyan drivers, as I understand it, and they also desire that any trucks should remain permanently inside Ethiopia. Is this an option that is closed altogether? Isn't there something we can do to apply pressure on the Government of Ethiopia with respect to that rental question?

Mr. GLADSON. Well, we will certainly follow up. That is one of those things we have been discussing with all parties, Mr. Chairman.

Actually WTOE has told us within the last week that they do not recommend more trucks at the present time.

Mr. WOLPE. More trucks what?

Mr. GLADSON. They do not recommend more trucks at the present time. By June 1st there will be 801 trucks in country. Alto-

gether 91 trucks have been destroyed. I believe 16 of them were WTOE trucks and the balance were private sector trucks. The original transport assessment identified a total need of 863 trucks in the north. We are going to have 801 there by the first of June. There is really no way of getting additional trucks into Ethiopia between now and the first of June.

Mr. WOLPE. Doesn't the 801 assume no further destruction of the Ketena trucks, and also assume timely delivery of those that are in the pipeline?

Mr. GLADSON. The recommendations from the field are that we should not put additional resources into trucks at this time.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, that is not——

Mr. GLADSON. That is what we are checking on.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, you and I, I guess, are reading some of the same materials and getting very different understandings of what is being told.

Yes?

Ms. TAFT. I'm sorry, sir.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me just understand, is it your testimony that there is no need, that there is not a shortfall? I want to just understand what your testimony is.

Ms. TAFT. Yes.

Mr. WOLPE. Are you saying there is no shortfall of 100 trucks, that that is simply myth?

Ms. TAFT. No, I am not saying that at all.

Mr. WOLPE. Then what is the strategy for addressing that 100 shortfall?

Ms. TAFT. Our strategy is to press for "open roads and own risk" policy as much as we can. We are doing everything we can so that the trucks that are there now can move. We spent the last 2 weeks with trucks piled up in convoys that cannot move.

Mr. WOLPE. I respect that. I understand that.

Ms. TAFT. To send more trucks into a situation where they can't move, doesn't make sense right now. Now we do need trucks in reallocation at the ports. Food stocks in the ports are piling up. We are going to have to move the grain out of the ports to some other place until we can get access to the ultimate distribution place. It is very complicated.

I think what you are making it sound like, out of respect, sir, is that we are not responsive to the mission. We have been working very closely. This isn't something we have pushed aside.

Mr. WOLPE. I have only one question. Please, I am not trying to say you are not responsive to anyone. I am simply asking a question. We received testimony that there was a 100-truck shortfall. Is that true or not true? If it is true, what is your plan for addressing that shortfall? That's all I want to know.

Mr. GLADSON. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the committee has available to it a cable dated 7 March from Addis Ababa, the subject of which is the trucking situation in Ethiopia. That cable clearly states—and this is the opinion of the mission and WTOE and the U.N. coordinator—"Additional trucks are not needed for the north, but there is an urgent need to open roads so that trucks there now can be used effectively." That is in the cable of March 7 that the

committee has available to it. We delivered that cable to the committee yesterday.

Mr. WOLPE. I would like to pursue this perhaps at the staff level subsequent to this hearing, because that is in conflict with a lot of other kinds of traffic and reports we have received with respect to the shortfall, but in deference to my colleague here, I want to yield to him at this point and I will return to some other line of questioning in a few minutes.

Mr. BURTON.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to preface my remarks like my colleague did regarding Angola. I have a different view than he does, and I feel to not support Dr. Savimbi and the freedom fighters over there would guarantee a pro-Communist, Soviet-backed government, and it would also guarantee that the 40,000 Cuban troops who are stationed there, that are being paid for by the Luanda government, would not leave, and it would guarantee that the people would be subject to Communist tyranny indefinitely. Now the Soviets have sent \$2 billion in military assistance in there, and they have Soviet generals on the battlefield as well as those 40,000 Cuban troops, and for us not to support the freedom fighters as we have been doing and as you have been advocating would be a tragedy, so we have a little difference of opinion there, about 180 degrees.

What happened to the 350 trucks that were donated during the 1984-85 famine to Ethiopia? Are they still there? Are they around?

Ms. TAFT. Many of the trucks that the U.S. Government funded in 1984-85 were in fact given to the PVO's, and the PVO's have them. Of the fleet that the RRC retained, about half of those are not working, and those are some of the ones that are going to be repaired, hopefully, by the European Community representatives. I know that Volvo and Fiat are sending people to fix some of those RRC vehicles.

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

Ms. TAFT. We also made contributions to the WTOE fleet, and many of those are still operational, so of the trucks, of the 800-odd trucks that will be in place by June, all but about 150 are either Ethiopian trucks, Ketena trucks, or leftover trucks from 1984-85.

Mr. BURTON. But there will be about 800 trucks?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Now the issue has been raised about not having enough trucks, which you just addressed in your communique of yesterday, to get foodstuffs into the northern provinces. How many trucks does it take to transport 2,000-plus people to relocation centers? If there is an answer to that, why aren't those trucks being used to deliver food, instead of forcing people into the back of them like cattle and carting them off to some other place?

The point of my question is, I figure that you can probably get, maybe if you really cram them in pretty hard, 50 people in a truck, and if you are talking about 2,000 people, you are talking about 100 people for two trucks, that is 20 times 2, that is 40 trucks that have to be used just to cart people to a relocation center. I don't know how far away it is, but it seems to me that those trucks could be used for a better purpose, and that is what we ought to be address-

ing, I think, rather than just beating on you that way, the way we have previously.

I would like to ask one other question, and it was in your prepared text and I alluded to it earlier in my questioning of some previous witnesses. That was, the Government of Angola is getting approximately \$2 billion in foreign revenues, primarily from their oil sales, I presume, and to use 3 percent of that to feed their people would still leave them with 97 percent to do with as they see fit. Why is it that they are not using even 3 percent of their revenues to feed their people? And since they won't, why shouldn't we put pressure on them through diplomatic channels to use 3 percent of that, instead of giving them economic assistance to feed the people or giving food relief to those people?

That food that we are delivering there could be used in Ethiopia or Mozambique or some other place, and it appears to me that Angola has enough resources of their own to feed those people. Can't we do something to make them do it themselves, instead of just wasting all that money on the war?

Mr. GLADSON. Mr. Burton, our role in providing food aid to Angola has been limited for several years to a maternal/child health emergency program through UNICEF, and that program last year was just 12,000 tons. We have just recently approved an additional 6,000 tons this year, for a total in 1988 of 12,000 tons.

The point is that there has been some question about the actual food needs overall in Angola, and a serious question about the ability of the Government of Angola and its responsibility to provide more food to its people than it has been providing. There has been a major problem with respect to the Government's ability to properly monitor the programs underway through food provided from other donors.

One thing that I am not sure came out clearly in Mr. la Muniere's testimony when he talked about the overall number of people at risk is important and should be restated. There are approximately 600,000 people in the rural areas who are at risk, of which I believe Mr. la Muniere said that 300,000 could be reached with respect to delivery of emergency food and an additional 200,000 could not be reached. The International Committee of the Red Cross is taking care of 100,000. The overall number of people identified as in need of food in Angola is 1.6 million.

The balance are 1 million people who are residing in cities in Angola. The country does not have an overall food deficit, as he clearly testified. Nothing is being done by the Government of Angola, so far as we know and so far as the U.N. knows and this assessment team knows, about 1 million people who cannot afford to buy food, who reside in the capitals, who are formerly displaced people, although food is available in the country. That is a point I am not sure came through clearly.

Mr. BURTON. Well, you have made it very clear now, and I appreciate your clarifying that point. I agree with you on most of what you have said. I would like to take issue with one last thing, and I am sure you see this one coming, and that is our position in Mozambique. I feel it would be a dereliction of my responsibility if I didn't at least let you know my feelings one more time, and that is that in Mozambique we have East Germans, we have Ethiopians,

we have Cubans, it is my understanding—not a lot, but some. The Soviet Union sent over \$1 billion worth of war materials in there, and yet we continue to call the Renamo forces “terrorists.” It used to be they were guerrillas; now they are terrorists.

Many people believe that the Renamo forces under Mr. Dhlakama are freedom fighters who want to put that country in the democratic column. Granted, there have been atrocities that are unexplainable. I think the Homoine incident that took place is highly questionable. It has been attributed to Mr. Dhlakama and the Renamo forces but the people who were eyewitnesses said that the troops that killed those people down there were wearing new uniforms, and Dhlakama doesn't have any new uniforms, so I think there is some disinformation that is going on to try to discredit Renamo further.

But the fact is that I think that we should, at the very least at the State Department, because it is hurting a lot of people, because there is famine and there is a shortfall of food and there are people dying of starvation in that country, that our State Department instead of just being—pardon the expression, and I mean this in a nice sense—myopic by only talking to the Frelimo forces, that they should make a sincere effort to talk to Dhlakama and the Renamo forces and try to get the two sides together, to come up with some kind of a solution to that conflict. To do otherwise I think will prolong the famine, and that means we will be involved in sending more food and more aid over there in the future that otherwise might not be necessary.

With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. If you would like to respond, that's fine. It doesn't require a response but if you want to, that's fine.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Mr. Burton always enables me to have some opportunities to praise the administration. [Laughter.]

Because I happen to think the administration has been very enlightened and farsighted in its approach to its Mozambique policy.

Mr. STACY. We appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Would you care to respond, Mr. Stacy?

Mr. STACY. Well, Mr. Burton, you and I have debated these issues of Renamo and Mozambique even last year. It looks like this year may be another round. I think there is a lot of new information that is coming out of that beleaguered country. Certainly we know of no Ethiopians down there. Hopefully they are all staying up in Ethiopia.

But I think it might be useful, perhaps, since it has been a long day already, that as we do get new information about the situation there and certainly we continue to be encouraged by the government, their working relationship with us, despite their U.N. voting, we continue to be encouraged by some of the policy changes they are making, so I think that rather than take up the committee's time, we should have a chat about it. We should exchange information.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, just one second, briefly.

If you have any additional information that is coming out of Mozambique, would you please send it to my office? I would sure appreciate it.

Mr. STACY. We would be happy to.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to just kind of close out the discussion of truck availability in Ethiopia. [Laughter.]

You thought I was going to forget it. I have not. I do want to get the record clear, at least. Is it your position that there is or is not a shortfall of trucks in Ethiopia? Aside from the immediate situation, that you have some roads which trucks cannot traverse, is there or is there not a shortfall of trucks?

Ms. TAFT. I would like to say that, quoting from this cable that just came in that says one thing—

Mr. WOLPE. We have 6 weeks of cables. Does this cable override all previous weeks of cables?

Ms. TAFT. No. OK, you asked my opinion. A.I.D. talks about trucks an awful lot. We have a working group on transport. We have been working closely with the representatives in Ethiopia on transport. We look at it, monitor it. The Food for Peace coordinator is going out next week to look, not just at the north but also at what is happening in the ports and transferring the commodities out of the ports. We are monitoring and working on this as much as we can.

Mr. WOLPE. OK.

Ms. TAFT. Sure, there would be a need for as many trucks as we could fund for all of the countries we are talking about. The issue is—

Mr. WOLPE. No, I don't want to talk about all the countries. All I am trying to understand is—

Ms. TAFT [continuing]. Are we overutilizing the capacity we have now? No. They could be more efficiently used than they are used now, because the security is preventing the ones we currently have in place from actually delivering the food.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me just say that I have the sense that you think I am trying to embarrass you, and I am not, Ms. Taft. I really am not. I am trying to understand, though, what your assessment of the need is, and what can be done to make sure that there will not be a tragic shortfall. You can have the food there, and you haven't got the trucks, and you have no food delivery and people starve.

Now my understanding is, from reports that we have seen, that there is a real concern that, one, there is a major need for new trucks. As I said earlier, the estimate was about some 100 trucks. A total of 860 trucks are needed in the north, but pledged new trucks will bring it up to over 90 percent of the estimated carrying requirements by June, so there is still a 10 percent shortfall. We are told also that more new trucks will not be useful unless they can arrive before June. All I am trying to establish is how we are planning to make up that shortfall, and that is all.

Ms. TAFT. OK. Not to beat a dead horse, but one of those cables that I am sure we shared with you said we should airlift trucks. This was about 3 weeks ago: Let's airlift trucks. Well, we don't have unlimited resources, and that cable prompted us to ask: If we are going to airlift anything, should we be using our money to air-

lift food, or airlift trucks that won't be able to move because the lack of security creates conditions where they can't move?

Quite frankly, we are looking at it, and we will find out from Food for Peace coordinator Reese what he suggests and what the latest thinking is. In terms of available funding we have already put in, just out of the disaster assistance account, \$6.9 million. That is a lot of money on trucks, for this go-round. We just have to monitor it and see, but if they need trucks——

Mr. WOLPE. My only—excuse me. I'm sorry.

Ms. TAFT. I'm sorry. I don't mean to be inarticulate. I just want you to know that we are monitoring this. We keep on looking at it. We will be responsive. If trucks need to be brought in through Kenya or wherever, we will try to do that.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me say I ask these questions out of some very bitter historical experience, because I was out in Ethiopia on one previous occasion—I have been there a couple of times, of course—but on one occasion and we tried to say, "Hey, there is this need. This is what the field is saying." We had all sorts of assurances from Washington that we were on top of it and we were going to monitor. The fact of the matter is, the trucks eventually came, they did, but they were too late and a lot of folks died unnecessarily. And so my only plea in this instance is that I hope you may, in the next week or so, please share with us what that plan is for meeting whatever shortfall exists, in as detailed a fashion as possible.

The other question I would come back to is the question of these Ketena trucks. My understanding is that if they are not placed in fact under U.N. control or some other kind of international auspices, that they are much more vulnerable to being shot up, and that is the purpose of the question I asked earlier. Is there consideration being given to any new trucks coming to this fleet being put under that kind of auspices administratively?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, that is correct. ICRC is doing it. The PVO's are trying to do it, but one interesting thing about the private sector in Ethiopia is that these trucks do not have to go and work for ICRC if they don't want to. The PVO's have a hard time getting good enough trucks, reliable truck drivers, to be part of the U.N. fleet or whatever. It is not a money question. There is money available to hire those trucks. The question is whether those trucks will be willing to really work under the agreements with those agencies or not.

Mr. WOLPE. I also hope it will be possible and that you might consider really pushing the Ethiopian Government on this question of the Kenyan trucks, because it seems to me that is just nonsense that that should become a barrier to getting the trucks in.

And as far as this airlift goes, I look at some of the language, and some of the reports that we have seen indicate that unless trucks arrive prior to June, they won't be useful, so my concern is the timeliness of how we meet whatever shortfall exists. There has been a \$30 million transfer, as I understand it, from the U.S. A.I.D. to the disaster account—from the reserve.

Mr. GLADSON. Mr. Chairman, the \$30 million figure from the Development Fund for Africa, is not a transfer. Of the overall borrowing authority of \$50 million which Congress has provided as an

Agency-wide limitation on borrowing authority for disasters, over and above the appropriated amount of \$25 million, the administration has decided to make \$30 million of that \$50 million available from the Fund if it is required. It is a borrowing authority, but with condition that it would be used, if needed, for sub-Saharan Africa disasters only. Now at this point, \$25 million original appropriation for OFDA has not yet been exhausted.

Mr. WOLPE. Been exhausted, yes. It almost is, but then you would still have—let me understand—but you still can use the current appropriation, and then you could borrow up to \$30 million for an additional allocation if that were required. Is that correct?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, sir. Of the \$25 million of our normal appropriation, OFDA has about \$4 to \$5 million left. However, the 4 disasters that are the subject of this hearing are only 4 out of 18 that we are working worldwide, so we have a lot of drawdowns on our account, as your staff well know. What we have been trying to do with the Ethiopia response is to have a food-led response, U.S. food in support of the PVO's that are delivering that food with the U.S. Government funding internal transport. To the extent that OFDA's money is being used, it is being used to augment some of the U.N. activities and to supplement the PVO's that are moving U.S. food, so we are trying to use our money as seed money for other things without carving out massive investments.

We have spent \$10.5 million of our \$25 million already on Ethiopia. We are talking about other requirements that would use part of this drawdown from the African Development Fund, which would include such things as seeds and emergency airlift, and some water projects. We don't want to be in this mess next year, and the seeds are going to be very important, seeds and water, for recovery, so we are looking at the \$30 million to be drawn down for the emergency that will help in that aspect.

Mr. WOLPE. OK. I want to turn to this question that I raised earlier with the international witnesses, representing international organizations, the deaths at Korem. The recent tragedy at Korem appears related to the issue of how donors and the Ethiopian Government respond to the de facto formation of large peasant camps.

A large number of people, some 20,000, had gathered at Korem, yet the Ethiopian Government refuses to allow camps to form, and then we were told earlier that the international relief community is behind an effort to try to discourage the creation of these camps. I assume that is American policy as well, but I would be interested in your reaction to that.

My question is, if current trends continue and if tragedies like Korem are not to be repeated—and I guess I would be interested in your view as to whether it occurred or did not occur—and if forceful resettlement in Ethiopia is to stop, there has to be some orderly approach on the part of the Ethiopian Government especially to handling the situation that is emerging. What is A.I.D.'s strategy and what are U.S. A.I.D.'s projections regarding the formation of camps over the next few months?

Mr. GLADSON. As far as the Korem incident, Mr. Chairman, we don't know the answer to your question. The original reports were not official reports witnessed by members of the U.S. community. A.I.D. representative Rick Machmer, Michael Priestley, and other

donor representatives went to the scene as soon as they could get there after the occurrence of the alleged incident, but they could find no evidence or nobody that could testify to the actual occurrence of the incident. Something happened at Korem, but we are not exactly sure what.

It is true that the strategy to this point has been to avoid a situation in which people congregate in camps. The donor community and the Government of Ethiopia have agreed to that strategy, and the reason is that we were ahead of the curve. We still think that by getting food close enough that people can walk to get it and walk home again, the massive health problems and all that goes with it that occurred in the last famine could be avoided because we started early enough this time.

However, with the situation in Tigray as it is today, there is a lot of frustration in the donor community. I am very frustrated. My people are very frustrated. What are the options? If this situation continues, if this battle in Tigray continues at the current level over a long period of time, we have to go to other options because 1.2 to 1.5 million people are directly affected and do not have food, and there is no way right now to get food to them.

We went into the question of expanding an airlift with our U.N. colleagues, and we came to the conclusion that that is not the answer. The reason is that with the security situation the way it is, the aircraft have to be overnighed in Addis, the only place where they can be maintained in a secure environment. They have to go to Assad for gasoline and then they fly their missions and go back to Addis at night. However, they cannot fly these planes at night. The ability, then, to really expand the delivery of food in Tigray is just so negligible as not to be a solution.

I personally think that if this situation is long-term, we are going to have to go to camps once again, as much as we would like to avoid that situation. People will start to move. They will start to move south and they will start to congregate, and they have to have food. It may be that the only way of getting them food is in a camp situation, but it is something we have to look at very carefully for the next few days.

Mr. WOLPE. So you have no hard projections yet in terms of that situation?

Mr. STACY. To the best of our knowledge, people have not started to move, although there are some people congregated at Korem for want of other services. The government has not been willing to provide those yet, and clearly if movement continues, that is an agenda item to take up with the Ethiopian Government.

Mr. WOLPE. Yes. What is being done on the diplomatic front, Mr. Stacy, to try to move both the government and also the TPLF and the EPLF to not interfere with food shipments? What are we doing ourselves? What are we doing vis-a-vis third parties? What is happening in an effort to try to free this log jam?

Mr. STACY. Well, there have been at least four meetings in the last 4 months between our representatives and representatives of the EPLF and the TPLF, urging them to desist from their military activities and to support an open roads, open risk effort.

Mr. WOLPE. What has been their response?

Mr. STACY. Their response has been, in many cases, promises, efforts to say that they will review the situation, and yet we see in recent days that the offensive by the TPLF has been mounted nonetheless. Quite frankly, we think that their efforts are scurrilous. These are Marxist organizations who are using their own people as cannon fodder, as far as we are concerned, in the way that they are going about the war effort and blocking the relief, so that I can't say that these diplomatic efforts have been very fruitful to date.

Mr. WOLPE. What is the amount of American aid that is going to the relief arms of the TPLF and the EPLF?

Mr. STACY. It is relatively small. I don't have the exact tonnages but it is about the maximum that they can absorb at the present time.

How much?

Ms. TAFT. It is 15,000 tons.

Mr. STACY. That is 15,000 tons. I might say that the cooperation we have received from the relief arms of those organizations is certainly more forthcoming than the support that we have received from the political arms.

Mr. GLADSON. Mr. Chairman, that figure is now 39,000. An additional 24,000 was approved last week, I am just told.

Mr. WOLPE. What about nonfood aid, trucks and the like?

Ms. TAFT. With the food aid comes the internal transport cost, and that amounts to about \$5 million for the first 15,000 tons.

Mr. WOLPE. I didn't hear you. I'm sorry. It amounts to what?

Ms. TAFT. I'll get it for you. Just a minute.

For the tonnage that was just announced, the 39,000, \$8 to \$9 million will be given to the distribution agencies for internal transport. With that, they can buy trucks, they can rent lorries from Sudan, and that should cover the internal transportation cost for the distribution of the U.S. commodities this year.

Mr. WOLPE. Do you have any rough number in terms of what aid is being provided by the EEC, by PVO's and some of the other sources?

Ms. TAFT. We will submit that for the record, sir, unless we have it here.

Mr. GLADSON. Mr. Chairman, the EEC contribution is 39,000 tons.

Mr. WOLPE. I guess the question, I guess the policy question that is raised by the information that you have just supplied to us, in terms of both the substantial quantities of assistance in dollars and food that is going through these agencies and that which is being supplied by the EEC and other donors, it suggests that there ought to be some leverage in terms of our relationship to these groups. I guess the question I would wonder about is: to what extent is that leverage being exercised?

Mr. STACY. All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that in meetings with them we have had frank and very hard discussions with them about what they are doing, what they are doing to their people, and that they are risking losing the support of the American public and the American Congress and the American administration for these kinds of cross-border operations, but that obviously has not

convinced the TPLF not to mount the offensive that they have in the recent days.

[The information referred to above appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. WOLPE. Let me switch now to the Sudan, if I may. In your written testimony, Mr. Gladson, you indicate that the rebel SPLA has not respected relief operations, but you refer only to, and I quote, "press reports" that the government is impeding relief efforts. Could you give us some detail about what our government thinks or knows about specific Sudanese Government failures to deliver relief supplies to those that are in rather desperate need in the south?

Mr. GLADSON. I think that it is a combination of SPLA activities in the south that make it an extremely dangerous situation in which to work and to deliver food, and government inaction in terms of delivering food that is available for delivery to the south. There is no question in my mind that the Government of Sudan has available to it the wherewithal and the food to get more into the south than it is presently getting into the south.

We have been very active ourselves. We have tried to figure out different ways of getting food up from Kenya. We have provided substantial resources in food swaps to get food into the south from Kenya, and we have provided something like 20,000 tons specifically earmarked for distribution from Khartoum to the south, but we are very worried about the actual performance of the government and about the interference with the ability to deliver food by the SPLA.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Stacy, can you give us some detail about the nature of our conversations with the Sudanese Government and what results those conversations have yielded?

Mr. STACY. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, we have had a series of discussions with the Sudanese Government, not only about the question of their support for food operations in the south but also the whole question of trying to find a nonmilitary solution to the differences between themselves and those forces represented by the south.

In the context of the food discussions, I would say that we do believe that the government is making a renewed effort. Certainly the effort to push these barges through to Malakal that I testified about earlier received a lot of support from the government. They have formed a Mercy Committee now and are trying to reinvigorate certain ministries to try to deliver food more effectively.

Certainly the Prime Minister since his election—and I think it is no secret to this committee that you are dealing with a coalition government there that has all sorts of problems. It is not a government that I would say has a great deal of clout to solve these problems overnight, but their offer of a cease-fire which was made in April of last year has been rejected by the SPLA. There have been mediators shuttling back and forth between Addis and Khartoum. There have been meetings that have been held, both in London and in Kampala, between the government and representatives of the SPLA.

We basically have carried on a dialogue with the Prime Minister and with the government, encouraging that they try to modify the

Sharia laws, that they try to deal with the constitutional issues which are really at the crux of this fighting. The recent moves on the part of the government to come up with a new charter we think are encouraging.

Mr. WOLPE. My understanding is that when there was a meeting, I think it was on February 27th with the Prime Minister, that did not go that well and that we have been rather dissatisfied with the response of the government. Those barges you just referred to, isn't it true that this also involves substantial commercial and military supplies and a relatively small amount of relief supplies? I guess what I sense here is, are the reports of our dissatisfaction with the government inaccurate?

Mr. STACY. I would say we feel the government certainly can do better. That has never been at issue, but the fact that the government is really trying to talk to the SPLA now, the fact that they have formed a joint commission, is very encouraging. I don't think we want to throw cold water on the government's efforts now to talk about a solution. The fact that they are talking in Sudan is very important. I wish that we had that kind of situation in some of the other areas, such as Ethiopia.

Mr. WOLPE. The government has not, as I understand it, done more than to undertake some—they have not entered into direct discussions with the SPLA. There is this so-called nonofficial committee. What is your reaction to all that? I mean, isn't it necessary that there be some direct discussions established, and haven't we in fact been pushing the government for direct discussions with the SPLA?

Mr. STACY. Well, I mean, whether these discussions have been direct or indirect I think is a question of interpretation. There were talks in London that I would say were more direct than indirect. The discussions in Kampala were probably more indirect than direct. The transitional charter, as you undoubtedly know, Mr. Chairman, calls for the adoption of substitute legislation, in substitute for the September laws, and also an equitable distribution of natural resources. It also calls for a government that is both African and Islamic, and the joint commission that has been formed is going to meet later this month. We think that is encouraging.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, you know, I am sensing a bit the kind of reaction that I sensed some time ago within the earlier regime, in which for reasons that relate to—sometimes I think that our friendship is not always as helpful as it might be, because we sometimes pull our punches in talking with the Sudanese in ways that I think are not helpful to the end product.

For example, the discussion of the Islamic law issue, surely you are not suggesting that the formulation the government has emerged with, that you believe it is adequate to an ultimate political settlement, are you? Even the most moderate of Sudanese have raised—those are pro-government southerners—have indicated they don't believe that it represents any kind of significant progress.

I guess when you suggest that somehow what has happened to this point is kind of indicative of progress, I am not sure that you are saying things that these guys want to hear in that respect. I

mean, I think that undermines an effort to kind of accelerate and to intensify the political negotiations that are in fact required.

Mr. STACY. I am not sure I follow your line of thinking in that, Congressman. I am not going to judge whether the ideas that have been put forward are adequate to roll back the Sharia laws to a point where they would be satisfactory to the southerners. I think what they have made clear is that they are prepared to put all of these things on the table for discussion in a constitutional context, and that is what is important.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, I came away from my own visitations in the Sudan, and we had rather extensive discussions with all of the parties some time ago, with a real sense of sadness that indeed, not unlike our own racial situation within the United States, that some well-intended northerners who really thought they were taking a rather magnanimous step and had a more enlightened understanding of what was needed to maintain the unity of the country, in fact failed to comprehend that sense of second-class citizenship that those in the north so keenly felt and perceived, and that is tough. It is a tough psychological barrier to transcend. It's a bit like a lot of white folks in the United States who have had great difficulty fully comprehending what it is to be black in our own society.

I say that understanding fully how sensitive these matters are, but I confess to a much greater sense of stagnation in those talks that you describe and that you characterize as manifesting substantial progress. I don't see that progress yet, and I guess my only hope would be that we will continue everything we can to press for greater creativity and perhaps greater risk-taking on the part of those that can help structure an ultimate dispensation for the Sudan.

We have also been told, my understanding is also, and maybe this is the kind of issue that you would probably more comfortably deal with in executive session than in public session, but my understanding is—and I hope it is the case—that we have been far more explicit in expressing our own sense of concern about the nature of the proposal that has been advanced than you have suggested just now in your kind of summary of America's position.

Mr. STACY. These issues are extremely sensitive. As you said, you came away from your experience in Sudan with a great sense of sadness. The issues are very sensitive to the government and you know the Sudanese Government is a government that we have worked with very, very closely. You say perhaps we pull our punches. Well, that is not always the case.

As this committee is undoubtedly aware, the levels of assistance to Sudan in the last few years have declined precipitously. This year we are providing no military assistance to that government. There are no MAP funds available to Sudan. We have certainly sent very strong signals to that government that they must come to terms, not only with their economic policies but to really try to solve the issues peacefully between themselves and their southern citizens.

So I think we will continue to speak strongly, but we must recognize that this is a government that for many issues in the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East has been partner, and we want to work with this government. It is one of the few democratically

elected governments in Africa, and for that reason we will continue to work with them.

Mr. WOLPE. No, I understand. In fact, I was in the Sudan shortly after the transition, the end of the former regime, and the sense of euphoria and excitement that greeted that change by almost the whole population was really very exciting for all of us as observers.

My concern is not whether this is a government that we want to work with. Our concern is whether or not we are in fact doing everything that is consistent with your analysis, in terms of what needs to be done to secure that political settlement and to end the killing.

As you know, I and a number of other subcommittee or committee chairmen concerned with the relief efforts, Congressman Leland, Senator Kennedy, Senator Simon, appealed to both the Prime Minister and to Colonel Garang to cooperate with an open roads policy in secure areas and to put humanitarian over military priorities in areas they control. Those messages were transmitted via our Embassies in Khartoum, Addis Ababa about 2 weeks ago. Could you tell us what has been the response and whether our Embassies endorsed those particular appeals?

Mr. STACY. The Embassies have delivered the appeals, Mr. Chairman. They have been put into the hands of senior officials. I have no way to confirm whether those have actually gotten into the hands of the principals.

Getting back to the question that you raised earlier as to the SPLA response, for instance, to a cease-fire, I think it is very appropriate that we have laid some of these canards at the feet of Chairman Mengistu because certainly his country has not played the most constructive role down there in trying to encourage both sides to arrive at a nonmilitary solution.

But we have no response to those letters at the present time. If we do—those may come in privately, through direct channels, they may come in through the embassies—we will get in touch with you immediately.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

What is the United States planning to do concerning the need for some food relief or even simply a survey of displaced southerners in Khartoum, given the Sudan Council of Churches reports of a doubling of infant mortality among this population and high malnutrition?

Ms. TAFT. We have been trying to find that out. Quite frankly, one of the problems that—

Mr. WOLPE. To find what out? I'm sorry.

Ms. TAFT. To find out what the condition of the displaced persons in Khartoum and Omderman is, and get a census and get some needs assessments. Many of the people who came to the urban areas there have joined their families and have gone into nonspecific settlement areas. The Sudan Council of Churches is trying to pull together some programs. There are some maternal and child health programs. We have tried to get some definition from the mission and from the U.N. and from the Government of Sudan, and quite frankly I must say we don't have a good handle on that.

In connection with our orphan funds that we have available, we have asked the U.S. A.I.D. mission Khartown whether or not there

would be any appropriate interventions for the children in that urban area that were separated from their families. They seemed to feel that there would be some programs that could be developed for them. They are just now trying to get a handle on that, but I think it is a hidden problem that we don't have any hard facts on but we have to pursue. Your raising it now is a very good opportunity for us to go back again and try to do a better assessment and work harder with the Government of Sudan on that.

Mr. WOLPE. My last question on the Sudan, what is the United States doing to reverse Sudan's new policy of expelling private voluntary organizations engaged in food relief in the south on what I understand to be rather poorly documented security charges, and what is the likely impact of such expulsions on food aid distribution?

Mr. STACY. Mr. Chairman, we do understand as you do that the cabinet in Sudan has upheld the decision of the government to ask the three PVO's to depart. We very much regret this decision. These views have been made known to the Prime Minister very forcefully, that we think this is a mistake, that these organizations have very important and legitimate roles to play in distributing food in the south, but that has not dissuaded them from taking these steps.

Frankly, it is difficult to assess, with all the other problems, what this will mean in terms of a gap in food distribution efforts. We just have no assessment of what this will mean particularly in the town where these organizations were working.

Mr. WOLPE. OK. I want to shift now to Angola for the last series of questions. U.S. assistance last year to Angola amounted to a mere 12,410 tons of food aid. It included no nonfood assistance. Our food contributions amount to approximately 5 percent of the international donations. Our nonfood assistance is zero percent. This is a radically smaller U.S. proportion of the international relief effort than what is seen in Mozambique, in Ethiopia and in numerous other comparably difficult situations, and I wonder if you can give us the explanation for that rather sharp disparity, Mr. Stacy?

Mr. STACY. Well, I think Congressman Burton gave us a large part of the answer, Mr. Chairman. We have continued to view that the Angola situation is substantially different from that of Mozambique and Ethiopia and other countries which do not have the resources. We find it curious that the lifting of oil reserves has gone up to 400,000 barrels a day in Angola, and that commercial food imports have fallen in the meantime; that the destitute that we are dealing with that are identified in the U.N. report are primarily in urban areas.

Quite frankly, when I read the U.N. report, which talks about preferential access to food stores for Party members and people in urban areas, while there a million destitute out there that do not have access to these food stores, that do not have access to imported food that could come from the foreign exchange earned by the oil liftings, I really find that report is a very strong indictment of the policies of that government.

I don't think, frankly, that we should be responding in the same way that we are trying to do in Ethiopia and Mozambique. I think that we need to make sure that we are supporting the UNICEF

and ICRC efforts. I think that we should encourage the government to do what it has said it will do, opening its doors to international PVO's to come in there and help, but I think we also have to hold that government responsible for importing the food it needs to feed its urban destitute.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, let me just say that the international relief agency officials testified earlier that the Angolan Government was taking steps to alter, to make a number of reforms in its institutional capacity; that they have had a very positive response. We have had conversations with other embassies, Western embassies operating inside Angola. We are the only folks that would provide the account, Mr. Stacy, that you just provided.

Very bluntly, I mean, I think this is much more a product of politics. I think it is really a violation of our traditional posture with respect to food and humanitarian assistance. I think it is very tragic. I think it is particularly tragic that we are contributing to the killing and to the death that is taking place in Angola, and then preaching to the Angolans about how they ought to be doing more in the humanitarian area. I find that absolutely extraordinary.

My last question would be whether or not American willingness to respond to the emergency in Angola is linked to the increasing Angolan Government commercial imports of foods?

Mr. GLADSON. We are gratified that the U.N. assessment team has completed its report. We find this report, that has now been approved and cleared by the Government of Angola and is ready for release, to be a substantial improvement over previous analysis of needs. We are gratified at the report that the Government of Angola is willing to improve its food distribution systems. It is going to make important steps in terms of its management of its food problem, and we are most gratified that PVO's are now evidently going to be allowed or invited in for the first time to work in Angola.

On the basis of the U.N. report, I stated earlier the U.S. Government's position is that we are now willing to consider favorably international appeals for assistance, and I did not limit that to non-food assistance. We are willing to join in an international meeting on Angola to discuss the results of the U.N. team's assessment, and we are willing to join in a team, if necessary, that would go to the field to look at the technical requirements. We have so notified the United Nations in a letter that I delivered last week.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, I appreciate those observations and I would encourage you to act as expeditiously as possible and to move in that direction.

I want to come back, though, just for a second to the specific question I asked, just to understand the policy up to this point in time. Has American willingness to respond to the emergency in Angola been linked to the increased Angolan Government commercial imports of food?

Mr. GLADSON. No.

Mr. WOLPE. There has been no linkage?

Mr. GLADSON. No. No request has been made for direct food aid to Angola from the Government of Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. What about the request from UNICEF in that respect?

Mr. GLADSON. We are providing 12,000 tons of food through UNICEF, and we do not feel that at the present time, considering the food pipeline in country, that there is any reason to make a decision to respond to the additional request of UNICEF.

Mr. WOLPE. I think we have only provided 50 percent of the request that was made. Isn't that true?

Mr. GLADSON. They requested 24,000 tons.

Mr. WOLPE. Are we planning to meet that additional request?

Mr. GLADSON. We have not yet made a decision with respect to future support to UNICEF. I would say, however, that we do have some problems regarding UNICEF's ability to monitor the U.S. food that it distributes in Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. Would it not be then possible for us to provide some technical assistance to enable UNICEF to handle that particular task?

Mr. GLADSON. That may be necessary. I think that we would probably not be willing to go forward with more than the present level for UNICEF without being assured that their ability to monitor was improved.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Stacy, you indicated in your testimony that the United States is prepared to be involved in relief efforts in Angola this upcoming year in the event that, and I quote, "responsible PVO's can be found to make deliveries independently." Does that mean that we have approached the International Committee of the Red Cross and begun discussions as to how the United States can direct food and nonfood aid to the central highlands and possibly elsewhere through the ICRC? If we have not had that kind of contact with the ICRC, why not?

Mr. STACY. I would prefer to let Ms. Taft respond, since she is the primary interlocutor with the ICRC on Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. Fine.

Mr. STACY. The purpose of my testimony was to indicate, and this goes back to what I testified in October, that one of the stark differences between the Angola situation and that in, say, Mozambique and Ethiopia, has been the willingness of those latter two governments to really open their doors and say, "Help," to the international PVO's, "come in and work with us." We would like to see that happen in Angola. We think that would be one of the major things that could happen to improve the situation of relief.

Ms. TAFT. Thank you.

In the central plateau region there are about 100,000 people who are being served by ICRC. That is approximately the same number of people that have been served since 1984. ICRC gives us no indications that they think in that area there is greater need than those they are currently serving, nor do they plan to expand to the urban areas.

What is interesting about the ICRC program is, it is the only aid program that we are aware of in Angola that provides 100 percent of its own transportation and monitoring. They accept the food when it comes in. They transport it by aircraft to the area that needs to be provided. They have their own truck fleet. They have 50 expatriate staff. They have a controlled program, where we have

total faith that any resources that are going through ICRC are actually meeting the beneficiaries' needs.

We would be delighted if ICRC would expand. Obviously if there is not a need in that area, they need not expand in that area, but we have indicated to them should they be able to expand elsewhere, as we have supported them in every country, that in Angola as well we would be willing to provide additional support.

The key, of course, is being able to report back to Congress and to GAO that, in fact, we know where the food is going and that there is a monitoring system. We always feel confident that ICRC can do that, and would support additional efforts by UNICEF to increase its monitoring, too. I think that would give us greater confidence that we could actually track the end use of the food.

Mr. WOLPE. OK. Well, I appreciate your indication of a future response based upon some of the things that are happening in Angola, as testified to earlier by the international agencies, in terms of movements that are being made there. This business about you wish that they would expand to the PVO's, and that might make us more willing to do more, I would only note that the Sudan just kicked out two of the largest PVO's and that hasn't deterred us in our determination to assist in the Sudan.

I guess I do have a feeling that, for reasons that are matters of history at this point, that our response has been different here, and I think that is unfortunate. I am pleased with the indications of what I hope will be a more forthcoming response that will be sensitive to what I think is a very tragic human situation that is emerging in Angola, and that is not receiving the attention because of political factors, and I think that is really unfortunate.

Ms. TAFT. But the pivotal point here is that what we have seen or seem to be seeing is a reversal on the part of the Government of Angola, to be willing to accept PVO's. We are very interested in that and supportive of that, and I think we are going to see that emerging over the next few months. As Mr. Gladson pointed out, we want the U.N. to have this meeting quickly because we think that this may be an opportunity, with the Government of Angola's seemingly apparent willingness to accept the PVO's, that we will be able to have more options in terms of how to provide aid.

Mr. WOLPE. OK. Very good.

We have covered a good deal of ground today, and I appreciate both your patience in awaiting your turn in what has been a very long day of testimony, and appreciate also your willingness to supply this committee, at the staff level as well as in formal testimony, much of the background information that can help us do our job of oversight. Our effort is to try to work with you in trying to make certain that we minimize the suffering that is occurring, and advance America's humanitarian and national interests in the process as well, so let me thank you all.

We do have some additional questions, and I hope that if we would ask, that you might respond to those in writing, and they will be supplied in the very near future. Thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICKEY LELAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF TEXAS**

Good afternoon. I am glad to join my dear friend and respected colleague, Howard Wolpe, in co-chairing today's hearing on four serious and worsening humanitarian crises in Africa. I would like to welcome our witnesses today, especially Mr. Brona Szynalski with the World Food Program who has come from Rome to present information at today's hearing and Charles la Muniere who returned from Angola and Mozambique only three days ago. These two gentlemen are directing key elements of the United Nations' relief programs in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the Sudan and elsewhere in Africa. Their presence here is greatly appreciated and will be of enormous benefit in our efforts to understand the scale of the current problems in Africa.

Since the Hunger Committee and the Africa Subcommittee held their first joint hearing on food emergencies in Africa in 1984, much has changed in the U.S. Government response to these crises, but unfortunately much has remained the same.

In 1984, we were involved in a struggle with the Administration over providing adequate food and non-food assistance to Ethiopia. Several concerns were put forward by an Administration arguing for delay and caution -- and some of these concerns were not unfounded -- but the fact remained that children were going hungry and the U.S. was not providing much food. Pressure from the Congress, the press and the public eventually led the U.S. Government to provide more assistance than any other donor and to be the major actor in response to the Ethiopian famine.

Ethiopia is again faced with famine, and this time the Administration has been out in front in providing food assistance. We have some concerns about U.S. Government non-food aid, in particular transport assistance, but overall the Administration is to be commended for its work in this country.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Administration's efforts in Angola. Howard and I met with some of you in a hearing last October and discussed U.S. assistance to Angola, and the responses we received were reminiscent of our discussions concerning Ethiopia in 1984. It seems that in the five months since our hearing, there has been no change in policy despite the deepening crisis in Angola. Again, children's lives are threatened, and, again, the Administration's decision is not to provide desperately needed assistance. This is a matter that we will certainly address in today's hearing.

We will also look into safe transport agreements in the Sudan and Ethiopia, and the role that the U.S. can play in securing such agreements. In Mozambique, we are interested in the U.S. commitment to meeting the needs in an increasingly difficult situation and how it is that food and medicine can be supplied to those in critical need.

As the scope of this hearing is ambitious and the time is limited, I would like to ask all witnesses to restrict their statements to a few minutes each. We will insert your entire written statements into the record. I would also ask the witnesses and our colleagues alike to assist Howard and me in retaining the focus of this hearing. We are examining the nature and the magnitude of grave humanitarian crises threatening literally millions of people in four nations. There are, of course, important political and economic issues present in each of these countries, but given the ambitious scope of this hearing and the limited time available, I hope we can limit our discussion to those issues directly related to the emergencies in each country -- and our ability to respond to those emergencies.

I look forward to the testimony and to the discussion this afternoon. I believe that some of my colleagues may have opening remarks.

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF OHIO**

Good afternoon. I would like to express my appreciation to the Africa Subcommittee, and to its chairman, my friend and respected colleague Howard Wolpe, for holding today's joint hearing with the Hunger Committee.

In my years with the Select Committee on Hunger, I have become increasingly concerned with the continuing crises in Africa. A few months ago, I visited Ethiopia and Mozambique and saw first-hand the critical conditions that the people of those countries are facing. I was encouraged by the U.S. Government's efforts in both Ethiopia and Mozambique to supply and deliver assistance under almost impossible conditions. I want to commend the Administration for its work in these countries and in the Sudan.

Unfortunately, in the few short months since I visited Africa, the conditions in these countries has deteriorated, especially in Ethiopia. I look forward to hearing how the Administration and the United Nations perceive the situations in these countries and what efforts will be undertaken to overcome these new obstacles.

I am also concerned by the Administration's apparent unwillingness to make a significant contribution to the needs in Angola. I understand that the Administration has several objections to providing more aid to the people of Angola, but it seems that similar objections are not raised with aid to other countries with similar problems.

I look forward to discussing these issues this afternoon as we all attempt to address the difficult problems facing these four African countries. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF MISSOURI

I welcome our witnesses to this hearing on food aid in Africa. Our interest will focus on Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique. These four countries are very different in some important respects, but very similar in other ways. I will be interested in hearing about the particular emergency relief needs in each country.

There are some striking differences between these countries. Ethiopia is the poorest country in the world, with a per capita income of about \$100 dollars. In contrast, Angola's per capita GNP is nine times that amount. In fact, the MPLA regime in Angola spends more on weapons per person per year than the average person in Ethiopia earns in an entire year.

The food aid needs in these countries also vary greatly. Most international attention has focused on Ethiopia, which was the scene of a tragic famine just a few years ago. Drought has once again returned to the country, creating a need for 1.3 million tons of emergency food. Less noticed, but perhaps more serious, is the emergency in Mozambique, where as much as one-third of the population may be at risk.

While drought has been a major factor in some of these countries, civil war appears to be the most common denominator. All four countries are engaged in civil wars that are not only causing suffering among civilians, but are also making relief efforts difficult. I am afraid that much of the suffering in these countries will not end until the fighting ends. I am pleased that Mr. Stacey is here to address the diplomatic issues associated with these emergencies.

As the hearing progresses, I will have several questions for the witnesses. I look forward to hearing their testimony.

AFRICAN FACT SHEET

Population at Risk (millions)		% of Population	Food Aid Needs 1988 (tons)
Ethiopia	7.2	17	1.3 million
Sudan	2.8-3.2	13-15	570,000
Mozambique	3.2-4.3	23-32	750,000
Angola	1.7	20	240,000

(Sources: Famine Early Warning System Country Reports, U.S. Agency for International Development; Foodcrops and Shortages January/February 1988, Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N.)

	GNP (\$m)	Per Capita GNP (\$)	Military Expenditures		
			(\$m)	% GNP	\$ per capita
Ethiopia	4,742	113	442	9.3	10
Sudan	8,680	404	283	3.3	13
Mozambique	5,667	422	273	4.8	20
Angola	6,970	940	988	14.2	133

(Source: World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-1988, 12th Edition, Ruth Leger Sivard. Data is best estimate for 1984, most recent figures available.)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. GLADSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA,
BUREAU FOR AFRICA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to appear before this panel at this important hearing. I am pleased to be able to carry on this Administration's and A.I.D.'s tradition of constructive and close cooperation with your committees as we seek temporary and longer-term solutions to hunger and malnutrition in Africa. I also thank you for your recent concurrent resolution commending us for our emergency relief efforts to date, and urging us to continue these efforts.

This hearing focuses on the emergency needs of Africans in the continent's most emergency-affected countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. There are no countries in Africa now where life is more tenuous for so many millions, or where it is more challenging and difficult to meet short-term, life-sustaining needs. The situations in each country can be mistaken as similar; in fact, they are each very different and unique.

At the same time, the factors driving the emergency needs of these four countries have shifted in a very significant and telling fashion. In the past, the impact of natural disaster(s) - drought, flood, pestilence and disease - was the prime factor, the momentum behind the emergency need. The suffering of innocent men, women and children elicited an immediate humanitarian out-pouring from Americans. Now, however, and although natural factors are still present and important in each of these countries, man-made factors predominate and drive the seemingly intractable emergency situations and ever-escalating needs.

The man-made factors which cause the great human distress in these countries are well known. I need not elaborate beyond a bare mention of the most obvious factors, of which civil strife is by far the most important:

-- Internal strife - civil wars, disrupt all aspects of life for millions of non-combatants in large areas of each of the four countries, drive many into refugee status in neighboring countries, manipulate relief efforts and highlight the inhumanity of the situation innocent victims face;

-- Misguided governmental policies, particularly in the agricultural sector, fail to provide incentives for peasant farmers to produce enough food for themselves, let alone increase agricultural production. They also interfere with the human rights of peasant farmers;

-- Poorly developed infrastructure and few man-made resources, severely hamper the delivery of emergency assistance to people;

-- Inefficient governmental institutions, which are incapable of coordinating overall relief efforts.

The overall result of the presence of these factors is that millions of people are threatened with death. An overlay of natural disaster only aggravates the already tenuous existence of these millions. Moreover, these disasters often spill over into neighboring countries in the form of refugees, creating a significant burden for the country of asylum.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, the U.S. Government's desire to be of assistance in helping African governments meet their emergency needs has not changed. It is useful, nevertheless, for the record, to reiterate our approach:

-- Identify, with other donors and the U.N.,

potential emergency needs (and their cause) at the earliest moment possible;

-- Determine what the African government is going to contribute in terms of resources and cooperation;

-- Quantify all needs and resources as accurately as possible and determine what additional options exist for donor assistance;

-- Determine and provide the appropriate level of U.S. emergency assistance, given the unique country situation, on a timely basis through the most effective channel(s) to help meet emergency needs;

-- Monitor and evaluate the U.S. programs to ensure the assistance is used for the purposes intended.

In order to help us achieve these objectives, A.I.D. shares information widely with other potential donor organizations and nations. This is one of the hallmarks of the experience gained during the previous droughts and famine - greater communication, information sharing, networking if you will, with our many contacts here, in Europe, in Africa and around the world. As a result, we are better prepared earlier to anticipate problems in Africa, and to propose solutions. It does not always make resolution of the problems easier, but it does allow us to program the use of available resources more efficiently and effectively.

While there are overall criteria for reviewing emergencies in Africa, no two emergencies are identical. While there are often similarities in the situations in different countries (i.e., suffering from internal warfare, poor government policies, extended periods of drought), each country situation is unique. The situation in Ethiopia, for

example, is different from that in southern Sudan. The situation in Angola is different from that in Mozambique.

Consequently, while A.I.D. and other Government agencies apply the same emergency matrix to each situation, the resultant emergency program responds to a particular country situation and is made-to-order for the needs of that country at that time.

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At this point, let me provide you with a short summary of the U.S. Government's emergency assistance program in each of the four countries. This will highlight the differences that exist in the four countries, and underscore the validity of our basic approach - to design an emergency program that is unique, responsive and appropriate to the emergency needs and conditions in each of the countries.

ANGOLA

In many ways, Angola is the most problematic of the emergency programs in Africa:

- It is a relatively rich country, with foreign exchange earnings in the neighborhood of two billion dollars per annum.

Angola could afford easily to buy its total food shortfall on commercial terms in world markets. Total imported food needs are estimated to cost in the neighborhood of three to five percent of its oil revenues per annum.

- The problems in Angola are the result of civil strife and economic mismanagement.

- The Angolan government (GPRA) has demonstrated little initiative about publicizing its emergency needs, or soliciting emergency aid.

In 1987 alone, the GPRA twice delayed publication of United Nations emergency assessments of the situation. The latest UN report has been "in clearance" by the GPRA since November of last year.

-- Except for the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) program in the Planalto, there are no independent relief operations which can monitor the delivery of relief supplies to the intended recipients.

Nevertheless, the U.S. is committed to providing emergency assistance to affected people in Angola. From 1981 through 1987, we have provided 78,000 MT of high-value supplementary foods valued at \$36 million. These programs were conducted, in the beginning, through the World Food Program (WFP), and more recently through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). They are targeted for maternal and child feeding, particularly of displaced women and children.

In addition to our food aid, we have been financing one quarter of the cost of the ICRC emergency aid program. This program is now reaching about 100,000 people in the Planalto.

Our concern about Angola was heightened by the UN's draft emergency assessment, completed in June 1987. A review of the document raised some questions. For example, a major portion of the emergency food need - a requirement to feed two million urban dwellers - was premised on a temporary shortfall in oil revenue caused by lower world oil prices. But by the time the report was completed, oil prices had recovered and Angola's foreign exchange position was improved enough to permit purchases of commercial food in the world market. And, as we testified last October, the report lacked data needed to substantiate its assessment of emergency needs. The information was almost wholly derived from Government sources, without any on-the-spot

verification of data. The report also provided little information on what the GPRA planned to contribute and how it proposed to implement emergency programs. Finally, the GPRA held up publication of the report - in fact, it has never been issued officially and its emergency value has been diluted by the passage of time.

Because of the numerous questions raised by the UN report, the U.S. decided to try to develop additional information on the situation in Angola. A.I.D. and State created an informal working group to monitor developments in the country. And, we began regular consultations with ICRC officials in Luanda, Geneva and Washington. Throughout this recent period, A.I.D. has kept in constant contact with officials of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in New York and overseas. Given our concern about the situation and the lack of information, the U.S. requested a meeting of the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group in Geneva - a group of donor representatives to various Geneva-sited bodies that deal with refugee and other emergency issues.

Finally, Department of State officials who have travelled to Angola have made it a priority to meet with local representatives of the western donor countries, NGOs, and the UN agencies to hear their analysis and assessment of the situation. Based on these discussions, we have concluded that pockets of severe food shortage and malnutrition appear to exist in the eastern towns of Angola in the vicinity of the fighting between the GPRA and UNITA. But this region is extremely insecure and it appears almost impossible for anyone to deliver assistance in that area. It now looks as though there might have been some improvement recently because of the expectation of a reasonable harvest and the fact that additional food aid needs have been fully subscribed by donors.

This impression is reinforced by the recent (February 18) press release by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It notes that food requirements for the current

crop year (ending March 31st) have been met fully, through a combination of donor food aid and an increase in Angola's own commercial food imports. There is no projection in the press release of food needs for the coming crop year. We deduce that the crop now being harvested, therefore, should alleviate the need for additional cereal imports for some time, and a carryover stock of emergency food for feeding displaced people is expected.

A.I.D. is awaiting the release of the new UN emergency assessment, which was provided to the GPRA last November. Based on our knowledge, we believe that the new UN assessment is more comprehensive than any previous assessment. We understand that the assessment highlights specific actions that the Angolan Government must take to improve the management of emergency operations. It also enumerates needs in the areas of health, logistics, relief and survival goods, agricultural recovery and water and sanitation. When the UN report is released, we will be able to review it and judge how best to provide an appropriate U.S. response to any additional food or non-food aid needs it identifies. Further, the U.S. has been in touch with senior UN officials in New York to express our willingness to participate in a joint donor meeting to address the technical issues of an expanded donor relief effort.

In sum, the U.S. is prepared to increase the level of its emergency and humanitarian assistance to the people of Angola if the situation warrants. We will certainly continue to fund the ICRC programs, and we would support an expansion if needed. With the approval of a second tranche of 6,000 metric tons (MT) for UNICEF earlier this month, the U.S. has now approved 12,000 MT of blended and fortified supplementary feeding foods, valued at \$5.2 million this fiscal year. UNICEF's program targets displaced mothers and

children in Angola, principally in the Planalto region. Without an up-dated assessment of the kind that we believe is contained in the UN appeal, we cannot technically justify the second tranche. Our Angola working group, however, decided that the pipeline should keep flowing because of the time it takes for shipments to arrive.

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ETHIOPIA

Once again, A.I.D. is providing emergency and humanitarian assistance to deal with the consequences of severe drought in Ethiopia. Approximately seven million Ethiopians are believed to be at risk, a threat comparable to the famine of just three years ago. To date, the U.S. has committed 267,000 MT of food aid, valued at \$94.6 million, to meet the needs of the hungry, as well as \$12.3 million in non-food aid for associated emergency costs (trucks, airlift, spare parts, et cetera). Our food contribution is about 30 percent of total food donations to date.

There are, however, significant differences between the current drought and the previous ones. As last Saturday's article in the Washington "Post" pointed out:

-- When drought conditions unexpectedly returned, in the summer of 1987, A.I.D.'s early warning system - of sophisticated weather satellites with backup from NGOs and donors on the ground - forecast the problem before it became reality.

A.I.D. was able to set a U.S. emergency relief program in motion quickly, in large part because we continued to support a residual core of American PVOs in Ethiopia. Our rapid response to the crisis and work with the UN and other donors stimulated them to make special efforts as well.

This prompt action by the U.S. has put us "ahead of the curve" until now in dealing with the drought. So far, in collaboration with partner PVOs and the UN:

-- It has been possible to help families stay on their farms.

-- We have been able to avoid a desperate abandonment of home for disease-ridden famine feeding camps by assuring that they can bring enough food home with them from strategically located distribution centers.

In addition, the UN truck fleet, although it showed the effects of two years running on some of the worst roads in the world, was still available and could be reinforced rather than having to be created anew.

Some U.S. and other donor residual food from earlier programs was already on hand to meet the earliest needs, giving the donor community a grace period in which to fill the supply pipeline.

Further, the Ethiopian government assumed greater responsibility for the drought response effort and was more forthcoming with the donor community. It transferred budgetary resources from other government departments to expand emergency relief programs and released 50,000 MT of food from its strategic reserves to be used for emergency feeding of drought victims.

Other donors have responded as before, with traditional donors providing almost 400,000 MT of food aid and significant non-food aid, including trucks and airlift. In a surprise development, the Soviet Union pledged 250,000 MT of wheat for the current emergency. We understand that some of it is being bought in foreign markets.

These developments, however, may well be overtaken by unfavorable events very shortly. The drought again is most severe in northern Ethiopia, an area that is even more hotly disputed by guerrillas than before. Road travel in Eritrea and Tigray is threatened continuously. After the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) attack on two relief convoys on October 23rd, both guerrilla groups active in the north promised to respect marked relief vehicles. EPLF attacks on Ethiopian commercial trucks continue, however, and indiscriminate mining of roads is a constant hazard to all vehicles.

No less important, the Ethiopian government (GPDRE) has yet to discharge forcefully its responsibility to de-mine roads, keep them open and minimize impediments to road use by relief vehicles. As the "Post" article describes, relief trucks are being sidelined to give military transport priority. The result has been an unnecessarily excessive and costly reliance on airlift to provide food in Tigray province of northern Ethiopia.

Despite the continuous use of airlift since December to reach towns isolated by insecure roads, relief stocks are becoming more precarious. Over the next few months the inadequate autumn harvest will be exhausted. This will require that a larger volume of relief commodities be moved to areas of need, particularly in Tigray, but the security situation will make this expansion difficult to achieve.

In the northern regions the transportation infrastructure is stretched severely: the port of Massawa is small and cannot handle the influx of imports easily, and both the road and truck fleets must be stretched beyond their limits to distribute needed relief. The additional truck need in the north is being met by transferring vehicles from the south - many from the Government's truck fleet - and by importing new, donor-supplied vehicles. The losses of relief, commercial, and government trucks by violent means, however,

offsets about one-third of the gain in trucks. Overall, if the roads could be kept open, there are enough trucks and food in place to meet the need.

The most hopeful aspect of this horrendous situation is that the short "belg" rains of 1988, beginning last month, are on schedule and falling in good quantity. This may mean that the later, long, "meher" rains will come.

In the long run, however, future prospects for Ethiopia are not good. The shortfall due to unfavorable weather continues to be matched and outstripped by the impact of lagging production due to bad agricultural policies: forced sale of produce to the state, low farm-gate prices, unsettled land tenure, misdirected farm inputs and other disincentives to peasant farmer production. The resultant "structural" food deficit continues to grow by at least 250,000 MT per annum. By the end of this century it will exceed 2.0 million MT per annum.

While there have been some recent moves towards agricultural policy reform by the Government of Ethiopia, the initial steps have been so small as to have no meaningful influence on production.

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique faces two emergencies. In one, millions of rural people afflicted by civil strife and drought are in need of relief food. In the other, millions of urban people are in need of food aid because Mozambique can no longer feed its cities from domestic production, nor can the country pay for food imports on commercial terms.

The emergency situation in Mozambique's rural areas is possibly the worst in Africa because the civil conflict directs vicious attacks on civilians in addition to

inhibiting relief programs and making food delivery extremely dangerous in virtually all parts of the country. Tens of thousands of Mozambicans continue to flee the country seeking safety, sustenance and shelter in neighboring states. At present there are almost 800,000 Mozambican refugees in other southern African countries. By the end of this year the number may surpass one million. They arrive not only emaciated and stripped of all clothing, but also terrorized.

By the Government's count, the number of affected and displaced people accessible in Mozambique has jumped from 1.8 million at the beginning of 1987 to 3.2 million now. Even if this figure is somewhat overstated, it portrays the magnitude of the disaster. Every day more people - literally naked and starving - stagger into relief centers in Mozambique, fleeing the terror of life in the interior.

Mozambique's rural situation is certainly one of the most difficult. The constantly shifting conflict requires that almost all relief supplies move by armed convoy or by air. Some relief centers can be reached only by air or sealoft.

Although A.I.D.'s position is to favor the use of American PVOs to administer U.S. emergency relief programs, the threat to relief workers is so great that few PVOs can involve themselves with final, end user, distribution. Only the ICRC administers direct food distribution in rural areas. Others, such as World Vision, help the Government's relief agency or the local Red Cross in providing relief aid.

The Government's relief agency, the Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN), in collaboration with CARE, has made steady progress over the last few years in increasing its capacity to deliver food aid. CARE, with substantial A.I.D. funding, was invited by

the Mozambican government to play a vital role in assisting the logistical unit of DPCCN. Nonetheless, although the Government of Mozambique has demonstrated extreme commitment to the relief effort, the country's finances cannot support the resource requirements of DPCCN. The management at the last end-user stage, which is usually handled by American PVOs, must be strengthened. Efforts to help displaced people rebuild their lives in new, "safe" areas have been hampered by the arrival of insurgency.

The United States, through A.I.D., has been responsible for a major portion of the donor relief program in Mozambique. We have supported since inception CARE's assistance program to the DPCCN logistics unit. We provide food for emergency relief to DPCCN and World Vision. In FY 87, the U.S. provided 15,500 MT to World Vision and 15,000 MT to the DPCCN, valued at \$17 million. In FY 88, we have increased World Vision's level to 23,395 MT, and DPCCN's to 35,000 MT, valued at \$ 35.0 million. A.I.D. is also funding the delivery of vital medicines by UNICEF, the distribution of agricultural recovery supplies by World Vision, the internal air transport of relief workers and supplies, and program operational costs for ICRC, World Vision and CARE.

It is clear that the GPRM, DPCCN and all donors must look for ways to improve delivery of relief goods in rural areas. A.I.D. will soon be evaluating the DPCCN/CARE project to see if logistical operations can be improved and expanded. We are also reviewing a proposal to expand sealift capacity as a substitute for armed convoys and airlifts in coastal areas. A.I.D. is also encouraging more American PVOs to become involved, and has received proposals for three new PVO programs.

We are equally concerned with Mozambique's urban food deficit. At present, Mozambique can meet only 10 percent of

its cities' food needs from domestic production. The insurgency and economic atrophy, caused by years of misguided economic policies, have constrained the marketing of local food production. In addition, Mozambique has always imported a portion of the cereal requirements of its cities, but its balance of payments situation is now so desperate, the country will require \$1.0 billion a year of external financing for the next four years, that it can no longer afford to purchase food commercially, or even on concessional terms.

A.I.D. is encouraged by the Government's steps over the past few years to rectify its economic crisis. It has liberalized prices for many food products and raised the prices of others. It has expanded the role of private farmers and private traders in food production and marketing. At the same time, it is undertaking tough, far-reaching macro-economic reforms under the World Bank/IMF Economic Rehabilitation Program. The currency has been devalued in the past year from 40 to 450 Metical to the dollar. The Government deficit is being cut, domestic credit controlled and subsidies phased out.

During FY 87, the U.S. provided 146,100 MT of U.S. food aid for urban, commercial sales in support of the Government's reform program. In the FY 88 food aid program for the urban sector, although still under development, we hope to improve positive impact through self-help measures and programming of local currency generations for specific relief, recovery and rehabilitation activities.

SUDAN

With respect to Sudan, the problems we face in attempting to respond to the difficult, but vital emergency feeding requirements in southern Sudan are formidable.

Most of the needs in this region result from the civil war between the Government and the insurgent forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (S.P.L.A.). Of the six million people living in the south, about 1.5 million are estimated to be affected.

Since the fighting began in earnest again, in 1983, many displaced people have gathered in garrison towns such as Aweil, Wau, Juba and Raga, while others have moved north to Khartoum. The several hundred thousand displaced people in these southern towns are dependent on relief supplies for their survival. Again, the very conflict that drives up the demand for emergency food and relief makes the delivery of these emergency supplies extremely difficult, and in some areas virtually impossible.

Recent press reports, as you may know, have charged that the Government of Sudan (GOS) has failed to support relief efforts in southern Sudan and may, in fact, be impeding relief efforts (e.g., fuel supplies blocked, relief vehicles commandeered by the military, relief convoys not protected, and several U.S. PVOs expelled from the country). The S.P.L.A., on the other hand, has not respected relief operations and has been responsible for several unfortunate incidents which have hampered relief efforts. There is a clear need for all parties in this conflict to respect those agencies carrying out relief efforts. A.I.D. works constantly with members of the donor community and the involved parties to allow neutral parties, such as the ICRC, to extend assistance.

In 1987, A.I.D. worked with the donors to preposition up to 72,000 MT of food for urban centers in the south before the summer rains began in May. Despite our efforts to move food and relief supplies to the south from both northern Sudan

and southern bordering countries (Zaire, Uganda and Kenya), only half of the goal has been met to date. We have completed two wheat swaps with the Government of Kenya in which 6,000 MT of wheat have been exchanged for maize and beans to be moved into southern Sudan. In addition, a swap with the GOS of 20,000 MT of wheat for 25,000 MT of local sorghum has just been signed. As was the case last year, the donors and the Government are attempting to preposition food - to the extent that it is possible given the security situation in the south. Recently, an airlift to Juba began, and there have been some promising reports on improvements in surface supply of relief aid. To the extent that food cannot be moved to the south, the swap with the GOS may be used for drought-stricken regions in other parts of Sudan.

Besides food assistance, the U.S. is providing funds (mainly through PVOs) for:

- road and bridge repairs on roads travelled by relief vehicles;
- transport costs by rail, road, barge and air; and
- health services for the needy people in the Juba area.

Further complicating the situation in Sudan is the large and growing number of Sudanese who are moving from the conflict zones in the south to towns in the north, such as Khartoum. The precise number of displaced people is not clear and is subject to rapid change depending upon the severity of the conflict locally and the availability of relief supplies. Overall, it is conservatively estimated that between 250,000 - 300,000 people have been displaced.

The drought situation in the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan is also worrisome. In early October, 1987, the Government of Sudan and the international donor community became aware that Sudan was, once again, facing a severe,

drought-induced crop failure which could present serious food shortages for upwards of 1.75 million people in the west. This drought, however, is not considered as serious as that which occurred in Sudan in 1985-86:

- The crop losses this year are far less severe than in 1985-86;
- Our crop monitoring system in Sudan was far more effective this year in alerting us to the problem;
- The GOS and donor community have learned much from their relief efforts in 1985-86; and
- There exists now a government provincial relief system to lead relief efforts on the local level in both affected provinces.

Early on it was estimated that about 70,000 MT of grain, mostly sorghum, would be needed for Kordofan, and about 50,000 MT for Darfur. The GOS and donor community, moreover, agreed that in-country food stocks were adequate to meet the needs in both provinces. Equally important, it was agreed that the GOS would carry out this relief effort with minimum outside support, except for expert staff loaned to the GOS relief organizations by several donor groups. Accordingly, it was agreed that donor-generated local currencies would be released to transport and monitor distribution of food stored previously in the west.

At present, food stocks are being released from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) under the donor-coordinated relief program and consigned to the provincial governors. The governors, in turn, are responsible for distributing the food to those in need on an ability-to-pay basis. The Government had already begun distributions from locally available stocks. The first donor-funded tranche of 30,000 MT has already begun to move to the west for distribution and prepositioning. Arrangements for a second donor tranche

of 38,000 MT are now being finalized. We are monitoring the situation closely to ensure that relief efforts to the Government are on track.

I would like to touch briefly on the problem of refugees from Ethiopia who, thus far, are concentrated in and around the northeastern section of the country and Khartoum. As you know, since the Mengistu regime came to power in 1974, there has been a significant influx of Ethiopian refugees into Sudan. They number about a million, according to most accounts. Most of them are not receiving any direct assistance from relief agencies and are, to some degree, integrated into the local economy. Their presence and participation in the economy has been a source of political tension. In 1984-85, the drought in Ethiopia generated large numbers of refugees. Many of these refugees returned to Ethiopia in 1985 to resume their lives. With the resurgence of drought in 1987, there was speculation that large numbers of Tigrayans might come to Sudan again. To date, this influx has not materialized.

Clearly, the Government of Sudan is shouldering heavy responsibilities in dealing with these emergencies. Sudan is a large country, but these emergencies and long standing economic mismanagement add significantly to the country's dire economic situation. The nation has an extremely high debt already and it is unable to meet its payments to the international community.

Recently, there have been some promising signs that the Sudanese have taken corrective measures associated with an economic reform program. The U.S. has played a critical role in this process and our assistance will be an integral element of any long-term solution to Sudan's problems.

Thank you for the opportunity to describe our emergency relief programs in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. I would be pleased to respond to questions.

INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA

According to the United Nations World Food Program listing, as of March 29, 1988, confirmed contributions pledged toward 1988 emergency food needs in Ethiopia were as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Amount of Food (MT)</u>
Australia	15,900
Austria	7,020
Canada	18,000
Canadian Food Grains Bank	9,389
Canada, Red Cross	4,500
Canadian International Development Agency	6,000
Denmark	15,600
Denmark, Red Cross	500
European Community	193,000
Finland	250
Finland, Red Cross	1,400
France	17,000
Germany, Fed. Rep.	26,059
Greece	4,000
International Committee of the Red Cross	7,658
Italy	21,040
Japan	65
Japan, Red Cross	785
Mennonites	8,347
Menschen fur Menschen	10,000
Netherlands Dutch Red Cross	2,580
Norway, Redd Barna	10,040
Norway	80
Soviet Union	250,000
Soviet Union, Red Cross	11
Sweden, Radda Barnen	900
Switzerland	4,800
Switzerland, Red Cross	2,000
United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization	60
United Kingdom	68,620
United States	271,737*
World Food Program	56,895
TOTAL	1,034,209

*Figure for U.S. contribution provided by A.I.D. as of May 4, 1988.

The international organizations and private and voluntary agencies which have assisted in A.I.D. emergency food aid distribution in Ethiopia are as follows:

- Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)
- Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC)
- Food for the Hungry International (FHI)
- Save the Children Federation (SCF)
- Joint Relief Partnership (JRP)
- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- Missionaries of Charity (CRS/MC)
- World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO)
- U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Responses to Questions for Charles Gladson

Questions Submitted by Hon. Mickey Leland

PRIVATIZING RELIEF OPERATIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, I understand that the U.S. Government is evaluating its support for the joint operations of the Mozambican Government's relief operation, DPCCN, and CARE. Apparently one proposal from the U.S. was to sell trucks from the DPCCN fleet to the private sector in order to "privatize" the relief operation. Is this true, and if so, does it not seem illogical to you to reduce the government's trucking fleet in a period when conditions are worsening? If the Administration is interested in strengthening the private trucking capacity in Mozambique rather than further building up the government's fleet, have you considered providing more funding to CARE and DPCCN to hire private trucks to augment its own fleet?

Answer: To my knowledge, there has been no suggestion to privatize the fleet of Mozambique's Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) while there is still a major ongoing emergency. Rather, the United States, other donors and the Government of Mozambique itself are interested in using private sector truckers to supplement DPCCN's transport capacity and allow DPCCN's trucks to be more effectively used in priority areas for district-level and local distribution. The evaluation of the CARE program will examine how this might be done, specifically how the emergency program can provide private truckers with access to the spare parts, fuel, lubricants and new equipment they need. There have been suggestions, even within the Government of Mozambique, of privatizing some government trucking operations to improve efficiency, but not that of DPCCN at present.

MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, I have heard that the State Department plans to drop Mozambique from the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and in its place have Senegal and Somalia. I find this hard to believe when Mozambique is facing one of the most severe famines in the world, partly as a result of drought which is what FEWS is supposed to look for. Could you explain this decision? What is the status of the decision and what can be done to change it?

Answer: The design team for the new FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) project is working now to define an objective basis for determining which countries should be included in the project. The decision has not yet been made.

We share your concern about the present severe famine in Mozambique, which is due not only to drought but to a high degree is the result of civil unrest. However, the inclusion of Mozambique in FEWS is not certain for the following reasons: (a) our resources for FEWS are limited - they will focus on the Sahelian belt; (b) Mozambique, unlike other countries in Africa, is not afflicted with continuous famine problems due to natural causes; and (c) the inability to place FEWS personnel in the field for security reasons seriously complicates the FEWS approach. In the event that Mozambique is not selected as a core FEWS country, please be assured that we will continue to monitor conditions there that may require a response to potential famine. A.I.D. has provided emergency assistance to Mozambique almost annually since 1977, and we would expect to supply additional requirements in the future, should it be necessary.

USG RESPONSE TO UN ANGOLA APPEAL

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, now that the Angolan Government has approved the UN appeal, is the U.S. Government prepared to accept this report and provide assistance? Or does the Administration continue to have concern about the validity of the UN's figures? Are there any other obstacles which must be overcome before the U.S. provides increased amounts of food and non-food assistance?

Answer: The current UN report on Angola is probably as accurate as is possible, given the circumstances in the country. In addition to a demonstrated need for emergency assistance, however, we also require a reliable means by which we can be assured that our assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries. This is difficult in Angola, as there are presently no U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) through which to work. While some PVOs have expressed interest in establishing programs in Angola, the security situation has so far precluded any from doing this. Also, international organizations operating in Angola have only limited access to rural areas where the need is the greatest. Nonetheless, we believe that suitable means for delivering U.S. assistance can be found. We will pursue this issue with the UN. It should be noted that the UN report does not identify any need for food aid at present. We will continue to support the UNICEF supplementary feeding program and monitor the overall food situation to the extent possible.

UNICEF MONITORING IN ANGOLA

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, you state in your testimony that the Administration is concerned about the ability of UNICEF and others to monitor the delivery of relief supplies. Have you considered funding a staff person to work with UNICEF to improve monitoring capabilities? If you are unable to do this, have you considered providing additional funding to UNICEF so that they could hire the staff necessary for effective monitoring?

Answer: The primary constraint to better monitoring of

relief aid is the lack of access to rural areas because of security problems and travel restrictions. Staffing levels and budgetary constraints do not appear to be major problems. Nonetheless, we would consider funding a proposal by UNICEF to improve its monitoring capabilities.

ETHIOPIA - STATUS OF RELIEF PREPARATIONS

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, your testimony indicates that, with the major exception of the worsening security situation, the relief operation in Ethiopia is going well -- "ahead of the curve", you say. Are all of the critical food and non-food requirements of these seven million or so people at risk being met? Are you satisfied that sufficient transport capacity, medicine, water, shelter, tools and seeds are available and that these items will get to people before it is too late? What additional assistance is most critical?

Answer: Pledges sufficient to meet the estimated food needs for 1988 were made by the beginning of March; at about the same time the number of trucks available (with interim air support, new truck pledges, and repair efforts) gave us a reasonable hope of moving the food from the ports to the drought area. As long as drought victims stayed in place, water, medicine and shelter were never as critical as food and the means to move it. Our concern over getting relief to the needy in time now stems not from any lack of supply or transport, but first from the hazards imposed by the fighting which prevents us from moving what is available, and second from the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GPDRE's) expulsion of foreign relief workers from the northern provinces. We fear that over a million

and a half drought victims can no longer be reached by relief agencies. Many of these may be forced to leave their homes in order to survive; this will mean they cannot plant crops for the main harvest. This movement also may require the establishment of feeding camps for the displaced. Measures are being taken by the donor community to prepare for this eventuality, though the GPDRE apparently intends to forbid such camps.

ETHIOPIA - MOVING SOVIET GRAIN

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, should it be that circumstances require it, is A.I.D. prepared to help transport some of the Soviet grain donation to the interior of Ethiopia?

Answer: Transportation and distribution of the 250,000 MT pledged by the Russians have not yet been arranged. We believe this quantity of food exceeds the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission's ability to distribute commodities, and the PVOs we work with have neither plans to undertake an additional program of such size nor funds for the vehicles and personnel needed to carry it out. We are currently attempting to clarify the RRC's plans for distribution of the Soviet donation. The United States provides financial support for the movement of our food; other donors have done the same. We would encourage the Soviet Union to follow this example in programming its donation.

GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN RESPONSE TO THE EMERGENCY SITUATION

Mr. Leland: Mr. Gladson, in your testimony you say that U.S. Government assistance "will be an integral element of any long-term solution to Sudan's problems." In your opinion, are we fully employing the influence that statement implies to bring about a more responsible stance on the part of the Sudanese Government to address the emergency situation faced in the country? I see no evidence that the government is putting much priority on getting food to hungry people. What do we do about that?

Answer: The U.S. Government has exerted pressure through every possible means available to it, short of cutting off all economic assistance. Our overall economic assistance levels to Sudan have dropped significantly over the last three years, limiting our leverage. We have mobilized the donor community to speak with a united voice to the Prime Minister as well as at all levels of the Government of Sudan (GOS) in order to press for increased food movements to both the West and the South. The Prime Minister has been asked to facilitate the release of food, fuel and funds on a timely basis.

These efforts have had some positive results. For example, the GOS has taken on the task of carrying out the relief effort in the West with minimal outside support. Donor-generated local currencies are used to purchase domestic stocks and pay transportation costs. In addition, food stocks are being released from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) to the Regional Governors of Kordofan and Darfur for subsidized distribution.

Before the multi-donor effort described above got under way, the regional governments had already made several food distributions to the West on their own initiative. In collaboration with other

donors, we are monitoring this effort. The PVO community's help in assisting the GOS with logistics has also been enlisted.

With regard to the emergency situation in the South, the United States has had an active ongoing dialogue with all elements of Sudanese society regarding peace and relief. At every opportunity, with all interested parties, we raise the issue of moving food into the areas in need. Government policies are fully supportive of relief operations, senior officials recognize the need for improved performance and are committed to doing better. Most importantly, we are attempting to get agreement between the GOS and the SPLA to allow the ICRC to take the lead role in getting relief into the conflictive areas in the context of a food truce. This intervention has been integral to bringing what we are hopeful will be a success in reaching the hungry while the more difficult negotiations on a political solution are proceed.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROY STACY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AFRICAN BUREAU,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to meet with the Committee today to review some of the issues related to U.S. humanitarian assistance in Africa. The Sahelian drought of 1973-74, which reached across the whole northern tier of the continent, was the first major catastrophe; but it was followed by drought in southern Africa in 1975 and again in 1981-85, the terrible drought in Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Sahel in 1984-86, and now again severe problems in Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, and Angola. In addition, political instability and civil strife in the drought-stricken areas of these nations have compounded the effects of bad weather leading to even more serious famine and refugee conditions.

Against a very difficult backdrop of insecurity, relief operations must still be carried out. My colleague, Mr. Gladson, has addressed operational issues in his statement; I would like to concentrate on the political environment in each nation and how that shapes our response.

ANGOLA

Let me start first with Angola, which I know is of special concern to the Committee since its staff delegation recently returned from Luanda. The last time I sat before this Committee I expressed concern about our lack of information on the Angolan food situation. Since then we have become much more informed about the dimensions of the food crisis in Angola. This is in large part due to the concerted effort by our government, international relief organizations, other donor governments, and your own Committee Staff to respond to the estimates first presented in the UNEG's June 1987 report on the dire situation facing the people of that country.

Mr. Chairman, after the testimony of Administration witnesses at the last hearing there was some concern that we were using information gaps and the apparent indifference of the Angolan government to deny a real food emergency. It was alleged that the U.S. was willing to ignore the needs of hungry people in Angola because of concern with the nature of the

government there. Mr. Chairman, that is simply not true. We have applied the principle that "a hungry child knows no politics" in Ethiopia, and we are willing to apply the same principle in Angola.

As Mr. Gladson has already testified, we took the lead in the search for hard, field-verified data, which would enable the international community to confront the food crisis in Angola in the most efficient manner. We have been in close consultation with the UN, other donor governments, international relief organizations, and with your Committee as the multilateral effort to produce a serious assessment of the situation on the ground has evolved. We are continuing in those efforts.

We now have a draft of the Report of the United Nations November Inter-Agency Mission to Angola. Of greatest interest, and in sharp contrast to the ~~June 1987~~ report which spoke of the need for \$116 million in immediate emergency food requirements, the new document states the "food aid requirements (both cereal and supplementary) of Angola's displaced and affected population have been fully covered by donor contributions and pledges until the crop year 1987-88, i.e., March 1988". In other words, the immediate food situation is in hand, and a new crop will be harvested shortly. The international community will therefore have considerable lead-time to coordinate a full and effective response as the needs for the end of the calendar year become apparent. As significant, is a downwards estimate of the number of displaced people at risk in Angola, from 690,000 to about 640,000.

The situation in Angola of course remains serious. The

draft report and February 18 appeal by Secretary General Perez de Cueller, while disputing the need for additional food donations at this time, underscore the need to address bottlenecks in the distribution of the available food supply.

If that is the case, we are prepared to participate in the event that responsible PVOs can be found to make the deliveries independently, as has been our long-standing policy in other afflicted parts of the world.

In the meantime, and in spite of the budgetary constraints you are well aware of, we have continued to approve emergency food assistance for Angola in the form of donations to the UNICEF and ICRC programs in-country. The DCC has just approved a second FY 1988 tranche of 6,000 MT for delivery to UNICEF's operations.

No one, least of all those of us who have responsibility for emergency assistance programs around the world, wants to see food donations and the suffering of innocent populations held hostage to political differences between governments. That would just add to the misery of populations already afflicted

by the misguided policies and administrative incompetence of governments they are powerless to change. Our policies in Angola over the years have demonstrated our commitment to this principle, and, despite the absence of U.S. diplomatic ties with Angola, we will continue to make every effort to respond to the crisis.

I cannot close this review, however, without reminding the committee that the country we are speaking of in this instance is by one measure one of the richest in Africa. As its petroleum output continues to rise, and the prospects for its

foreign exchange earnings continue to improve, I cannot help but wonder why it cannot divert what would amount to as little as 3% of its \$2 billion in export earnings to meeting the food needs of its people. Instead it chooses to request assistance from the international community, secure in the knowledge that governments like ours will never allow children to starve if we can provide recourse. This is a sorry commentary on the MPLA's political priorities, and we would urge that it be encouraged to concentrate its efforts on helping, rather than hindering its country's development.

ETHIOPIA

Let me now turn to Ethiopia. Unfortunately, as a nation Ethiopia has become synonymous with famine and war, for these two horsemen of the apocalypse ride regularly through that stricken land. There have been no "normal" times in the northern highlands for a generation. Instead, there was always war and often a drought. When the rains failed unexpectedly in 1987, peasant farmers had few defenses. Neither the land nor the people nor the animals had recovered from the horrors of 1984-86. Meanwhile, war had intensified. Sons were conscripted into government or rebel militaries. Peasants were ordered about by whichever side controlled their areas. Some were "villagized," others forcibly resettled, others simply displaced or discouraged by war and predations of soldiers and civilian bureaucrats. As a consequence of war and inadequate agricultural incentives, economic activity declined.

Because of strife, roads were closed, markets diminished, distribution networks fizzled, and merchants quit. In short, there was no cushion of food reserves, and the badly stressed economic system could not cope. Under these circumstances, drought quickly transformed into famine.

Today, the overwhelming logistical task of moving hundreds of thousands of tons of food over primitive roads with inadequate numbers of trucks is further hampered by insecurity. Roads are mined, patrolled, and watched by both sides. Often the government closes sections for days at a time following attacks or reports of insurgent activity. Trucks have long been considered fair game by rebels, who have destroyed at least 99 since last August. For its part, government forces have always attacked trucks from the air spotted moving through rebel-held territory.

American policy is to seek the accommodation of all warring parties to the unimpeded movement of relief convoys. We support "open roads, own risks." We insist that the provision of food not be a political act, but a humanitarian one. And despite setbacks, we intend to press on to move food as expeditiously as opportunities permit.

We have underlined to the government of Ethiopia its responsibility to ensure that roads be opened and that convoys be permitted to move unimpeded and unescorted. We also seek longer hours for road operations, i.e., for traffic circulation, and a halt to intermixing military vehicles amongst relief trucks while traveling. To the extent possible, we ensure that donor-controlled convoys are clearly marked and stay together.

From the EPLF and TPLF, we seek renewed commitments to their respective policies that relief shipments not be targeted by their forces. Whenever such an action has occurred, we have immediately protested. We will continue to hold these organizations accountable. We respect the relief activities that the EPLF and the TPLF have organized through their

respective relief organizations, the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief Society for Tigray (REST), in territory they control. We would hope that such laudable activities not lose American public support due to intemperate military actions by their parent organizations.

Mr. Chairman, despite the rather formidable constraints set forth here, I must acknowledge that insecurity has not halted movement of relief food, although the tonnages are inadequate. Insecurity has made the task much more difficult and much more tenuous, but food still moves. We are dismayed with reports of extensive new fighting in the north. We appeal to parties to the conflict to desist from further militarization of roads and politicization of the famine precisely at the time when people are most vulnerable. We urge compassion that would permit starving people throughout northern Ethiopia to be fed.

Stepping back from the immediacy of the emergency, a hard look at the problem is instructive. Simply put, even in the best of times, Ethiopia cannot feed itself with its current policies. It simply does not yet have in place the sorts of agricultural policies that will permit a start down the long road to food self-sufficiency. A growing population, centuries of soil erosion, and poor farming practices, inadequate market mechanisms, a poor internal transportation system, misguided land tenure laws, artificially low and controlled farm prices, and lack of modern inputs, all covered with a veneer of Soviet-style collectivism have effectively conspired to degenerate Ethiopia's agricultural potential. Policy reforms are a large part of the answer, and encouraging indications have been made to our allies and the World Bank that new policies could be adopted. As actions speak louder than words, we will watch closely to see if concrete policy decisions are taken by the government.

Ethiopia should feed itself. That is an essential attribute of nationhood. Whereas drought cannot be prevented, with proper agricultural production, famine need not always result. Had Ethiopia been more resilient to drought, presumably some of the over \$2 billion in emergency aid which donors allocated since 1984 might have been spent for food production there or elsewhere in Africa. The U.S. Government alone spent over \$600 million for emergency aid to save lives, but without incentive farming policies such assistance does not result in recovery and provides little resistance to the next drought.

SUDAN

Even more than in Ethiopia, in neighboring Sudan, civil war is responsible for hunger. Sudan's internal strife was rekindled in 1983 with the formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army led by Colonel John Garang. This group opposed the policies of the Nimeiri regime, particularly the imposition of Islamic law (Sharia), as well as Nimeiri's repudiation of the 1972 Addis Accords, which resolved an earlier southern rebellion by granting special status to the south. During the years since 1983, with substantial assistance from Ethiopia, the SPLA developed into an effective guerrilla force that now operates throughout much of the three southern provinces. Although the SPLA's battlefield successes have been few, it has demonstrated an ability to keep government forces bottled up in garrisons and has regularly contested their ability to move freely in rural areas.

Resolution of the war is correctly a principal preoccupation of political authorities in Khartoum. Contact between the opposing forces takes place but has many currents,

cross-currents, and shoals upon which to founder. Even so, we judge that the process holds more promise now than at any other time in recent years. Khartoum has taken certain initiatives for peace talks and has shown itself conciliatory and flexible. Its new "charter" is a positive step, as are modifications to Sharia, both symbolic of renewed intent to convene constitutional discussions. But these new gestures have not yet generated any significant response by the SPLA.

The United States firmly and vigorously supports peace based on a political process resolving legitimate grievances. We see this essentially as an internal Sudanese process, but one that might be helped along at some point by outsiders who are friendly and supportive. We endorse the concept of free passage of food and a cease fire as a precursor to a more general settlement.

Unfortunately, absent a resolution of the political crisis, it is clear that relief for those hundreds of thousands of people displaced by war and stricken by famine will continue to be hampered by the political and military criteria of belligerents.

The SPLA adheres to a hard line. Unrepentant about its shooting down of three civilian aircraft, it also claims that movements of vehicles and barges are legitimate military targets. This policy was underlined only last week when SPLA forces claimed to have attacked the barge convoy carrying relief food up the Nile to Malakal and torn up train tracks south of Babanusa. The SPLA's stance has severely restricted the opportunities for food to move easily to those in need.

During 1986, donors realized that the combined impact of war and spotty rainfall was pushing people out of their homes towards the north, the principal garrison towns of the south,

or to refuge in Gambella Province, Ethiopia. As a consequence, regular donor-supported feeding programs based in Juba, Wau, and Malakal were strengthened. As road security conditions deteriorated, airlifts were organized and several deliveries made to various locations. However, with the downing of the Sudan Airways F-27 at Malakal in August 1986, the SPLA proved its threat to shoot down flights over southern territory. An intense UN/FAO effort to negotiate a food truce was rejected by the SPLA. Shortly thereafter, airlifts resumed anyway to Juba, the most secure airfield in the south.

By the beginning of 1987, in conjunction with government authorities, donors established a goal of sending 80,000 tons of food south. From the north, food was to be moved upriver on barges to Malakal, by rail to Aweil, by road to Raga, and on to Wau. Daily airlifts to Juba from Khartoum also continued. From Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire, overland convoys departed periodically to Juba and Wau. Military escorts were required for most movements south, at least for the last stages of the trip, and escorts were also required for convoys from Tambura to Wau. Additionally, the main road through northern Uganda to Juba was closed due to insecurity arising from the January 1986 ouster of the Okello government in Kampala. Only the less direct western roads, which also required smaller trucks, were open. Food has consequently moved through these various routes sporadically as circumstances permit. Generally deliveries were sufficient for Juba, from which CART (Combined Agencies Relief Team) operates the largest distribution network, but inadequate for Malakal and particularly for Wau, where hunger and violence have been most acute.

The United States has not been content with the pace of deliveries. Transport delays and bottlenecks have almost all

been security related. We have been in the forefront, seeking free movement of food, alternative routes, and more timely provision of military escorts for food destined for the provincial capitals. We have repeatedly protested delays and continually sought solutions. Not only have we worked through the donor coordination group with the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, but we also have stressed relief matters in virtually every official conversation we have had with Sudanese leaders, military or civilian, northern or southern, government or rebel, over the past year. There can be no doubt as to our concern.

We have found Sudanese authorities similarly frustrated with delays of relief shipments. They have assured us that an even greater effort will be made to secure timely movements. We do not doubt the sincerity of such sentiments, but we all are faced with the constant challenge of translating sentiment into action. Both political and military leaders have a number of priorities for the south, of which humanitarian relief is only one.

Yet we know our concerns have registered. Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi announced the formation of a "Mercy Committee" in November 1987 with a specific mandate of augmenting food flows to the south and even to devise a mechanism for the provision of assistance across military lines. Leaders of the Mercy Committee have met with SPLA representatives, but so far no agreement has been struck. Perhaps the most promising mechanism of this sort would be agreement permitting an impartial and reputable organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to undertake a widespread feeding program throughout the south.

We have occasional contact with representatives from the SPLA as well as its relief arm, the Sudanese Relief and

Recovery Association (SRRA), regarding needs in rebel-held territory. We note that some assistance is being provided by non-American PVOs which coordinate with the SRRA. However, as a practical matter, expansion of such efforts is predicated on agreement by the SPLA that humanitarian activities can proceed unimpeded.

Mr. Chairman, we believe our policy regarding relief operations is appropriate and, under the circumstances, as responsive as is possible. We will continue to move food into stricken areas whenever conditions permit. We continue to seek accommodation from both sides to permit food movements to occur without military impediments; but pending such agreement, we insist on more timely provision of escorts so that what is possible can be done. We support efforts to arrange a food truce or a mechanism that would enable assistance to reach people on both sides of the conflict. All this will help mitigate the calamity, but ultimately we judge that resolution of the food crisis in southern Sudan cannot be achieved without resolving the political crisis which has resulted in the civil war. We urge all concerned with this crisis to redouble efforts to promote a true and lasting peace.

MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Chairman, some of the most sobering pictures of suffering in Africa in recent months have come out of Mozambique. This reflects the accumulating pressures of years of conflict, compounded by episodes of drought, which have exhausted reserves of food, broken up communities, and, in the words of one knowledgeable observer, made Mozambique into "a country of nomads."

As I indicated before these committees last October, Mozambique is no stranger to food shortages, having suffered

severely from the drought which gripped southern Africa 1981-1985, and in the past from other natural disasters and from economic policies which discouraged food production and distribution. At present, however, the primary cause of food shortages in Mozambique is civil strife.

Conflict-caused food shortages in Mozambique are less easily understood than in the other countries we are discussing today, and still harder to overcome. There are no definite or even approximate battle lines in Mozambique. Nor are clashes between opposing forces and hit and run attacks confined to a few provinces or a single region but occur throughout the country. Roads that are safe one day may be attacked the next.

As a result, safe passage of clearly marked trucks transporting relief goods is often impossible. Unlike in Sudan and Ethiopia, no group has claimed responsibility for attacks on relief vehicles, and there is no foolproof means of positively identifying the political affiliation of attackers. All we have to go on is the testimony of those who have survived such attacks. In many cases, these witnesses have attributed the attacks to RENAMO. The private voluntary agency CARE tells us that 75 of its trucks have been destroyed or seriously damaged and 15 of its drivers or assistants have been killed in attacks by RENAMO over the past four years.

These factors make the usual means of arranging humanitarian relief deliveries in conflict areas--"food truces", "mercy corridors", or "open roads, own risk"--untenable in Mozambique. Because of this, the international community has relied heavily on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has been working in Mozambique for the past year. The most crucial part of its work has been airlifts of food and relief supplies to the areas most

difficult to reach because of the conflict; between June and December 1987 it reached up to 50,000 people in five of Mozambique's ten provinces. In late December, however, the ICRC was obliged to suspend its airlifts outside of provincial capitals because the security of ICRC aircraft could no longer be guaranteed due to threats from RENAMO. Since that time, ICRC has been working through its own channels on both sides of the conflict to obtain the assurances necessary to resume and expand its airlifts into areas which are currently inaccessible.

We strongly endorse the ICRC's efforts to get this vital program running again. The ICRC is uniquely placed to surmount the formidable combination of obstacles outlined above and arrange delivery of food, medicines, and other vitally needed supplies to Mozambicans who are now out of reach. That is why we and the rest of the international community have relied on the ICRC to deal with the most intractable aspects of the humanitarian crisis in Mozambique. We provided the ICRC a direct grant of \$1.2 million last year for its Mozambique program, as well as supporting a major portion of its overall budget for Africa. We plan to continue our support for the duration of the Mozambican food emergency.

We recognize that the current international effort to meet Mozambique's emergency needs is necessarily a stopgap measure. A long term solution requires economic rehabilitation and reform of the sort Mr. Gladson notes in his testimony, and more fundamentally, a political solution to end the violence. Last October, President Chissano told President Reagan that the Mozambican government wanted to explore all feasible means of bringing peace to Mozambique and was not committed to a purely military approach. President Reagan responded that we were prepared to be helpful in any way we could be. We look to the Mozambicans themselves to develop their own means of

communication, agenda, and ways of moving toward accommodation. We can best encourage this process by supporting quiet efforts to establish a peace process and by avoiding public posturing which locks the opposing sides into rigid positions.

None of the dimensions of Mozambique's food crisis will be resolved easily, or in all likelihood, quickly. But with perseverance, patience, and a firm commitment to a humanitarian mission, we can help ameliorate the present suffering and help turn the country toward recovery.

I would be pleased to respond to the Committee's questions.

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**15th McDOUGALL
MEMORIAL
LECTURE**

Jean Mayer

President, Tufts University, USA

**Rome
9 November 1987**

**Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations**

Mr Chairman,
Mr Director-General,
Honorable Ministers and Distinguished
Delegates,

It is a great honor to have been asked to present the McDougall Lecture. It is also, for me, a special pleasure, Frank McDougall was a friend and colleague of my father, André Mayer, in the years between the two world wars. Stanley Bruce was the High Commissioner for Australia in London, and McDougall was his economic advisor. McDougall knew of the nutrition surveys, linking minimum salary, employment, nutrition, and health, that had been led by my father in France, Lord Boyd-Orr in Scotland, and Hazel Stiebeling in the United States.

It was his account of these surveys that spurred Bruce's opposition to the restriction of food production at the height of the Great Depression. It was his acquaintance with my father and the other members of that small group of international economists, physiologists, and nutritionists that spurred Frank McDougall's lifelong commitment to feeding the world. In 1943, I was at the front in North Africa, then in Italy. But I knew later, from my father, of McDougall's memorandum proposing the formation of an international organization to implement President Roosevelt's pledge of Freedom from Want; of their approach to Eleanor Roosevelt, and through her, to the President; and of the Hot Springs Conference that was in a way the birth of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

It was with great pride that I joined FAO in its first years, and had a hand in the

promulgation of the first set of international calorie and protein requirements.

I have been proud to have the opportunity to meet, several times, with Frank McDougall. It seems appropriate to begin this lecture with his often-quoted statement, made in 1935 and still true: "it would argue a bankruptcy of statesmanship if it should prove impossible to bring together a great unsatisfied need for highly nutritious food and the immense potential production of modern agriculture."

To move on to the more recent past, specifically, thirteen years ago, I was traveling frequently to Rome as a member of the planning group for the 1974 World Food Conference. Many of you remember the Conference itself. Everyone here vividly remembers the cause. During the 1950s and 60s, world food production had been

outpacing world population growth. In 1972, the world suddenly reached a point of discontinuity in the history of the equation of food to population. For the first time in a long time, there were very poor harvests in four major growing areas: the Soviet Union, China, the Indian subcontinent, and the Sahel. Massive replacement grain sales in the United States (which, by the way, went unnoticed by American authorities until they were over) left the United States with no stock of emergency reserves. At the same time, the rise in oil prices in 1972 and again in 1973 left large areas of the developing world without agricultural fuel or fertilizers. All at once, the world grain reserve was reduced by 60 million tons. When the Conference convened in 1974, the world family was down to 20 days of food. There was essentially no food in many areas of the Indian subcontinent. There was food in the Sahel, but lack of organization and extreme difficulties in transportation prevented it getting to where it was needed.

Today, we are thirteen years from a new century. The total food situation has once again been reversed. In 1988, world stocks will equal about 23 percent of consumption. A recent article on economics in a Boston paper was headed, "The Food Glut is Worsening." In the American mid-west, silos are full. Grain is being stored in some schools. The Green Revolution (which first benefitted North America and Europe) has taken hold in Asia and in some parts of Latin America. We are at the point where India, China, Pakistan, and Mexico, among others, are giving technical assistance and sharing results of agricultural research with less agriculturally advanced nations.

There is enough food grown in the world today to feed adequately every person on earth, if the food were equitably distributed. (This, however, would condemn peasants in poor countries to eternal poverty). We could feed billions more if rich nations and the rich people in poor nations decreased their meat consumption. Probably

there would also be a decrease in deaths from cardiovascular disease. Yet we are no nearer the resolve of the World Food Conference, that by the mid-1980s no child should go to bed hungry. The percentage of hungry people is less than in 1974, but because the world population is growing, the absolute number is greater.

Sadly, "starvation" is very easy to identify. "Hunger" is a somewhat vaguer concept, and "malnutrition" an even less well-defined one. Looking at hunger, both the World Bank and FAO assume that sufficient energy implies sufficient protein (and perhaps enough of other nutrients). The World Bank uses 90 percent and 80 percent of country-specific FAO/WHO energy requirements. FAO uses the Basal Metabolic Rate - that is, the rate of a person's energy expenditure in the fasting and resting state - to estimate maintenance requirements. Estimating the number of people chronically deprived of the food necessary to lead and enjoy an active, healthy life, the World Bank arrives at

730 million. The FAO estimates 512 million. Using a stricter definition of hunger, FAO puts the number of people close to the survival line in 1985 at 348 million, up from 320 million in 1980 and from 316 million in 1970. Whatever estimate is used, the total is horrendous.

Between 1970 and 1980, 1.5 million people were added each year to the list of the hungry. Then, as the world economy faltered and inflation and debt increased in the developing countries, the figure rose to eight million a year. We must resort to statistics for analysis, planning, and remedial action. But we must also remember that the figure represents 40 million individuals, and that a disproportionate number are children. Furthermore, even when a food balance sheet looks adequate, acute malnutrition can occur in countries or in households, if the foods are divided inappropriately.

Malnutrition is the lack of sufficient amounts of one or more nutrients in the diet. It can occur even when calories and protein are adequate. Infants, young children, pregnant and nursing women are most at risk, because their needs are increased for a number of vitamins and minerals. For example, some 250 000 children go blind each year from xerophthalmia caused by vitamin A deficiency. This condition is easily reversed in the early stages by feeding vegetable foods high in beta-carotene, the precursor of vitamin A, or by giving vitamin A supplements twice a year at the cost of pennies per child.

Goiter and cretinism persist in a number of high-altitude areas far from the sea. Iodine deficiency has been identified as the major cause of both - in the case of cretinism, the deficiency predates pregnancy - and several hundred million people world-wide lack iodine to some degree. Again, at a negligible cost, iodine can be added to food (iodized salt, for example). Added to oil,

it can be injected or taken orally. It is cheaper to give orally, but even the injections, given every three to five years, cost just seven cents per person per year.

Iron deficiency afflicts women in the child-bearing years the world over. UNICEF estimates that about half of the women in developing countries have iron-deficiency anemia. It saps the energy of working women - and no one in developing countries works harder. It deprives a growing fetus of iron for the formation of red blood cells. In households where men and older boys are habitually given the best foods, particularly meats, which are rich in iron, the women and small children may suffer chronic anemia.

In areas where low-protein cereals are the staple foods, small children who cannot consume enough bulk may suffer from protein deficiency, even when calories are adequate. In areas where cassava or potatoes are the staple, protein will be grossly insufficient.

This is less likely to happen in areas where millet, rice, and particularly wheat are eaten, since these cereals are high in good-quality protein. Small children may have a problem eating enough rice. Older children will have no trouble. Nutrition should not be simply a set of corrective measures which are practiced in an episodic fashion after deficiencies are recognized. Nutrition should be the basis for planning agricultural production and food consumption and thus crucial to the laying down of long-term plans.

Some features of the food situation today are reminiscent of the 1930s. The world-wide economic collapse of the late 1920s had brought on the farm collapse of the early 1930s. Soup kitchens and a food surplus existed side-by-side in the United States. We can echo today Stanley Bruce's words at the 1933 World Monetary and Economic Conference: "If the best that can be done for a poverty-stricken world is to restrict

the production of food and other necessities of life, the.... political and economic system is leading to disaster."

There are, of course, major differences between the situation before the Second World War and the situation now. Today there is a surplus in almost every major growing area. In 1932, it may have made some sense to repeat, "the poor we have always with us." In 1987, by contrast, we have learned to multiply loaves and fishes so that all can eat and be filled. Barring massive changes in the climate, the food producing nations could keep the rest of the world on permanent food welfare. That is not the right solution. The world community has or is developing the knowledge in agriculture, food and nutrition, health, communications, transportation, and technology to permit all people everywhere, to feed themselves, provided that, in the near future, world population can be stabilized.

However, we also know we are dealing with something that did not have to concern Bruce, Frank McDougall and André Mayer: an extremely fragile environment that is being stressed in many ways, not the least being world-wide agricultural practices. Indeed, even at the time of the World Food Conference, the scientific community was hardly aware that earth's four great ecosystems, croplands, grasslands, forests and fisheries, had about reached or possibly had already exceeded their carrying capacity.

Again, at the time of the World Food Conference, a petroleum-powered Green Revolution was the only weapon we possessed to combat hunger. It has worked well for Europe, North America, and Asia, and to some extent for Latin America except where there are conditions of civil unrest or enormous social inequalities. But the Green Revolution, as it exists today, is energy, fertilizer and water-intensive (and capital-intensive, for small farmers). It cannot be pursued everywhere and indefinitely without

exhausting resources and further damaging the four ecosystems on which our food supply depends. The farming of the future - and the future is not too far away - must be less profligate.

In tropical areas, and particularly in Africa, agriculture has prospered far less than elsewhere. One essential reason is that research in the subsistence crops of tropical agriculture has only been intensively pursued in the last ten or fifteen years. The diversity of Africa's soils, terrains, and climates is matched by the diversity of its agricultural methods and societal organizations. Another reason, even more important, is that the agricultural revolution into which the rest of the world has moved presupposes a new social, economic, and physical infrastructure. It must be capable of supporting a market-oriented agriculture and a population able to purchase the foods that are produced. In short, the Green Revolution is a social revolution and a managerial revolution as much as a technological revolution.

(Even if, eventually, genetic engineering will progressively decrease the present large requirements of energy, water, and chemicals, the societal requirements will be the same). In addition to a large-scale market, farmers need roads and railroads to bring inputs to the farm and products to market. They will need trucks and small farm machinery - although it is crucial, in countries where the labor force is expanding rapidly, that agriculture not be mechanized too fast. Both the new seeds and nutrient-depleted soils require large amounts of fertilizer. High-yield needs require greater amounts of water, which means additional irrigation. More favorable conditions for growth mean more herbicides, insecticides and pesticides before harvest, and insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides, and storage facilities after. The best way to make more food rapidly available would be to devise storage to protect the 30 to 50 percent of crops that are destroyed before they can be moved to market. All this means a shift from a system of cash or barter to a

moneyed economy and the installation of local credit facilities. Small farmers will find it essential to form cooperatives in order to get better credit and buying conditions, and insure some specialization of labor. Of course, somebody must manage the cooperative.

Finally, food producers must have food consumers. Channels of distribution and means of transportation must be provided. Prices have to be high enough to encourage farmers to increase their output. Prices must be low enough so that the non-farming segment of the population, which will grow as farming becomes more productive, can purchase a nutritious diet. This means parallel development in other sectors of the economy. It makes sense to first create jobs by developing businesses that will help support and increase farm production, for example, manufacturers of small, simple farm machinery, fertilizer plants, small food-processing plants, and the like. Examples of successful development

can be found, compatible with a variety of sociopolitical ideologies, as long as conditions of education, credit availability and local control and local decision-making exist.

This, however, does not happen overnight. In Africa, to help prevent the recurrence of another disaster like the 1972-73 and 84-86 famines, it will be necessary to continue food relief to some countries. In some cases it may be as long as fifteen to twenty years. But this ought to be done very carefully. Food imports should not compete with local products and undermine the struggling farm industry.

Beyond all this is the absolutely crucial long-term support system. Agricultural research and development and a good network of extension services are vital for the evolution of a strong, diversified agriculture. Under "agricultural research and development" I would include veterinary research and services and a strong effort in

aquaculture. Thus far, aquaculture has not lived up to its potential. Africa, in particular, has very little tradition of fish farming, and could benefit greatly from the introduction of a plentiful source of high-quality animal protein. I would also like to see more intensive research on subsistence crops and on ground-cover crops for the Sahelian area. These crops would both fix the soil and serve as pasture for animals. Not enough research is being done on millet, corn, and the varieties of beans and rice that are appropriate for most parts of Africa. As rapidly as possible, we should try, through genetic engineering, to improve the protein content and quality of tuberous crops, especially cassava, and probably of plantain. Research in applied nutrition is urgently needed to develop highly nutritious diets based on native foods. It should be possible to use some dry skim milk. We now have a world surplus, and will probably have considerably more with the development of new hormone treatments of cows, which should double their milk production. Fortified milk

is an excellent source of protein and calcium, vitamins A and D, a number of the B vitamins, and zinc. If lactose intolerance can be circumvented, (and it is not a problem for small children) use of dry skim milk would result in much better diets for children.

Obviously, a literate population is essential. Most African nations emphasize primary education within the limits of their economic resources. In addition, farmers will need managerial and technical skills, and should understand the relationship of agricultural practices to environmental protection.

In some developing countries, women are responsible for 50 percent or more of the food production. It is absolutely essential to educate and involve them in every step of planning and decisions having to do with the food system. Women are also the custodians of their family's health, and there is an urgent need for nutrition education, most particularly for mothers of young

children. The high mortality rate of children under five could be lowered substantially if the cycle of malnutrition-infection-malnutrition could be broken by a good diet during these years of extremely rapid growth. As women understand nutrition better, they will improve the health of their own families, and thus the health of the nation.

Now let me say a word about the long term - the next twenty years or so. The present Green Revolution is still the only way to increase grain yields. At this point we are totally dependent on massive amounts of petroleum and water. Less water intensive methods of irrigation are being developed. However, the major key to eventual change is research in genetic engineering of food plants and animals (including aquatic animals) for tropical environments.

I do not need to point out to ministers of agriculture that genetic engineering is not the great danger to the environment envisioned by some groups of laymen. That is not

to say, however, that we should not take care with the development of projects in genetic engineering, or test the results thoroughly before disseminating them. But, used properly, genetic engineering is a powerful tool in enhancing food production and doing it in a way that also enhances nutrient quality, uses less of many inputs, and is ecologically beneficial. Tobacco and petunias have been described as the test organisms of agriculture as Escherichi coli, white mice, and fruitflies are the test organisms for medicine. In 1983, scientists succeeded in transforming these plants by transplanting useful genetic materials from one to another. Since then, various laboratories have transformed over a dozen vegetable and commercial crop plants. Plants have already been engineered to resist insect pests like caterpillars and beetles, to resist many viruses, or to live compatibly with a friendly herbicide.

Within the next seven years at the outside, genetic engineers will have tested and have ready for farmers major crops, such as

maize, soybeans, rice, wheat, oil-seed rape, sorghum, cotton and alfalfa that are resistant to fungi, pathogens, pests, and various stresses. Before too long thereafter, tropical crops like millet, cassava, yams and taro will also be ready. Experiments are underway to produce crops that grow hardier and give better yields with less fertilizer and no tilling, which can grow in saline or impoverished soils. The range of important food crops is being increased. Imagine the effects of an added range of 50 miles to the north for wheat in Canada or the Soviet Union. Similarly, imagine what a decrease in water requirements would do for millet in much of the South.

Foods are being designed with higher nutritional value and with better taste, foods that are easier to store, easier to process.

It is also very important that genetic engineering of plants can increase, rather than decrease, their diversity. Such crops

are less vulnerable than mono-cultures to disease and stress. These plants, in effect, are high-technology seeds which do not require high-technology farming.

Plants are not the only subjects of enlightened, humane genetic engineering. At some point in the foreseeable future, genetically-improved animals will be born, so to speak, already vaccinated. They will be resistant to various common infectious, viral, bacterial and parasitic diseases, such as hoof and mouth disease, trypanosomiasis, and intestinal nematode. Cattle and pigs will produce more protein and consume less feed. As plant yields increase, acreage needs decrease. With each acre that is unnecessary to increase production or to feed grazing cattle, the destruction of grasslands and tropical forests is slowed, helping to protect water reserves, prevent erosion, and preserve the germplasm that is the source of all genetic diversity.

Of course we cannot wait for the five to twenty years it will take to see the first of these crops planted on a large scale. This situation is urgent. Together, we must proceed with the Green Revolution, adapting the techniques whenever possible.

In Africa, per capita grain production peaked in 1967 just at subsistence level. That is, at 180 kilograms per person per year. During the 1960s, food production had been increasing 2.5 percent a year, barely exceeding population growth. In the 1970s, population growth rose from 2.4 to 2.8 percent a year. The rate of increase of food production declined precipitously, to 1.7 percent. While hunger declined in other areas, the numbers of undernourished in Africa rose steadily, from 92 million in 1969 to 110 million in 1980, to 140 million in 1985. Grain imports increased ninefold between 1972 and 1983. In 1984, food imports consumed about 20 percent of total export earnings. Debt service accounted for another 22 percent. If, as predicted, the population

rises by about 3.3 percent a year for the rest of the century, the growth rate of agricultural production will have to double merely to keep up. In his recent Arturo Tanco lecture, General Olusegun Obasanjo quoted a report of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture: "In Africa, almost every problem is more acute than elsewhere. Topsoils are more fragile and more subject to erosion and degradation. Irrigation covers a smaller fraction of the cultivated area, leaving agriculture exposed to the vicissitudes of an irregular rainfall pattern. The infrastructure, both physical and institutional, is weaker. The shortage of trained personnel is more serious. The flight from the land is more precipitate..." I might add that in normal times the flight from the land to the cities makes the nutritional state of the poor more precarious. Of course, this may not be so in the case of famines, although during the Nigerian civil war I saw as acute hunger in the countryside as in the cities. Chronic hunger and malnutrition are caused by a lack of access to food rather than by the absence of food.

The Fifth World Food Survey shows that hunger tends to be greater in unemployed urban poor than in rural poor. In rural areas, the exceptions are landless households, particularly those headed by women.

The installation of more productive, sustainable agriculture and of an economy that permits an adequate diet for every person, has been likened to the Marshall Plan. (The Marshall Plan, if you remember, revived the European agriculture and economy after World War II.) In reality, the project is far more complex and costly and will take far longer. It asks for contributions from each member of the world community, for every member has a particular capacity in one area or another.

For example, as we saw only too recently, the world does not yet have a fully effective early warning system for incipient famines. The pieces of such a system are beginning to fall into place. We need

monitoring of harvests and market prices; long- and short-term weather monitoring by satellites and airlines; ground reports of the health and nutritional status of vulnerable populations, most especially of young children. But the pieces are not yet well coordinated. There is no mechanism in place to insure a timely response, either by the world community or by national governments. The trigger, if you want, does not exist. There is no systematic maintenance of reserves, either outside potential famine areas so situated as to allow quick delivery, or inside vulnerable countries to provide stop-gap aid until outside help arrives. Elements of this warning system, when they are in place, can also provide data and analyses for long-term national and regional food and agricultural planning. To work, the system must have inputs from the local to the international level.

Another example of large-scale infrastructure needs is an effective road and transportation network for the

continent. Africa (and to a lesser extent, Latin America) does not yet have the system of transcontinental roads and railroads, North and South, and, particularly, East and West to permit easy movement of food during famines. Even with the difficulties of moving foods inland from the ports, importing food is usually easier than moving it overland from one area of the continent to another. Or, for that matter, sometimes of moving it from one region of a country to a food-short area. Planning for an adequate system of roads and rail has to be done by the region, the nation, perhaps even the localities involved. But the funding and technical assistance must come from individual industrial nations or from the international community. The same is true of planning for water resources.

In general, assistance on large-scale projects to create missing infrastructure will have to come from governments. Private enterprises must realize a fairly quick return on their investment; non-profit

private organizations do not have the financial resources. Companies can be part of the second phase of economic development, and of the research effort - for example, in genetic engineering. Contributions of the international agricultural research network, most especially of the thirteen CGIAR centers, are absolutely indispensable. It has been said that these centers, funded through the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, may well be a more significant contribution of the Green Revolution than the expanded harvests. Universities and other research organizations also have a significant role to play, both in research and in its application in the field. Universities are especially qualified to train agricultural research scientists, veterinarians and aquaculturists, teachers, technicians, extension workers, nutrition educators, and managers. In addition, the transfer of intermediate technologies under the Regional and South-South Cooperation effort is particularly useful.

The issue of population growth is usually seen as a matter for the people of each nation to decide, but the world community should stand ready to give whatever assistance is requested by national governments. It is obvious that even genetic engineering in agriculture cannot forever produce enough food if the world population expands indefinitely. There is no doubt that a rapid drop in the rate of population increase in many countries would help the population: food equation. But it is well to remember that North America and Western Europe, which had their population increase earlier than other parts of the world, also were the first areas to eliminate famine, except in wartime. It may well be that we will run out of housing, schools, health care, and recreation space, even breathable air, before we run out of food. Every person who is born deserves a chance at a good life, and a long one. The world can provide that, as well as an adequate diet, provided we stabilize the population or, better, reduce it through birth control.

All the forms of assistance, ranging from infrastructure to agriculture, to early industrialization, to birth control to health and to education can be given through bilateral agreements between rich or developed countries and poor countries. However there is a risk that such bilateral agreements may create situations of permanent dependence. Whenever possible, it seems more consistent with principles of universal fairness, maintenance of national self-respect, and (when the international organizations work well) with effectiveness, for aid to be provided through multilateral channels. In the opinion of many sympathetic observers, there has been a wide range of impartiality and effectiveness in the activities of multinational organizations. Some, like UNICEF, have justifiably received universal applause - including, for UNICEF, the Nobel Peace Prize. Everyone knows, at the other extreme, the tribulations of Unesco. The very creation of FAO as an international organization, was based on the fact that the problems both of agricultural surpluses and

of agricultural shortages transcend national boundaries. They are thus best dealt with in the framework of international action. From the point of view of practical work in the field, it also is to FAO's advantage that much of the experience gained in poor countries - tropical or arid - is transferable to other areas with similar geological and climatic conditions. Finally, the experience of several crises have shown that to be effective the defense of agricultural prices to producers has to rest on multilateral international agreements. Given a budget of sufficient size, and assured choices of its specialists based on competence and not on politics, FAO should be on its way to fulfilling the hope of its founders, and of an entire generation of us who, back from World War II, believed in world organizations.

There is, however, a condition that has to be underlined. I have spoken of FAO being given sufficient means. This will demand an international commitment to a common goal that has not been seen since World War II, a

commitment of intellectual, human, and economic resources to restoring the life of a continent. The intellectual and human resources are mobilizing. But the world's economic resources are being drained by a commitment to death. The arms race consumes close to 2 billion dollars a day in the United States and the Soviet Union. Our economies suffer, our domestic programs suffer, our people suffer: the United States' infant mortality rate stands eighteenth in the world. The Soviet Union's is forty-sixth. But the two largest powers are not alone in these warped priorities. The developed countries on average spend 5.4 percent of their GNP for military purposes, 0.3 percent for development assistance. The United States' yearly non-military aid for Africa amounts to five hours of the yearly arms budget.

In total, the world spends about one trillion dollars a year on "defense". Between 1975 and 1985, arms imports of the developing countries amounted to 40 percent of the

increase in their foreign debt. Since 1960, while their unemployment increased eight-fold, military expenditures increased six-fold in constant dollars. Throughout the world, in fact, since 1960, military expenditures, at over \$14 trillion, have more than absorbed the over-\$9 billion increase in GNP, in effect leaving a smaller civilian economy than existed in 1960. Yet military requirements do not foster a broad economic base. Military production is capital-intensive, creating fewer jobs than if an equivalent amount of money had been spent on schools, health programs, and the like in the private sector. Labor training in the military has limited use for civilian jobs in industrialized countries. It is almost totally useless for the domestic needs of developing nations. All this, while the International Labour Organization estimates the number of unemployed people in the world at present at 90 million. Another 300 million are underemployed. By the year 2000, 600 million new jobs will need to be created,

90 percent of them in developing countries, - just to absorb additions to the work force. Without looking at the worsening situation in the industrialized countries, in the developing world alone, one billion people - one in five - are estimated to live below the poverty line, 100 million have no shelter, one billion are inadequately housed. Four times as much is spent each year on armaments as on health care. The Food and Agriculture Organization recently destroyed a plague of locusts in Africa at the cost of less than one half hour of the world's military outlay. Africa, incidentally an essentially disarmed continent in 1960 is accumulating arms and armies at the cost of development.

Just twelve nations have or are thought to have the capacity to produce the nuclear weapons that could destroy all life. But every nation whose military imports consume a significant share of its GNP, or whose military exports make a substantial contribution to its trade balance, is contributing to the slow wasting of its people and the

slow devastation of its environment. We must find a way to break this mad cycle of expenditure. If nuclear arms can be abolished and conventional arms reduced and controlled, the funds and technologies can be redirected to peaceful and humane ends. The first priority should be food for the world.

